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Three Essays On Interfirm Interdependence And Firm Performance
Abstract
This dissertation explicitly examines the structure of interdependencies that firms are subjected to within
a platform-based ecosystem and its implications for firm performance. Two theoretical themes emerge
from this dissertation: (1) a firm’s interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem matters both for its
performance and the sustainability of its superior performance; and (2) a manager’s understanding of
these interdependencies can have significant implications on firm performance and the choice of
governance structures. The first essay explores how a firm’s innovation differs with respect to its
interdependence with various elements of the ecosystem and examines its implications on the
innovation’s commercialization success. The core set of data is based on all the apps that were launched
in the Apple iPhone ecosystem from 2008 to 2013. The results suggest that firms can enhance the value
of their innovation by drawing on the broader set of complementary technologies that are available in the
ecosystem. But, these complementarities also subject firms to an array of bottlenecks limiting their
innovation’s value creation. The second essay examines how ecosystem-level interdependencies affect
the extent to which firms can sustain their value creation in a platform-based ecosystem. The analysis is
based on a panel dataset of top-performing app developers in the iOS and Android ecosystems from
January 2012 to January 2014. The results suggest that a firm’s ability to sustain its superior
performance is facilitated by the technological interdependence faced by its innovation within an
ecosystem and the experience gained within the ecosystem, but hampered by technological transitions
initiated by the central firm. The third essay addresses the performance consequences of
misrepresentation of interdependence structures in the alliance context using an agent-based simulation.
The results suggest that the misrepresentation of interdependence structures plays an important role in
determining performance consequences of various governance modes to manage the alliance
relationship. Specifically, overrepresentation of interdependence structures requires fully integrated or
more hierarchical governance modes, whereas underrepresentation of interdependence structures
requires more decentralized governance modes. Collectively, these essays contribute to the literature on
ecosystems and alliances, shedding new light on the role of structure of interdependence ins shaping
firm’s performance.
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ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON INTERFIRM INTERDEPENDENCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Shiva Agarwal
Harbir Singh & Rahul Kapoor

This dissertation explicitly examines the structure of interdependencies that firms
are subjected to within a platform-based ecosystem and its implications for firm
performance. Two theoretical themes emerge from this dissertation: (1) a firm’s
interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem matters both for its performance and
the sustainability of its superior performance; and (2) a manager’s understanding of
these interdependencies can have significant implications on firm performance and the
choice of governance structures. The first essay explores how a firm’s innovation differs
with respect to its interdependence with various elements of the ecosystem and
examines its implications on the innovation’s commercialization success. The core set of
data is based on all the apps that were launched in the Apple iPhone ecosystem from
2008 to 2013. The results suggest that firms can enhance the value of their innovation
by drawing on the broader set of complementary technologies that are available in the
ecosystem. But, these complementarities also subject firms to an array of bottlenecks
limiting their innovation’s value creation. The second essay examines how ecosystemlevel interdependencies affect the extent to which firms can sustain their value creation
in a platform-based ecosystem. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of topperforming app developers in the iOS and Android ecosystems from January 2012 to
v

January 2014. The results suggest that a firm’s ability to sustain its superior performance
is facilitated by the technological interdependence faced by its innovation within an
ecosystem and the experience gained within the ecosystem, but hampered by
technological transitions initiated by the central firm. The third essay addresses the
performance consequences of misrepresentation of interdependence structures in the
alliance context using an agent-based simulation. The results suggest that the
misrepresentation of interdependence structures plays an important role in determining
performance consequences of various governance modes to manage the alliance
relationship. Specifically, overrepresentation of interdependence structures requires fully
integrated or more hierarchical governance modes, whereas underrepresentation of
interdependence structures requires more decentralized governance modes.
Collectively, these essays contribute to the literature on ecosystems and alliances,
shedding new light on the role of structure of interdependence ins shaping firm’s
performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The strategy literature has long explored how firms generate rents by
combining resources that lie outside their boundaries (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati
1998). The bulk of the attention has been on the bilateral nature of interdependence,
such as those between buyers and suppliers. However, in today’s world, with the rising
prominence of ecosystems often fueled by technology platforms, the nature of
interdependence between firms is becoming increasingly multilateral, involving a
network of suppliers and complementors (Teece 2007; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor
and Lee 2013; McIntyre and Srinivasan 2017). In this dissertation, I focus on this
emergent phenomenon of platform-based ecosystems and examine how the structure of
multilateral interdependencies shapes firms’ value creation. Scholars in economics and
strategy have studied platform-based ecosystems primarily through theories of direct
and indirect network effects, where the main line of inquiry has been to understand how
the platform firm orchestrates interactions between different players (e.g., Katz and
Shapiro, 1986; Schilling, 2000; Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong,
2006). While complementor firms are considered key enablers of value creation in these
ecosystems, their strategies and performance have been largely understudied (Kapoor,
2013; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). This dissertation focuses on complementor firms
participating in platform-based ecosystems and explores how the structure of
technological interdependencies with respect to platform and other elements in the
ecosystem impact their performance.
Two theoretical themes emerge from this dissertation: (1) a firm’s
interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem matters both for its performance and
1

the sustainability of its superior performance; and (2) a manager’s understanding of
these interdependencies can have significant implications on firm performance and the
choice of governance structures to manage these interdependencies. The dissertation
comprises three essays. The first essay focuses on complementors participating in
platform-based ecosystems via their innovations. It considers the structure of
complementors’ innovations with respect to the platform and other complements in the
ecosystem. It introduces the notion of connectedness to refer to the extent to which a
given innovation interacts with the platform (i.e., platform connectedness) and also with
the other complements in the ecosystem (i.e., complement connectedness). For
example, while all software applications (apps) launched by developers on the iPhone
platform interact with the iPhone’s core mobile computing module, there is considerable
variation in terms of whether they interact with the iPhone’s other components (e.g.,
camera,GPS, accelerometer), as well as with other complementary apps (e.g., Google
Maps, Dropbox, Facebook). The core set of data for this first essay is based on all the
apps that were launched in the Apple iPhone ecosystem from 2008 to 2013 within the
U.S. market. The results suggest that firms can enhance the value of their innovations
by drawing on the broader set of complementary technologies that are readily available
in the ecosystem. Still, these complementarities also subject firms to an array of
bottlenecks that limit their innovations’ value creation.
The second essay examines how ecosystem-level interdependencies affect the
extent to which complementor firms can sustain their performance in a platform-based
ecosystem. In this chapter, I offer a novel perspective on firms’ ecosystem-level
interdependencies that is rooted in the structural and evolutionary features of the
ecosystem. The structural feature is based on the technological interdependence
between firms’ products and other components of the ecosystem. I incorporate the
2

evolutionary feature by taking into account the technological transitions initiated by the
central firm that governs the ecosystem and the experience gained by complementors
within an ecosystem over time. The analysis is based on a unique monthly panel dataset
of top-performing app developers in the iOS and Android ecosystems from January 2012
to January 2014. The results suggest that a firm’s ability to sustain its superior
performance is facilitated by the technological interdependence faced by its innovation
within an ecosystem and its experience gained within the ecosystem, but hampered by
technological transitions initiated by the central firm.
The third essay takes a more behavioral perspective and examines the
implications of an incorrect understanding of interdependence structures. Specifically, it
uses an agent-based simulation model to gain insights into the behavioral biases that
may exist when interdependent firms form strategic alliances. The model simulates
managers’ understanding of underlying task interdependencies within an alliance under
different levels of complexity and governance modes. The findings suggest that the
misrepresentation of interdependence structures plays an important role in determining
performance consequences of various governance modes to manage the alliance
relationship. Specifically, I find that overrepresentation of the interdependence structures
requires fully integrated or more hierarchical governance modes, whereas
underrepresentation of the interdependence structures requires more decentralized
governance modes. Additionally, I find that the complementary effect of both types of
misrepresentation and governance modes on exploration and coordination can explain
the performance differences of various governance modes.

3

2. TWO FACES OF VALUE CREATION IN BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS:
LEVERAGING COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MANAGING
INTERDEPENDENCIES
INTRODUCTION
There is increasing recognition among strategy scholars and practitioners that
firms are dependent on their ecosystems for creating value from their innovations (Iansiti
and Levien, 2004; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, Kelly, 2015). In many cases, the basis of
value creation in ecosystems involves a platform that serves as a foundation upon which
other firms can build complementary products or services (i.e., complements). Scholars
have explored this phenomenon primarily from a perspective of a platform firm,
emphasizing how platform-based architectures encourage innovations by complementor
firms and enhance the overall value proposition of the platform (e.g., Baldwin and Clark,
2000; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Evans et al., 2008). While having a large number of
complementors innovating around a platform is uniformly acknowledged as an important
driver of the platform’s success, the implications for complementors themselves
participating in these ecosystems with their innovations remain less clear. There are
often significant differences in the extent to which a given innovation is commercially
successful in an ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010), and yet, what makes a
complementor’s innovation successful in a platform-based ecosystem is not well
understood.
In this study, we start with the premise that a given innovation does not stand
alone. Rather it is connected with other elements in the ecosystem that impacts its value
creation (Rosenberg, 1982; Hughes, 1983; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 2016). We draw on
this premise and take the perspective of a complementor firm innovating around a
platform to explain the commercial success of its innovation. To do so, we introduce the
notion of connectedness to refer to the extent to which a given innovation interacts with
4

the platform (i.e., platform connectedness) and also with the other complements in the
ecosystem (i.e., complement connectedness). For example, while all software
application (apps) launched by developers on the iPhone platform interact with iPhone’s
core mobile computing module, there is considerable variation in terms of whether they
interact with iPhone’s other components (e.g., camera, GPS, accelerometer), as well as
with other complementary apps (e.g., Google Maps, Dropbox, Facebook).
On the one hand, higher connectedness may allow the innovation to leverage a
broader set of complementarities in the ecosystem. Firms will be able to enhance the
value of their innovations by drawing on complementary technologies that are readily
available in the ecosystem (Teece, 2006; Kapoor and Furr, 2015). On the other hand, it
may subject the innovation to an array of interdependencies that may limits its value
creation. An innovation that is interdependent on other complementary technologies
may not achieve its desired functionality either because of the challenges in managing
the interdependencies (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), or
because of being subject to the bottlenecks that may arise with respect to other
complementary technologies in the ecosystem (Ethiraj, 2007; Adner and Kapoor, 2010;
2016). In the context of platform-based ecosystems, these challenges are especially
salient when there is a change in the platform architecture triggered by platform firms
through the introduction of a new platform generation.
We explore our arguments in the context of Apple’s iPhone ecosystem between
2008 and 2013 within the U.S. market. This context provides a relevant and important
opportunity to study the commercialization success of complementors’ innovations in a
platform-based ecosystem. The focal firms are app developers launching their apps for
the iPhone. The iPhone ecosystem represents one of the largest and most valuable
business ecosystems with the App Store revenue estimated to be more than $10B in
2016. Hundreds of thousands of app developers participate in this ecosystem by
5

frequently launching new apps. Moreover, apps launched by developers vary in terms of
leveraging both the iPhone components and other complementary apps, providing us
with significant variance to test our predictions with respect to platform and complement
connectedness. Finally, we are able to exploit yearly changes in the iPhone platform
through Apple’s introduction of new platform generations to consider the
commercialization challenges that app developers may face with the new generation of
the platform.
The analysis is performed on a newly assembled dataset of 249,305 iPhone
apps launched by 20,391 developers with detailed information on the focal app and the
app developer, along with novel measures for each of the app’s platform and
complement connectedness. An app’s successful commercialization is measured based
on the likelihood of it being listed in the Top 500 list by revenue (e.g., Kapoor and
Agarwal, 2017; Davis et al., 2016). The Top 500 list is an important indicator of an app’s
successful commercialization as apps that make it into this list represent approximately
95 percent of the total revenue generated by apps in the iPhone ecosystem
(SensorTower, 2016). Such a list is also keenly followed by industry observers and
analysts as a reference for successful apps. We find that higher platform connectedness
and higher complement connectedness is associated with a higher likelihood of app’s
successful commercialization. However, the benefit of platform connectedness is
negated during the initial period of the new iPhone generation. In contrast, the benefit of
complement connectedness with respect to iPhone’s generational evolution is much
more nuanced. The benefit is strengthened when Apple introduces the new platform
generation and if the complements that the focal app is connected to have low platform
connectedness whereas it is weakened when Apple introduces the new platform
generation and if the connected complements themselves have high platform
connectedness.
6

These findings highlight the two facets of value creation in ecosystems, and the
implications for complementor firms innovating around a platform. Firms in platformbased ecosystems can enhance the value of their innovations by leveraging a broad
array of platform components and other complements. However, this interconnected
architecture of value creation can subject the firm to challenges with respect to
managing the technological interdependencies especially when there is a new platform
generation. Further, the distinction between platform connectedness and complement
connectedness helps in explaining the puzzling difference within innovations with high
complement connectedness. Our results suggest that the technological
interdependencies due to complement connectedness have a negative impact on the
innovation’s commercialization only when the connected complements themselves have
high platform connectedness. In contrast, when the connected complements have low
platform connectedness, the new platform generation actually facilitates the innovation’s
commercialization. In so doing, the study contributes to the emerging literatures on
ecosystems and platforms, examining both the opportunities and the challenges faced
by complementors in creating value from their innovations (e.g., Boudreau, 2010;
Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Kapoor, 2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Altman, 2016; Cennamo,
Gu, and Zhu, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 2016; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). More broadly, the
study contributes to the complementary assets framework (Teece, 1986) that has been
instrumental in explaining innovators’ commercialization outcomes. As Teece (2006)
points out in his reflection of the original article, the extant literature has been somewhat
limited in its examination of complementarities, confining them to enterprise-level value
chains (i.e., manufacturing, sales, marketing, and distribution), and not considering
complementarities within the broader ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2016;
Kapoor and Furr, 2015). Our findings offer compelling evidence of how such
complementarities impact the innovation’s commercial success. Moreover, while the
7

extant literature has emphasized the usefulness of specialized complementary assets for
innovators to benefit from their innovations, we show that in the context of platformbased ecosystems, even generic complementary assets (i.e., platform, complements)
can influence innovators’ value creation and appropriation.

INNOVATION IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS
A platform-based ecosystem encompasses a central platform firm and a network
of complementor firms who build products around the platform. A platform represents an
underlying technical architecture that acts as a foundation upon which other firms can
develop their products, and offer them to the users.1 Gawer (2014) highlights two
distinct approaches to studying platforms in the extant literature. One approach
focusses on platforms as creating value through network effects or multisided markets
(e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Schilling, 2002; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rochet and
Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). The other approach focusses on platforms as technical
architectures that facilitate innovation by complementors within the ecosystem (Gawer
and Cusumano, 2002; Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Boudreau, 2010). Scholars from
both streams of research have considered the focal platform or the focal platform firm as
the primary object of attention. While these scholars have also acknowledged the role of
complementors and their innovation in driving platform’s success, there has been in
general a lack of emphasis in examining the outcomes of complementors and their
innovations. There are often significant differences in the extent to which a given
innovation is commercially successful in an ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010), and
yet, what makes a complementor’s innovation successful in a platform-based ecosystem
is not well understood.
1

In this paper, the focus is primarily on platforms that provide a foundation upon which other firms
develop complementary products (e.g., platforms focusing on enterprise software, genomics, smart homes,
internet of things), and not on platforms that purely facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers (e.g.,
eBay. Amazon).
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An emerging stream of work has started paying attention to complementors,
which are critical to value creation within the platform-based ecosystem (e.g., Kapoor,
2013; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Boudreau, 2010, 2012; Altman 2016; Cennamo, Gu,
and Zhu, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 2016). While scholars have started shedding some light on
the complementors’ strategies and performance, they have largely been agnostic to the
technological interactions that exist between a complementors’ innovation and other
elements of the ecosystem. In this study, we focus on complementors’ innovation and
the vast array of its technological interactions within the ecosystem. For example, an app
in the iPhone ecosystem can interact with multiple components from the iPhone (e.g.
camera, GPS, accelerometer) as well as with other apps from the ecosystem (e.g.
Google maps, Facebook, Dropbox). We use the notion of connectedness to refer to
these technological interactions of a complementor’s innovation with the platform (i.e.,
platform connectedness) and other complements (i.e., complement connectedness). We
explore how an innovation’s platform connectedness and its complement connectedness
shape its commercialization success within the ecosystem.
For the platform connectedness, we consider the level of hierarchy within the
platform architecture. In addition to being a modular system, a platform is also a
hierarchical system and can be decomposed into core and optional components. There
are some components in the platform that represent the core architecture of the
platform, and all the complements participating in the ecosystem leverage these core
components. In other words, firms develop their products using the core components of
the platform. The rest of the components are optional, and complements may (or may
not) leverage them. For example, in the video game ecosystem, the console consists of
the central processing unit (CPU), the graphics processing unit, the memory controller,
and the video decoder. These are the core components of the console that enable
games developed by third-party developers to be played on the console. In addition to
9

the core components, the console also provides access to a number of optional
components (such as motion detectors, camera, and Bluetooth) that game developers
can leverage to enhance features of their games. The game developers use the core
components, and may also use some of the optional components, to develop different
games for the console users. Such an architectural hierarchy that involves core and
optional platform components exists in many settings such as in the cases of computing
hardware, enterprise software, genomics technologies and mobile payments. We
consider this characterization of the platform to understand variation in ways a
complementor’s innovation can be connected with the platform.
In addition to platform connectedness, we also examine the role of complement
connectedness in impacting an innovation’s commercial success. The extant literature
has considered the interaction between the platform and the complements primarily
through the theoretical lens of indirect network effects (e.g., Schilling, 2002; Zhu and
Iansiti, 2012). However, complements in an ecosystem can be connected not only with
the platform but also with the other complements in the ecosystem. For example, the
Uber app in the smartphone ecosystem is connected with Google Maps for its navigation
purposes. Figure 2.1 illustrates the two types of connectedness that we consider in this
study using a simplified schema. We now explore how the nature of connectedness for
the focal innovation within the ecosystem may affect its commercialization success.
----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.1 about here
----------------------------------------Platform Connectedness
We consider an innovation as having high platform connectedness if it leverages
the optional components of the platform in addition to the core module of the platform.
For example, in the iPhone ecosystem, the ‘QR reader’ app that allows scanning of QR
codes, barcodes, and documents through the app has high connectedness with the
10

iPhone platform as it leverages the core mobile computing module as well as the
camera, one of the optional components provided by the smartphone. The optional
components provided by the platform represent a set of complementary technologies
that firms can combine with their focal innovation, and achieve superior functionality
without having to invest in those technologies internally. Moreover, users are generally
familiar with platform components, and hence, may not face adoption challenges for
innovations high platform connectedness. Finally, access to these components can also
facilitate experimentation by providing the innovating firm with new options with respect
to the functionality at little or no cost. Hence, we expect that innovations with greater
platform connectedness will be more likely to achieve successful commercialization:
H1 - The greater is the innovation’s platform connectedness, the higher will be the
likelihood of its successful commercialization.
Complement Connectedness
We consider an innovation as having high complement connectedness if it
interacts with other complements in the ecosystem. For example, in the iPhone
ecosystem, the “National Park” app, provided by National Geographic Society, has high
complement connectedness, as it leverages the Google Map app to provide navigation
facility to its users. Prior work in strategy has considered how complements enhance the
value of the platform for the user through indirect network effects (e.g., Schilling, 2002;
Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). We argue that such network externalities can not only exist
between a platform and complements, but can also exist between complements.
The focal innovation that is connected to other complements in the ecosystem
might be more valuable as users can derive additional benefits from combining the
functionalities of the complements with the focal innovation. Such connections can also
provide the focal innovation with access to the installed bases of the connected
complements. Further, having access to the specialized technologies provided by
11

external complements can increase the combinatorial set for experimentation and
learning for the focal innovation and thus, can facilitate commercialization. Finally,
developing the complementary technologies on one’s own can be costly and uncertain.
By leveraging the readily available complementary technologies provided by other firms,
firms can also avoid commercialization setbacks that can be associated with the launch
of new innovations within an ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Furr,
2015). Accordingly, we suggest that:
H2 - The greater is the innovation’s complement connectedness, the higher will be
the likelihood of its successful commercialization.

Effect of platform evolution (generational change)
We now consider how the effect of platform and complement connectedness on
an innovation’s commercialization success might be impacted by the introduction of the
new generation of the platform. Transitioning to a new platform generation is an
important mode by which platform firms compete and create value over time. New
platform generations typically offer improvements in existing functionality as well as add
new functionality. In so doing, they alter the interfaces through which the complements
interact with the platform (Venkatraman and Lee, 2004; Ansari and Garud, 2009; Adner
and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Hence, a new platform generation may
represent the instance of an architectural change as discussed by Henderson and Clark
(1990) but at the level of the ecosystem, where the core design concepts and the
associated knowledge are not overturned but there is a change in the nature of the
interactions between the platform and the complements. This, in turn, might affect the
commercialization success of innovations that are technologically connected with the
platform for their functioning.

12

The connectedness between an innovation and a platform creates
interdependence that needs to be managed proactively. Traditional coordination
mechanisms such as hierarchy and ongoing communications associated with firms are
typically absent in platform-based ecosystems. The platform firm often relies on the core
technical architecture to frame interactions and to coordinate activities among
complementors (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). This is achieved through the design of
the platform interfaces that provide complementors with access to the platform’s core
and optional components. The platform firm coordinates activities within the ecosystem
by managing these interfaces so as to ensure coherent working of the ecosystem. As
firms build their innovations using the components provided by the platform, they
repeatedly interact with the platform through these interfaces. To maximize value
creation, they design their innovation specific to the interfaces provided by the platform.
They develop skills and processes specific to the interfaces provided by the platform.
This designing of the innovation and routinization of processes specific to the interfaces
and the platform context can also be referred to as ‘structural embeddedness’ of firms in
the platform (Karim, 2012).
When an innovation has a high level of connectedness with the platform, its
commercialization may be hampered by the newness of the platform generation. Users
may face challenges as they adopt the focal innovation during a period when there is
significant uncertainty regarding the overall architecture of the platform. From the
perspective of the innovating firm, while higher platform connectedness allows for the
leveraging of additional functionality accorded by the platform firm, it also imposes
greater technological interdependencies that have to be carefully managed during a
period of generational transition within a platform (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Such
additional challenges faced by the users and innovators during a period of generational
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transition may limit the commercialization success of those innovations with high
platform connectedness. Hence, we hypothesize the following:
H3 - The effect of platform connectedness on the innovation’s commercialization
success will be moderated by platform’s generational evolution such that the
effect will be less positive when the platform generation is new than when it is
mature.

The new generation of the platform not only affects innovations that have high
connectedness with the platform, but it can also affect innovations that are connected
with other complements in the ecosystem. On the one hand, the interdependent
complements enhance the value of the focal innovation; on the other hand, they can also
act as bottlenecks constraining its successful commercialization especially during
technology transitions (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 2016). For example, Gawer and
Henderson (2007) show that the performance of Intel’s microprocessor was constrained
by the bottleneck in the peripheral complements that supplied data to the
microprocessor. Similarly, in the semiconductor lithography equipment industry, the
commercialization success of innovations was negatively impacted by the technological
bottlenecks in the mask and the resist complements (Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Such
constraints that limit the commercialization success of an innovation are likely to be most
prominent in a platform-based ecosystem when a new generation of platform is
introduced.
In addition, it is likely that as the connected complements evolve in the face of
platform transitions, so will the technological interfaces between the focal innovation and
those complements. Thus, the focal innovation needs to adapt not only to the changes
made in the new generation of the platform but also to the changes that the connected
complement makes in response to the new platform generation. Such additional
challenges faced by the complementors during a period of generational transition may
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limit the commercialization success of those innovations with high complement
connectedness. Hence, we hypothesize the following:
H4 - The effect of complement connectedness on the innovation’s
commercialization success will be moderated by platform’s generational evolution
such that the effect will be less positive when the platform generation is new than
when it is mature.

METHOD
The empirical setting for the study is Apple’s iPhone ecosystem, and the focal
complementor firms are application software (app) developers who participated in the
ecosystem from 2008 to 2015 by developing apps for the iPhone within the U.S. market.
Apple launched its first generation of iPhone in January 2007, and it developed its own
apps for this generation. However, in March 2008, Apple released the first software
development kit that allowed external software developers to build apps for the iPhone,
and started offering apps from these developers through its App Store in July 2008.
Since this shift towards a platform-based strategy, the number of application developers
building apps and the number of apps for the iPhone has grown exponentially, and this
has been a key enabler of iPhone’s success over the past decade. As of June 2015,
there were more than 1.5 million apps offered in the App Store, and more than 100
billion copies of apps downloaded by iPhone users.
The setting provides an important and relevant context to study how the
commercialization success of complementor’s product innovations is shaped by the
structure of technological interactions within the ecosystem. The iPhone ecosystem
represents one of the largest and most valuable business ecosystems with App Store
revenue estimated to be more than $10B in 2016. Hundreds of thousands of app
developers participate in this ecosystem by frequently launching new apps. Moreover,
apps launched by developers vary in terms of leveraging both the optional components
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(e.g., camera, GPS, accelerometer) from the iPhone platform, and the other
complementary apps (e.g., Google Maps, Dropbox, Facebook) offered by developers in
the iPhone ecosystem. Finally, between 2008 and 2015, there were six generational
transitions within the iPhone platform when Apple launched new versions of the
smartphone operating system and the handset, allowing us to observe the impact of
platform’s generational evolution on the commercialization success of apps across
multiple generations.

Data
The dataset comprises of all the apps that were introduced by developers for the
iPhone between July 2008 and March 2013. The primary sources of data are App Annie
(www.appannie.com), iTunes (www.apple.com/itunes/), and AppShopper
(www.appshopper.com). App Annie and AppShopper are the leading data aggregating
and archiving sources for information on apps in the iPhone ecosystem. Since 2008,
they have been independently archiving information on the apps launched in the iPhone
ecosystem. We first collected information for the apps that were launched until March
2013. Using two different sources helped us to minimize missing data, and we were able
to identify 796,876 unique apps. For each of these apps, we collected information on
launch date, app description, download price, average consumer rating, content rating,
app size, language, in-app purchases and category. We supplemented this with
additional information from iTunes on platform components leveraged by the focal app,
and all of the version updates up to December 2015.
In the analysis, we only consider those apps whose primary source of revenue is
from the App Store through either paid downloads or in-app purchases. We did that for
two reasons. First, firms from many industries such as retail and financial services offer
iPhone apps as an additional channel to support their existing business. Hence, the app
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on its own is not their focal product innovation. Second, many firms also offer apps for
free and rely on ad-based revenue model. In such cases, apps are the main source of
ad-based revenue, but these revenues are not captured by the App Store and, hence,
do not allow us to draw inferences with respect to their commercialization success. This
reduced the total number of apps to 421,021 apps. In parallel, we gathered information
about the Top 500 iPhone apps based on downloads and revenues. Apple provides daily
lists of the Top 500 apps based on the number of downloads and the total app revenue.
App Annie has archived this daily ranking information from Apple, and we were able to
access this information from February 2010 to December 2015. To avoid any left
censoring in the data, we excluded 127,703 iPhone apps that were introduced before
February 2010. Finally, we induce the extent of complement connectedness from the
detailed app description and using a keyword-based approach. This approach made it
difficult to include apps offered in other languages, and hence, these apps were
excluded from the analysis. We also excluded books, news, and reference apps, whose
description typically include portions of the actual content which made the keywordbased approach to identifying complement connectedness less effective. The final
dataset comprised of a total of 249,305 apps launched by 20,391 firms. Because of the
hypercompetitive nature of this setting, we test our predictions using monthly
observations for each of the apps.

Measures
Dependent variable: We measure successful commercialization of an innovation
by examining whether the focal app made it to the Top 500 apps list by revenue (e.g.,
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Davis et al., 2016). The revenue distribution for smartphone
apps is heavily skewed. According to Sensor Tower, a leading vendor for App Store
marketing and sales tracking software, the top 1 percent of the app developers in the
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iPhone ecosystem represent approximately 94 percent of total ecosystem-level revenue
(SensorTower, 2016). Therefore, having an app in the Top 500 list offers clear evidence
of successful commercialization among hundreds of thousands of apps. Such a list is
also keenly followed by industry observers and analysts as a reference for successful
apps.
Platform connectedness: The iPhone platform comprises of a core mobile
computing module that all app developers have to leverage for their apps to function on
the iPhone. In addition, app developers can leverage a number of iPhone components
such as Bluetooth, camera, GPS, gyroscope, location services, video camera, and Wi-Fi
for their apps. The greater is the number of iPhone components that an app is
leveraging, the higher will be its platform connectedness. Hence, we measured platform
connectedness based on the number of non-core components offered by the platform
that the focal app leveraged. While about 50 percent of apps leveraged only the core
module of the iPhone platform, 30 percent of apps leveraged one optional component,
and 20 percent of apps leveraged more than one optional components.
Complement connectedness: In addition to connectedness with the platform, a
focal app can also be connected with apps offered by other firms in the ecosystem. For
example, many apps in the iPhone ecosystem leverage Google’s map app for its
navigation functionality via the application programming interfaces (APIs). Similarly, a
large number of apps leverage Facebook’s apps such as Facebook and Instagram for
the social networking functionality. The information on the apps that a focal app
leverages is prominently disclosed in the description of the app. We searched the
description of all apps for the mentions of these other apps. For example, one of the
apps, ReaddleDocs, describes its connectedness with other apps such as MobileMe
iDisk, Dropbox, and Google Docs in its description:
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“…readdleDocs is all-in-one document reader for iPhone and iPod
touch...readdleDocs allows you to download and upload files from MobileMe iDisk,
Dropbox, Google Docs, and other services....”

Similarly another app, Matg, discusses how it leverages Google Maps:
“….designed for sales, marketing or finance executives, this app allows you to access
customers, sales order transactions, accounts receivable statements, item master, and
item warehouse information...tight integration with other iPhone features, such as e-mail
and Google Maps, will provide you with the ability to communicate effectively with your
corporate office about any of your accounts….”
The greater is the number of other complementary apps that the focal app is
leveraging, the higher will be its complement connectedness in the ecosystem. Hence,
the variable complement connectedness measures the number of other apps that the
focal app is connected to in the iPhone ecosystem. While about 13 percent of apps
leveraged one complement, about 9 percent of apps leveraged more than one
complement. In some cases, apps would increase their complement connectedness as
part of their “version update” which includes new features. Hence, in addition to
searching through the product description, we also searched through the version update
history to identify changes in an app’s complement connectedness. As a robustness
check, we excluded these apps from the analysis, and found very similar results.
Table 2.1 summarizes the number of apps based on their platform and
complement connectedness for all apps in the dataset and for only those apps that
made it into the Top 500 list by revenue. Apps that leverage at least one optional
component of the iPhone platform are categorized as having high platform
connectedness, and low otherwise. Similarly, apps that leverage at least one other
complementary app are categorized as having high complement connectedness. Of all
the apps in the dataset, 49.3 percent had high platform connectedness whereas of all
the Top 500 apps, 64.4 percent had high platform connectedness. This pattern is
consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 1. Similarly, 21.9 percent of apps in the
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dataset had high complement connectedness whereas of all the top 500 apps, 41.2
percent had high complement connectedness. This pattern is also consistent with the
prediction in Hypothesis 2.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.1 about here
-----------------------------------------

Generational Newness: Between 2008 and 2015, the iPhone platform underwent
six episodes of generational transitions. These transitions included both changes in the
operating system (iOS) and in the handset. More than 90% of iPhone users have been
shown to migrate to the new operating system within the first month whereas the
migration to the new handset is much more gradual. From a perspective of an app
developer, the changes in iOS are a major consideration as it impacts almost the entire
iPhone user base. In order to consider the impact of iPhone platform’s generational
evolution on the successful commercialization of the focal app, we used the variable
generational newness which is calculated based on the number of months between the
observation month and the month in which the latest generation of the iPhone platform
was launched. We multiplied this measure by -1 for ease of interpretation with respect to
the hypotheses. Hence, higher values correspond to an early period of a new platform
generation.
In order to explore the challenges faced by app developers and users during the
early period of a new platform generation, we used Google search data reported in
Google Trends (www.google.com/trends). Figure 2.2 shows the graphical plot for
normalized monthly trend of U.S. search volume for the search term “iOS app not
working” from January 2010 to December 2015. As shown in the figure, there are
significant spikes in search volume during the months when the new platform generation
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is launched, suggesting that iPhone users and app developers faced major challenges
with their apps during this period.
----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.2 about here
-----------------------------------------

Control variables: We control for a number of firm-level and app-level effects that
can influence the likelihood of successful commercialization for the firm’s app. First, we
control for firms’ experience in the ecosystem using the variable firm experience, which
is the total number of months that a firm has been participating in the ecosystem. To
obtain this measure, we first identified the month in which the firm introduced its first app
in the ecosystem (i.e., the month of entry) and then calculated the number of months
between the observation month and the month of entry. Second, app developers often
try to gain visibility among their potential users by providing free apps. We controlled for
this firm-level effect through a dummy variable top 500 free that takes a value of ‘1’ if any
of the apps developed by the firm were also part of the Top 500 ranking based on the
number of downloads for free apps in a given month. Further, an app’s successful
commercialization is likely to be influenced by the overall demand for its submarket
category (e.g., Games, Productivity, Utility, Business). An app in a high-demand
submarket category will find it relatively easier to succeed. We account for this possibility
using the variable category demand, which is the total number of apps from the focal
firm’s app category in the Top 500 list in a given month. In addition, we also control for
any category-level differences by using category fixed effects.
We control for the quality of the app based on consumer ratings received by the
focal app. Consumers can rate an app from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 being the highest quality.
In the dataset, we were able to observe the cumulative rating offered by the consumer
for a given app as of March 2013, but not the changes in the rating over time. We used

21

this time-invariant measure to control for app quality. The variable app rating is the
cumulative rating received by the focal app as of March 2013. We also control for recent
investments made by firms in their focal app by measuring the number of updates to the
focal app in the past three months (3-month updates) and the total number of updates
before the observation month (Total updates). Additionally, we controlled for other applevel characteristics like the price for download (download price), recommended age
rating for the app (content rating), the app’s storage space as a proxy for app
complexity, and whether the app has an in-app purchase option or not (in-app
purchase). Table 2.2 provides a brief description of the variables used in the analysis.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.2 about here
----------------------------------------Analysis
We tested our hypothesis using continous time event history analysis to estimate
the hazard rate of an app achieving successful commercialization. We constructed the
data in the long form to account for time-varying covariates. We started analyzing all the
apps since their first month of launch on the iPhone platform. For the apps that entered
the Top 500 list by revenue, we included information for the months until they first
appeared in the Top 500 list. For those apps that did not appear in the Top 500 list until
December 2015, we used two different approaches to identify the censoring month.
First, many of these apps continue to be available in the App Store without any updates
akin to the ‘living dead’ phenomenon (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1987). Censoring
these apps based on the last month of observation (December 2015) might be
problematic because the likelihood of them making it to the Top 500 list may be very low
beyond a certain month. To account for this possibility, we identify these ‘living dead’
apps by analysing data on version updates, and we only include monthly observations
until 12 months after their last update. As an additional robustness check, we also
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estimated a model where we only include observations for these apps until six months
after their last update. We report this analysis in the robustness checks section after
presenting our main results.
We used the Cox proportional hazard model, a robust technique for hazard rate
analysis that does not require making an additional assumption about the shape of the
baseline hazard, which may be increasing, decreasing, constant, or non-monotonous
(Cox, 1975). This helps address concerns about the incorrect distributional assumptions
yielding biased estimates (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002) and the choice of parametric
specification based on observed data generating inconsistent results (Carroll and
Hannan, 2000). Further, we tested for the proportionality hazard assumption by checking
if the slope of the regression equation of scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time is nonzero
for the full model as well as for all predictor variables (Grambsch and Thermeau, 1994).
The proportional hazard assumption was satisfied for both the full model and all
predictor variables. Finally, apps introduced by the same firm often differed with respect
to their connectedness within the ecosystem, allowing us to control for unobserved firmlevel heterogeneity by treating each firm as a separate stratum (Allison, 1996).

Results
We report the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates in
Table 2.3. The results from the Cox model are reported in Table 2.4. The model
estimates the hazard of an app achieving successful commercialization as identified by
its first inclusion in the Top 500 list by revenue. The reported coefficients can be
exponentiated to obtain hazard ratios, which are interpreted as the multiplier of the
baseline hazard for the app being included in the Top 500 list when the variables
increase by one unit (Allison, 2010). An increase in hazard can also be interpreted as an
increase in the likelihood of an app achieving successful commercialization. All standard
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errors reported were corrected for noninterdependence across multiple observations for
the same app by clustering observations for each app. All the models include categoryfixed effect and firm-level stratification to control for any unobserved time-invariant
differences across categories and firms. Model 1 is a baseline model with only control
variables. In Models 2 and 3, we include the variables platform connectedness and
complement connectedness to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. In Model 4, we
include the interaction term between platform connectedness and generational newness
to test Hypothesis 3. Similarly, we include the interaction term between complement
connectedness and generational newness in Model 5 to test Hypothesis 4. Model 7 is
the fully specified model with all independent variables and interaction terms.
----------------------------------------Insert Tables 2.3 and 2.4 about here
----------------------------------------In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that the greater is the innovation’s platform
connectedness, the higher will be the likelihood of its successful commercialization. We
find support for this prediction in both Models 2 and 4. The estimated coefficient for
platform connectedness is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). In considering
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in Model 2, we find that a one unit increase
in platform connectedness is associated with a 17.4 percent higher likelihood of the focal
app making it into the list of Top 500 apps by revenue within the iPhone ecosystem.
Similarly, in Hypothesis 2, we predicted that the greater is the innovation’s complement
connectedness, the higher will be the likelihood of its successful commercialization. We
find statistical support for this prediction. The coefficient estimates for the variable
complement connectedness in Models 3 and 5 are positive and statistically significant (p
< 0.01). Based on the estimated coefficients from Model 3, an increase in complement
connectedness by one unit can increase the focal app’s likelihood of making it into the
list of Top 500 apps by revenue by 15.1 percent.
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In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effect of platform connectedness on the
innovation’s successful commercialization will be weaker during the early period of the
platform generation than when platform generation is relatively mature. The results from
Model 4 supports the prediction. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term
between platform connectedness and generational newness is negative and statistically
significant (p < 0.01). Hence, the effect of platform connectedness on the app’s
commercialization success is less positive when the platform generation is new than
when it is mature. This suggests that the benefits of platform-level complementarities
that accrue to app developers whose apps have high platform connectedness may be
buffered by the challenges of managing additional technological interdependencies
between their apps and the new generation of iPhone platform.
Finally, in Hypothesis 4, we predicted that the effect of complement
connectedness on the successful commercialization of an innovation will be weaker
during the early period of the platform generation than when platform generation is
relatively mature. We test for the interaction between complement connectedness and
generational newness in Model 5. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is
positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of complement
connectedness on an app’s successful commercialization does not vary with platform’s
generational evolution.
To further explore this non-finding with respect to Hypothesis 4, we conduct a
post hoc analysis to understand how the connected complement might differ with
respect to its platform connectedness. Our theoretical arguments were premised on the
existence of technology bottlenecks and the need for firms to adapt and reconfigure their
products during generational transition of the platform (Henderson and Clark, 1990;
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2016). However, it is possible that there is some variation in the
degree of adaptation required, depending on the level of connectedness between the
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connected complements and the platform itself. To explore this possibility, we separate
the variable complement connectedness into two categories depending on the level of
platform connectedness of the complement that the focal innovation is connected to.
We identified the complements with high platform connectedness as those that
used at least one of the optional components offered by the platform. Apps such as
Google Maps, Waze, and YouTube use one or more optional components provided by
the iPhone platform, whereas apps like Dropbox and Google Drive use only the mobile
computing module of the iPhone platform. We measured complement connectedness
with high platform connectedness as the number of complements with high platform
connectedness that the focal innovation is connected to within the ecosystem. Similarly,
we measured complement connectedness with low platform connectedness based on
the number of complements with low platform connectedness that the focal innovation is
connected to within the ecosystem.
In Models 6 and 7, we test for both the direct effect of complement
connectedness with high and low platform connectedness respectively, and their
interaction effect with generational newness. The coefficient for the direct effect of both
types of complement connectedness is positive and statistically significant, providing
evidence for the argument that complement connectedness increases the likelihood of
the focal innovation achieving successful commercialization. Further, the coefficient for
the interaction effect of complement connectedness with low platform connectedness
and generational newness is positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the
coefficient for the interaction effect of complement connectedness with high platform
connectedness and generational newness is negative and statistically significant (p <
0.05). We illustrate this difference in the effect of the two types of complement
connectedness through the plots in Figure 2.3. The difference in the effect of
complement connectedness depends on the extent of connectedness between the
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platform and the complement that the focal innovation is connected with. The benefit of
complement connectedness is strengthened when Apple introduces the new platform
generation and if the complements that the focal app is connected to have low platform
connectedness whereas it is weakened when Apple introduces the new platform
generation and if the connected complements themselves have high platform
connectedness. These findings clearly highlight the two faces of value creation in
ecosystems – the opportunities associated with leveraging complementarities and the
challenges associated with managing technological interdependencies.
----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2.3 about here
----------------------------------------Robustness Checks
We conduct a number of additional checks to establish the robustness of our
findings. We report these results in Table 2.5. First, in order to ensure that the results
are not the artifact of a large number of observations, we conduct an additional analysis
on the randomly drawn subsample based on the weighted exogenous sampling
maximum likelihood (WESML) technique suggested by Manski and Lerman (1977). An
estimation based on the random exogenous sample was not practical because apps that
achieve successful commercialization are rare. There are only 4,213 apps out of
244,034 total apps that achieved successful commercialization during the observation
period. From the information point of view, it would be desirable to have a greater
fraction of apps that achieved successful commercialization. A choice-based sampling
that takes fractions of both successful and unsuccessful apps would not be appropriate.
Because this stratification would be done on the dependent variable, the estimates
would be subject to selection bias. Hence, the WESML technique is more suited for rare
events (Singh, 2005), as it allows for forming a sample with a greater fraction of
observations with rare events without any selection bias. Intuitively, the idea is to weigh
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each sample observation by the number of population elements it represents to make
the choice-based sample simulate a random exogenous sample.
In order to construct our sample, we followed the WESML technique laid out by
Singh (2005). We constructed the sample by first selecting all the apps that entered the
Top 500 list during the observation period and then drawing a random pool of
approximately 20 percent of the apps that never entered the top list. This generated a
sample of 50,091 apps. We then assigned weights to the each of these apps based on
the representation of these apps in the overall dataset. The apps that entered the top list
were assigned a weight of ‘1,’ as all these apps from the population were included in the
sample. The apps that did not enter the top list were assigned weights as the ratio of
total apps in the respective category that were in the sample to that in the entire dataset.
The results of the analysis based on this subsample are reported in Model 8 and are
qualitatively similar to our main results.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.5 about here
----------------------------------------Alternative specifications
We also conduct additional robustness checks with alternative specifications.
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to the use of categorical variables to categorize
high or low connectedness (Model 9). The variable takes a value of 1 if the focal app
connects with a complement or optional platform components, and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, we test the importance of the degree of connectedness, i.e., whether results
are driven by the presence of connectedness or whether the degree of connectedness
matters. We do so by removing all the apps that did not have any connectedness with
the platform or other complement (Model 10). Further, we also test whether our results
are sensitive to the window that we have used to specify whether an app is still active in
the ecosystem or not. As an additional check, we consider an app to be actively
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contesting for the top position only if it was updated in the previous six months (Model
11). The results from all of these analyses are consistent with the main results.
Finally, an important issue to consider in our analysis is the possibility that apps
self-select into different types of connectedness, which could potentially bias our
estimates. We use both coarsened exact matching and instrument variable approach to
test the robustness of our results to this potential endogeneity bias.
Coarsened exact matching analysis
Coarsened exact matching approach has been used commonly in economics to
address concerns related to selection bias. Recently, scholars in management have
started using this approach to address selection bias in their empirical specifications
(e.g., Aggarwal and Hsu, 2013; Feldman and Amit, 2014). It is a nonparametric
approach to reestablish the conditions of natural experiment by comparing statistical
results between a treatment group and a comparable control group, thus, allowing for
causal inference. We used this approach to evaluate whether apps with high
connectedness with the platform or other complements have higher likelihood of
achieving successful commercialization or not. For the purpose of this analysis, we
compare apps that have high connectedness with those that have low connectedness. In
the case of platform connectedness, apps are considered to have high platform
connectedness if they are leveraging at least one optional component provided by the
platform, and low otherwise. Similarly, apps that interact with one or more complements
in the ecosystem are considered to have high complement connectedness, and low
otherwise. We estimate separate models for platform and complement connectedness.
The treatment group is defined as the apps that have high connectedness with the
platform or other complements. Our control group is drawn from the apps that had low
connectedness with the platform or other complement.
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The coarsened matching provides an alternative approach by generating
counterfactual that closely match with the treatment on the set of observed variables. To
implement coarsened exact matching, the logistic regression predicting an app
propensity to have platform or complement connectedness is estimated using coarsened
values of independent variables, to accurately group innovations that share similar
values of these variables. We use cross-sectional data with observations pertaining to
the last month to estimate an app’s propensity to have platform or complement
connectedness. We, then, use the weights calculated by coarsened matching estimator
(cem routine in STATA) in the second-stage model that we used in the main analysis.
This model estimates the app’s likelihood of entering into the top 500 revenue ranking
based on its connectedness with platform or complements. The un-coarsened
observations are weighted according to the prominence of each stratum into which they
fall. Table 2.6 presents the result from the second-stage model. The estimates for
second-stage model for platform connectedness and complement connectedness (with
high platform connectedness) are statistically significant and consistent with the main
model. The coefficient estimate for complement connectedness (with low platform
connectedness) is qualitatively similar to the main model but has large standard error.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.6 about here
----------------------------------------Instrument variable analysis
While the coarsened exact matching approach matches the apps with and
without connectedness on the basis of observables, it is possible that these apps’
connectedness may be due to some unobserved differences. To further check for any
potential app-level endogeneity bias, we use instrument variable using ivprobit STATA
procedure (Bascle, 2008).
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We identify an instrument that is likely to be correlated with an app’s likelihood to
have platform or complement connectedness, but uncorrelated with the app’s
commercialization success beyond its effect on the endogenous regressor (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008; Bascle, 2008). We use the number of queries posted by developers on
an online discussion board about the development challenges associated with the
integration of platform components and other complements with their app. The number
of queries is reflective of an overall interest within the developer community about the
platform components and other complements. Hence, it is likely to be highly correlated
with an introduction of platform or complement connectedness in the new apps or
existing in the upcoming months. However, it is unlikely that this instrument would be
correlated with an app’s commercialization success, beyond its effect on the app’s
connectedness with the platform or complement. Given that our independent variables
and queries related to these variables are mutually exclusive, we instrumented each
independent variable separately. In this analysis with instrument variable, we focus only
on the direct effects as we are not aware of any technique that allows using instrument
variable for the interaction term. Further, we believe concerns related to endogenous
selection are mainly associated with the direct effects of the connectedness on an app’s
successful commercialization. Hence, for this analysis we convert the long-panel data
into a cross-sectional data by using values of the variables pertaining to the last
observation month.
In Models 15, 17 and 19 in Table 2.7, we show the coefficients of the first stage
selection model that estimates the effect of the number of queries on the apps’ degree of
platform and complement connectedness respectively. Models 16, 18 and 20 presents
results from the second-stage model. The coefficient for platform connectedness and
complement connectedness are positive and statistically significant (p <0.01). The Cragg
Donald statistics for three models is greater than 16.28, the recommended threshold
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provided by Stock and Yogo (2004) to satisfy instrument relevance condition. Overall,
these additional analyses help to further establish the robustness of our findings.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 2.7 about here
----------------------------------------DISCUSSION
A given innovation often does not stand alone. Rather it is connected with other
elements in the ecosystem that impacts its value creation. In this study, we draw on this
premise in a platform-based ecosystem in which participating complementor firms
innovate around a platform to explain the commercial success of its innovation. We
depart from the existing conceptualization of these ecosystems as multisided markets in
which firms interact with other actors and benefit from network externalities. Instead, we
conceptualize them as interconnected technological systems in which the focal
innovation interacts with other technology elements to create value. We introduce the
notion of connectedness to refer to the extent to which a given innovation interacts with
the platform (i.e., platform connectedness) and also with the other complements in the
ecosystem (i.e., complement connectedness). On the one hand, higher connectedness
may allow the innovation to leverage a broader set of complementarities in the
ecosystem. On the other hand, it may subject the innovation to an array of
interdependencies that may limits its value creation especially when a generational
transition triggered by the platform firm changes the underlying platform architecture.
We explore these arguments on app developers that participated in Apple’s
iPhone ecosystem between 2008 and 2013 in the U.S. market. We find that higher
platform connectedness and higher complement connectedness is associated with a
higher likelihood of app’s successful commercialization. However, the benefit of platform
connectedness is negated during the initial period of the new generation of platform. In
contrast, the benefit of complement connectedness with respect to platform’s
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generational evolution is much more nuanced. The benefit is strengthened when Apple
introduces the new platform generation and if the complements that the focal app is
connected to have low platform connectedness whereas it is weakened when Apple
introduces the new platform generation and if the connected complements themselves
have high platform connectedness.
The study contributes to the emerging literatures on ecosystems and platforms,
examining both the opportunities and the challenges faced by complementors in creating
value from their innovations (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Kapoor,
2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Altman, 2016; Cennamo, Gu, and Zhu, 2016; Zhu and Liu,
2016; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). We show that while participation in platform-based
ecosystems enables firms to enhance the value of their innovations by leveraging a
broad set of platform components and other complements, such an interconnected
architecture of value creation can subject the firm to challenges with respect to
managing the technological interdependencies. We also contribute to the literature on
platform architecture (e.g., Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Gawer, 2014). This stream of
research provides a detailed account of the modular nature of the platform architecture
and emphasizes its role in spurring innovation. We build on this characterization of the
platform architecture and elucidate how the modular components of the platform differ
with respect to their level of hierarchy within the platform architecture. We illustrate that
the platform components can be decomposed into core and optional components, and
this difference has important implications for value creation in ecosystems.
Further, we contribute to the research on complementary assets by focusing on
complementary technologies that lie outside the firm’s value chain. It has long been
recognized that complementary assets play an important role in the success of an
innovation and in the firms’ ability to appropriate value from their innovations (Teece,
1986; Teece 2006). However, the bulk of the attention to this line of inquiry has been on
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complementary assets that either lie within the boundary of the firms or can be accessed
by firms through alternative means such as licensing or strategic alliances (e.g., Dyer
and Singh, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). The role of
complementary technologies and assets that reside in the external business ecosystem
remains relatively underexplored (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Furr, 2015;
Teece, 2006). In this study, we show how complementary technologies that lie outside
the firm’s value chain can help support the firm’s focal innovation. Further, we also show
how complementary technologies can be detrimental to a firm’s performance when a
platform is relatively new.
In practical terms, our study offers some guidance for both platform firms and
complementor firms. A platform firm can enhance the overall value potential of an
ecosystem by bundling a number of optional components along with the core
technological architecture. Complementors can combine these optional components with
their focal innovations and create more value for end users. Further, platform firms can
also enhance value creation in an ecosystem by attracting participation by the
“keystone” complementor firms in their ecosystems. These keystone firms represent a
set of complementors who provide specialized technologies or user networks other
complementors can leverage. Finally, our results also suggest that platform firms should
pay more attention to platform generational transition and its impact on the interfaces by
which complements interact with the platform. As these generational transitions can
hamper complementor firms, better management of platform interfaces can help platform
firms preserve the value of the platform during periods of generational transition.
The findings of this study are subject to a number of limitations that provide an
opportunity for future research. First, they are based on a single empirical context, and
their validity needs to be established through explorations in other settings. Second, our
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measure for successful commercialization is based on whether the focal app is ranked
within Top 500 apps in terms of revenue in the iPhone ecosystem. Although this
measure is consistent with our theory and is widely accepted as a proxy for successful
commercialization, it may not represent superior economic performance for firms in
general. Finally, the measures for complement and platform connectedness do not
account for differences between complements or platform components in terms of their
impact on an app’s value creation. Despite these and other limitations, the study sheds
light on the two faces of value creation for firms innovating in ecosystems -- the
opportunities associated with leveraging complementarities and the challenges associated
with managing technological interdependencies.
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Figure 2.1:Different types of connectedness for an innovation in a platform-based
ecosystem
Platform
Platform
connectedness
Complement

Innovation
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Figure 2.2:Normalized weekly trend of Web search in the U.S. on Google for the
term “iOS app not working.”
(Data source: Google Trends; http://www.google.com/trends/)
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Figure 2.3: Interaction graphs for complement connectedness
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Table 2.1: Apps with platform and complement connectedness
Type of Connectedness

All Apps

% Total
apps

Top 500
apps

Platform
connectedness

Low
High

126,311
122,994

50.67%
49.33%

1,654
2,997

% Total
Top 500
apps
35.56%
64.44%

Complement
connectedness

Low
High

194,683
54,622

78.10%
21.91%

2,735
1,916

58.80%
41.20%
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Table 2.2: Description of variables
Dependent variable
Successful
commercialization
Independent variables

Dummy = 1 for the month in which the app enters the Top 500 list by
revenue

Platform connectedness

Number of optional platform components with which the focal app
interacts

Complement
connectedness

Number of complements in the ecosystem that the focal app
interacts with

Complement
connectedness (Low
platform connectedness)
Complement
connectedness (High
platform connectedness)
Control variables

Number of connected complements that interact only with the core
platform module
Number of connected complements that interact with optional
platform components

App rating

Number of months since the launch of the latest generation of the
platform; multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation
Cumulative consumer ratings received by the app

App size

The amount of storage space required by the app (in MBs)

App content rating

Recommended age rating based on the app content

3-month updates

In-app purchase

Number of times the focal app was updated in the last three months
Total number of times the focal app was updated since its first
launch
Dummy = 1 for apps that have an in-app purchase option

App price

Price of the focal apps (in U.S. dollars)

Firm experience

Number of months since the focal firm launched its first app
Dummy = 1 if firm has an app in the Top 500 ranking for the free app
in a given month
Total number of apps for the focal category in the Top 500 ranking
based on revenues in a given month

Generational newness

Total number of updates

App in Top 500 free
Category demand
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics and correlations
No.
1

Variables

2

Platform connectedness
Complement
connectedness

3

Generational newness

4

App rating

5

App content rating

6

App size

7

Mean

S.D.

1

0.636

0.770

1.000

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.393

0.894

-0.003

1.000

-6.901

3.802

0.031

0.007

1.000

1.463

2.068

0.048

0.129

0.003

1.000

139.301

109.943

-0.009

0.024

-0.002

0.039

1.000

47.887

230.691

-0.010

0.010

0.001

0.029

0.039

1.000

In-app purchase

0.308

0.462

0.222

0.068

0.018

0.265

0.055

0.005

1.000

8

3- months updates

0.534

0.892

0.027

0.068

0.025

0.134

0.025

-0.006

0.077

1.000

9

Total updates

2.717

2.613

0.025

0.153

0.021

0.257

0.028

-0.016

0.113

0.316

1.000

10

App price

11

Firm experience

12

App in Top 500 free

13

Category demand

10

11

12

3.191

19.207

-0.100

-0.029

-0.032

-0.257

-0.091

0.125

-0.117

-0.040

. -0.058

1.000

26.959

16.443

0.165

0.046

0.000

-0.010

0.023

0.047

0.153

-0.107

0.097

0.006

1.000

0.019

0.135

0.018

0.062

-0.001

0.151

0.017

0.036

0.078

0.030

0.012

-0.042

0.061

1.000

136.111

186.492

0.273

-0.049

0.049

0.172

0.038

0.016

0.289

-0.025

-0.047

-0.124

0.109

0.084

Correlations greater than 0.01 or smaller than -0.01 are significant at p <0.05, N = 3,797,947
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Table 2.4: Cox proportional hazard model estimating the likelihood of achieving
successful commercialization
Model 1

Model 2

Platform connectedness

Model 3

0.174***
(0.023)

Complement connectedness

Model 4

Model 5

0.151***
(0.024)

Platform connectedness*Gen. newness

0.217***
(0.028)

-0.177***
(0.056)

-0.175***
(0.056)
0.070
(0.062)

Complement connect.(Low plat. connect.)
Comp. connect.(Low plat. connect.)*Gen.
newness
Complement connect.(High plat. connect.)
Comp. connected (High plat. conn.)*Gen.
newness

App rating
App rating * App rating
App content rating
App size
Has in-app purchase
3-month updates
Total updates
App price
Firm experience
Time effect
Top 500 free app
Category demand
Category demand * Category demand
Category-fixed effect
Firm-fixed effect
Total observation
Total apps
Total firms
Total events
Log likelihood

Model 7

0.131***
(0.030)

Complement connect.*Gen. newness

Generational newness

Model 6

0.226***
(0.028)

0.227***
(0.064)
0.831***
(0.074)
-0.069***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.431***
(0.054)
0.251***
(0.029)
0.131***
(0.024)
0.189***
(0.026)
-0.046**
(0.019)
0.028
(0.019)
0.832***
(0.071)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
3,797,947
244,084
20,174
4,213
-7,050.31

0.181***
(0.064)
0.836***
(0.075)
-0.070***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.384***
(0.054)
0.252***
(0.030)
0.113***
(0.024)
0.206***
(0.026)
-0.046**
(0.019)
0.028
(0.019)
0.832***
(0.071)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)

0.203***
(0.064)
0.826***
(0.074)
-0.069***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.395***
(0.054)
0.252***
(0.030)
0.115***
(0.024)
0.201***
(0.026)
-0.052***
(0.019)
0.038**
(0.019)
0.834***
(0.071)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,797,947
3,797,947
244,084
244,034
20,174
20,174
4,213
4,213
-7,028.78
-7,036.16
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

0.100***

0.091***

(0.035)
0.182**

(0.035)
0.183**

(0.076)
0.264***
(0.093)
-0.365**

(0.076)
0.236**
(0.094)
-0.340**

0.369***
(0.089)
0.835***
(0.075)
-0.070***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.379***
(0.054)
0.252***
(0.030)
0.113***
(0.024)
0.205***
(0.026)
-0.044**
(0.019)
0.027
(0.019)
0.831***
(0.071)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)

0.154**
(0.078)
0.825***
(0.074)
-0.069***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.397***
(0.054)
0.252***
(0.030)
0.115***
(0.024)
0.201***
(0.026)
-0.052***
(0.019)
0.038**
(0.019)
0.833***
(0.071)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)

(0.172)
0.150*
(0.078)
0.827***
(0.074)
-0.069***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.394***
(0.054)
0.252***
(0.030)
0.116***
(0.024)
0.199***
(0.026)
-0.052***
(0.019)
0.038**
(0.019)
0.834***
(0.071)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)

(0.172)
0.307***
(0.099)
0.834***
(0.075)
-0.071***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.371***
(0.055)
0.248***
(0.030)
0.114***
(0.024)
0.205***
(0.026)
-0.046**
(0.019)
0.029
(0.019)
0.830***
(0.070)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.000*
(0.000)

Yes
Yes
3,797,947
244,084
20,174
4,213
-7,025.72

Yes
Yes
3,797,947
244,034
20,174
4,213
-7,035.74

Yes
Yes
3,797,947
244,034
20,174
4,213
-7,033.68

Yes
Yes
3,797,947
244,034
20,174
4,213
-7,011.29
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Table 2.5: Robustness checks (Alternative specification)

Platform connectedness
Complement connectedness (Low platform
connectedness)
Complement connectedness (High platform
connectedness)
Platform connectedness*Generational
newness
Comp. connectedness (Low platform
connectedness)*Generational newness
Comp. connectedness (High platform
connectedness)*Generational newness
Generational newness
App rating
App rating * App rating
App content rating
App size
Has in-app purchase
3-month updates
Total updates
App price
Firm experience
Time effect
Top 500 free app
Category demand
Category demand* Category demand
Total observation
Total apps
Total firms
Total events
Log likelihood

Model 8
WESML

Model 9
Dummy IVs

Model 10
High dep. apps

Model 11
6-mth window

0.189***
(0.047)
0.064**

0.487***
(0.091)
0.219***

0.157***
(0.032)
0.085**

0.209***
(0.028)
0.092***

(0.025)
0.234**

(0.066)
0.239**

(0.037)
0.224**

(0.034)
0.236**

(0.104)
-0.149*

(0.102)
-0.336*

(0.097)
-0.127*

(0.094)
-0.161***

(0.082)
0.269**

(0.203)
-0.004

(0.067)
0.181**

(0.055)
0.180**

(0.131)
-0.504*

(0.151)
-0.324*

(0.082)
-0.254

(0.075)
-0.340**

(0.288)

(0.190)

(0.170)

(0.173)

0.342**
(0.158)
1.017***
(0.102)
-0.083***
(0.013)
-0.083***
(0.013)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.287***
(0.083)
0.256***
(0.045)
0.180***
(0.044)
0.182***
(0.040)
-0.036***
(0.005)
1.017***
(0.102)
0.843***
(0.106)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.455**
(0.222)
0.829***
(0.088)
-0.067***
(0.011)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.281***
(0.060)
0.217***
(0.033)
0.107***
(0.028)
0.181***
(0.028)
-0.047**
(0.018)
0.030
(0.018)
0.890***
(0.078)
0.006**
(0.002)
-0.000**
(0.000)

0.191
(0.143)
0.821***
(0.089)
-0.066***
(0.011)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.291***
(0.060)
0.223***
(0.033)
0.105***
(0.028)
0.172***
(0.029)
-0.045**
(0.019)
0.030
(0.019)
0.861***
(0.077)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.270***
(0.099)
0.832***
(0.076)
-0.070***
(0.010)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.353***
(0.054)
0.265***
(0.029)
0.087***
(0.023)
0.198***
(0.026)
-0.045**
(0.019)
0.030
(0.019)
0.814***
(0.070)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)

1,053,803
50,901
6,412
4,246
-363.87

3,797,947
244,034
20,174
4,213
-5,307.70

2,267,398
148,385
15,512
3,416
-5,319.49

2,925,262
244,034
20,174
4,213
-6,922.18

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Robustness check: Results with Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)
Model 12
Platform connectedness
Platform connectedness*Generational newness

Model 13

Model 14

0.474***
(0.139)
-0.540*
(0.316)

Complement connectedness (Low platform
connectedness)

0.132
(0.169)
0.182

Complement connectedness (Low platform
connectedness)* Generational newness

(0.358)
Complement connectedness( High platform
connectedness)

0.189**
(0.093)
-0.352*

Complement connectedness (High platform
connectedness) * Generational newness
Generational newness
App rating
App rating* App rating
App content rating
App size
Has in-app purchase
3-month updates
Total updates
App price
Firm experience
Time effect
Top 500 free app
Category demand
Category demand * Category demand
Total observation
Total apps
Total events
Log likelihood

0.206
(0.239)
0.925***
(0.177)
-0.054**
(0.022)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
0.349**
(0.139)
0.123
(0.080)
0.107
(0.067)
0.139*
(0.078)
-0.112
(0.092)
0.087
(0.092)
0.575***
(0.150)
0.004
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.000)
3,294,869
215,983.41
1,571.63
-2,216.84

0.226
(0.263)
1.225***
(0.283)
-0.102***
(0.033)
0.001*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
0.496***
(0.152)
0.323***
(0.110)
-0.030
(0.092)
0.113
(0.080)
-0.146**
(0.072)
0.124*
(0.072)
0.513***
(0.112)
0.010
(0.007)
-0.000**
(0.000)
1,488,883
223,089.98
1,134.00
-1,163.06

0.561***
(0.095)
0.846***
(0.172)
-0.055***
(0.020)
0.001*
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.155*
(0.085)
-0.176*
(0.093)
0.260***
(0.085)
0.243***
(0.046)
-0.021***
(0.002)
0.084
(0.102)
0.472***
(0.149)
0.007**
(0.003)
-0.000***
(0.000)
3,188,760
191,100.68
4,750.97
-15,625.77

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Instrument variable analysis along with first stage selection model
Model 15
Platform query

Model 16

Model 17

Model 18

Model 19

Model 20

17.305***
(0.226)

Platform connectedness

1.047***
(0.033)

Complement query (Low
platform connectedness)

4.293***
(0.173)

Complement connectedness
(Low platform connectedness)

1.293***
(0.005)

Complement query (High
platform connectedness)

6.818***
(0.792)

Complement connectedness
(High platform
connectedness)
Generational newness
App rating
App rating * App rating
App content rating
App size
Has in-app purchase
3-month updates
Total updates
App price
Firm experience
Time effect
Top 500 free app
Category demand
Category demand * Category
demand
Constant
Total observation
Cragg-Donald statistic

0.149***

0.024***
(0.007)
-0.091***
(0.004)
0.018***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.176***
(0.005)
0.057***
(0.003)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.039***
(0.002)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.038***
(0.000)
0.019
(0.012)
0.005***
(0.000)
-0.000***

0.065**
(0.032)
0.454***
(0.021)
-0.040***
(0.003)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.166***
(0.026)
0.476***
(0.019)
-0.071***
(0.000)
0.253***
(0.011)
-0.033***
(0.001)
-0.018***
(0.000)
0.973***
(0.039)
-0.012***
(0.001)
0.000***

0.011
(0.007)
0.038***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.052***
(0.005)
0.048***
(0.003)
0.063***
(0.000)
-0.005*
(0.003)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.307***
(0.012)
-0.002*
(0.000)
0.000***

0.010
(0.013)
0.023***
(0.005)
-0.016***
(0.003)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.028**
(0.011)
0.108***
(0.011)
-0.061***
(0.000)
0.074***
(0.006)
-0.012***
(0.001)
-0.027***
(0.001)
-0.075***
(0.027)
-0.004***
(0.000)
0.000***

0.036*
(0.020)
0.154***
(0.010)
-0.013***
(0.002)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.034**
(0.013)
0.045***
(0.007)
0.023***
(0.001)
0.056***
(0.007)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.324***
(0.025)
-0.004***
(0.001)
0.000***

(0.069)
0.055*
(0.042)
0.510***
(0.028)
-0.034***
(0.004)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.475***
(0.024)
0.632***
(0.010)
-0.031***
(0.000)
0.287***
(0.014)
-0.040***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
1.270***
(0.059)
-0.007***
(0.001)
0.000***

(0.000)
-0.169***
(0.013)

(0.000)
-2.812***
(0.102)

(0.000)
0.048***
(0.013)

(0.000)
-0.975***
(0.054)

(0.000)
-2.468***
(0.043)

(0.000)
-3.277***
(0.066)

244,084

244,084
6296.96

244,084

244,084
615.52

244,084

244,084
87.31

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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3. SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE IN BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS:
EVIDENCE FROM APPLICATION SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS IN THE IOS
AND ANDROID SMARTPHONE ECOSYSTEMS

Introduction
There is growing recognition within the strategy field that the locus of value
creation has shifted from focal firms to business ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien, 2004;
Teece, 2007; Baldwin, 2012; Adner et al., 2013). Increasingly, business ecosystems are
characterized by a firm that orchestrates the functioning of the ecosystem by providing a
platform and setting the rules for other firms to leverage the platform and offer
complementary products to the users. Scholars exploring this phenomenon have tended
to focus on the strategies and performance of platform firms (e.g., Cusumano et al.,
1992; Boudreau, 2010; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009;
Eisenmann et al., 2011; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). The emphasis has been on explaining
how firms can create a platform, attract users and complementors, and achieve market
dominance. Hence, the research so far has tended to focus on the unitary actor that
orchestrates the business ecosystem. Much less attention has been devoted to
understanding the performance consequences for complementors who typically
represent a vast majority of firms in the ecosystem and who are critical to the value
creation within the ecosystem.
In this study, we focus on the performance of complementor firms within a
platform-based ecosystem. Specifically, we study the extent to which a high performing
complementor can sustain its superior performance within the ecosystem. While
sustainability of superior performance is a critical goal for managers and has been an
important line of inquiry for strategy scholars (e.g., Porter, 1985; Rumelt et al., 1991), it
is becoming increasingly difficult for firms to realize it (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002; D’Aveni
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et al., 2010; McGrath, 2013). In the context of platform-based ecosystems, sustainability
of complementors’ superior performance has important implications not only for these
firms themselves but also for the platform firms whose performance is tied to value
creation by their complementors.
To unpack the drivers of sustainability, we offer a novel characterization of
complementors’ ecosystem-level interdependencies that is rooted in the structural and
evolutionary features of the ecosystem. We first consider the structure of the
complementor’s interdependence within the ecosystem based on the number of unique
components (or subsystems) that interact with the complementor’s product. For
example, in the iOS smartphone ecosystem orchestrated by Apple (the platform firm), an
application software (app) developer firm (the complementor) is interdependent on the
specific handset and operating system combination offered by Apple. In contrast, in the
Android smartphone ecosystem orchestrated by Google, an app developer is
interdependent on many unique handset and operating system combinations offered by
firms such as HTC, LG, Motorola and Samsung. We use the notion of ecosystem
complexity to characterize this difference in the structure of interdependence for
complementor firms. We then consider the evolutionary features of an ecosystem by
taking into account the generational transitions that are initiated by platform firms (e.g.,
introduction of new generation of operating system), and the experience that
complementors gain within an ecosystem over time. Our theoretical arguments are
premised on complementors’ search processes with respect to innovation and imitation
(e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004). We consider how
ecosystem-level interdependencies impact these processes, and the resulting
performance dynamics among complementors.
The empirical setting for the study is the two dominant smartphone ecosystems
in the U.S. - Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android, and we examine the performance of app
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developers in these ecosystems from January, 2012 to January, 2014. The setting
provides a valuable opportunity to study complementors’ performance dynamics in
ecosystems with varying levels of complexity and being subject to frequent platform
transitions. The diversity in handsets and operating systems among the user base
makes the Android ecosystem much more complex for app developers than the iOS
ecosystem. While the contrast between iOS and Android is stark, we also observe
varying levels of complexity within both ecosystems over time. In addition, we observe
three episodes of platform transitions that entail major updates to the smartphone
operating system.2
We assembled a unique monthly panel dataset of top-performing app developers
in the iOS and Android smartphone ecosystems over the two-year period. To gain
insights into the challenges of developing apps and competing in these ecosystems, we
also interviewed several executives and engineers from app developer firms. The
analysis is based on the extent to which app developers sustain their superior
performance by observing whether their apps continue to be in the top performance
stratum in a given ecosystem (i.e., Top 500 apps by revenue). The research setting is
hypercompetitive and, on average, a firm sustains its superior performance for only six
months. Moreover, once a firm exits the top performance stratum in a given ecosystem,
the likelihood of reappearance in the stratum is very low. Only 14% of exit events are
followed by re-entry in the top performance stratum. Finally, 64% of top-performing firms
participate in both the iOS and Android ecosystems, which helps us address
endogeneity concerns due to firms self-selecting into a given ecosystem. Consistent
with our arguments, we find that app developers’ ability to sustain superior performance

2

While smartphone is the dominant hardware for Android and iOS operating systems, these operating systems
are also used in other hardware categories such as tablets and e-readers. In this study, we focus on the
performance dynamics of app developer firms within only the Android and iOS smartphone ecosystems. For
Apple, the iOS smartphone ecosystem is effectively the iPhone ecosystem.
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is facilitated by the ecosystem complexity and their ecosystem experience but hampered
by platform transitions initiated by Apple and Google. Moreover, ecosystem complexity
enhances the benefit of ecosystem experience whereas it exacerbates the impact of
platform transition.
The study, while limited to a specific empirical context, provides one of the first
detailed accounts of the drivers of complementors’ performance within a platform-based
ecosystem. A key aspect of the study is to offer a novel perspective of complementors’
ecosystem-level interdependencies that incorporates both the structural and evolutionary
features of the ecosystem, and to show that such a perspective is useful in explaining
performance dynamics among complementors within an ecosystem. In so doing, it
contributes to the emerging literature stream examining the challenges and opportunities
faced by complementors in business ecosystems (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; Ceccagnoli et
al., 2012; Kapoor, 2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). More broadly, the study offers a new
lens on the interactions between firms and their environments. Existing treatments of
firms’ environments are typically premised on complexity and uncertainty being a
general feature of the industry (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson and Tushman,
2001; Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2009). However, in platform-based ecosystems,
environmental complexity and uncertainty for complementors can be shaped by the
strategies of platform firms, and as a result, complementors in the same industry can be
subject to significantly different environments. Accordingly, there are implications for
both platform firms that orchestrate the ecosystem and for complementor firms that
leverage the focal platform. As we show in the study that ecosystem complexity can
help complementors sustain their superior performance but it can also magnify the
challenges that complementors face during periods of platform transition. Our findings
also contribute to the literature on technological change which has shed light on how
technology transition impacts the performance of firms in the focal industry (Tushman
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and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997). We highlight
how technological interdependencies between platform firms and complementors in
related industries can create a ripple effect for complementors when platform firms
introduce a new generation of the platform. Finally, the study is also among the first to
offer systematic empirical evidence about the role of complexity on firm performance as
theorized within the evolutionary economics perspective of firms (e.g., Levinthal, 1997;
Rivkin, 2000; Lenox et al., 2010).
Hypotheses
We focus on the performance of complementors within a platform-based
ecosystem. In particular, we take into account that there are performance differences
among complementors within an ecosystem, and we explore the extent to which a high
performing complementor can sustain its performance advantage within an ecosystem.
Sustainability of superior performance is an important goal for managers (e.g., Porter,
1985), and it has been studied extensively by strategy scholars (e.g., Rumelt et al.,
1991; Teece, 2007). We theorize how complementor’s sustainability of superior
performance is impacted by ecosystem-level interdependencies.
We first consider the structure of complementor’s interdependence in the
ecosystem based on the number of unique components that interact with a
complementor’s product. We refer to this structural feature as ecosystem complexity.
The greater the number of unique components that interact with a complementor’s
product, the greater is the degree of ecosystem complexity faced by the complementor.
This uniqueness could be driven by different variants of the components that perform the
same function (e.g., distinct versions of a hardware component) or by different
components that perform different functions (e.g., a hardware and a software
component). Moreover, depending on the architecture of the ecosystem, the same
complementor could be subject to varying degrees of complexity across two different
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ecosystems (e.g., an app developer participating in iOS and in Android smartphone
ecosystems), or two different complementors may be subject to varying degrees of
complexity within the same ecosystem (e.g., an app developer and a handset
manufacturer within the Android smartphone ecosystem). 3 Further, the architecture of
the ecosystem can itself change over time depending on the choices of platform and
complementor firms. This characterization of ecosystem-level complexity is distinct from
existing treatments of industry-level complexity that are rooted in the complexity of firms’
internal technological knowledge domains, products and processes (e.g., Ganco, 2013;
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Lenox et al., 2010; Singh, 1997), or in the concentration of
firms’ inputs and outputs in the focal industry (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson
and Tushman, 2001).
We then consider the impact of generational transitions initiated by platform firms
(e.g., new generations of gaming consoles introduced by Sony, Nintendo, or Microsoft).
These transitions represent a common means by which platform firms compete and
create value over time. From a complementor’s perspective, however, they necessitate
significant adaptation, as complementors need to reconfigure their products to leverage
the performance improvements accorded by the new generation of the platform. Finally,
we consider the impact of complementor’s experience in an ecosystem. Given that a
complementor’s product is closely tied to the ecosystem-specific components, we
explore the importance of ecosystem-specific learning as it relates to the sustainability of
superior performance.
Our theoretical predictions stem from the evolutionary economics perspective of
firms (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal,
2004). Drawing on this perspective, we consider the dual search processes of
3

Since our emphasis in this paper is to explore the performance outcomes of complementor firms, we are
considering the local structural complexity that the complementor firm is subjected to in a given ecosystem. A
separate characterization can entail the complexity of the entire ecosystem.
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innovation and imitation as shaping performance dynamics among firms (e.g., Zott,
2003; Lenox et al., 2006). The first process, innovative search, is characterized by firms
searching for superior solutions to a given problem and improving their performance
over time (e.g., Levinthal, 1997). Such a solution comprises of choices that
complementors may make regarding their products, tasks, or organization with respect
to the ecosystem, and which collectively represent a superior performance configuration.
The second process, imitative search, represents firms’ attempting to imitate other high
performing firms (e.g., Rivkin, 2000). We assume that complementors are continuously
searching for superior performance configurations within an ecosystem. The search
processes for the new complementors or the existing complementors with inferior
performance (follower firms) are likely to be characterized by some combination of
innovative and imitative search, while the search processes for the complementors with
superior performance (leader firms) are likely to be characterized by innovative search.
We first explore the role of ecosystem complexity. We then examine the role of
complementors’ experience and platform transition and how these factors interact with
ecosystem complexity.
Ecosystem Complexity
To explain how ecosystem complexity influences complementors’ sustainability
of superior performance, we need to understand how ecosystem complexity impacts the
search processes of firms in the ecosystem. As ecosystem complexity increases,
complementors need to optimize their products so as to account for greater number of
interactions between their products and other components within the ecosystem. For
example, in our empirical context, the large variety of the handset and operating system
combinations subjected app developers to significantly greater complexity in the Android
ecosystem than in the iOS ecosystem. During our interviews, many executives and
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engineers from app developer firms emphasized this difference. The quote below from
an engineer elucidates this:
“We need to test our app on different OEM devices likes Samsung, HTC to make
sure our app works on different Android devices.4 This creates a lot of work for
developer and testing teams. iOS does not have any such issue…this is our
biggest technological challenge with Android.”
Hence, an increase in ecosystem complexity translates into an increase in
complementor’s internal complexity with respect to its decision variables (i.e., the
choices that complementors make regarding their products, tasks, and organization).
For example, as the number of unique components that the complementor’s product
interacts with increases, there will be an increase in the number of decision variables
with respect to product design. These decision variables may also interact with each
other due to technological interdependence (i.e., hardware and software components) or
due to performance tradeoffs (i.e., higher value of a design variable that increases
performance with respect to one hardware component may decrease the performance
with respect to another hardware component).
Under conditions of high ecosystem complexity, the search for superior
performance configuration by follower firms will be difficult (e.g., Levinthal, 1997). This is
because higher ecosystem complexity increases the number of possible combinations of
decisions, which makes the search process intractable. Moreover, even if a follower firm
is able to innovate and identify a higher performance configuration, it is more likely that
the configuration represents a local optimum and may not lead to superior performance.

4

OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacturer. In our empirical context, it is used to refer to handset
manufacturers. Also, as this quote highlights that app developers do not create different apps for different
OEMs within the Android ecosystem. Rather they create the same app and try to ensure that it functions on
devices offered by the different OEMs. This is also consistent with our characterization of ecosystem
complexity faced by complementors.
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Further, such conditions also make it difficult for follower firms to search by incrementally
changing their decision variables (Rivkin, 2000).5
Beyond searching for superior configurations through innovation, followers can
also imitate leader firms. When ecosystem complexity is high, the focal firm with the
leadership position is also protected against imitation in two ways. First, follower firms
will find it difficult to decipher the exact configuration of the leader firm (Lippman and
Rumelt, 1982; Rivkin, 2000; Csaszar and Siggelkow, 2010). Second, even if a follower
attempts to replicate the exact configuration of the leader, greater complexity will help
sustain the leader’s superior performance. This is because a small error in imitation will
generate large penalties in performance when ecosystem complexity is high (Rivkin,
2000).
In summary, ecosystem complexity will help complementors sustain their
superior performance by making it more difficult for other complementors to search for or
to imitate higher performance configurations.6 Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 1: A complementor will be more likely to sustain its superior
performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.
Ecosystem Experience
A complementor’s experience within an ecosystem can also play a significant
role in its ability to sustain superior performance. Ecosystem experience, which spans
the entire period of participation in an ecosystem and not just the period of superior

5

It is worth noting that innovative search for superior performance configuration when ecosystem complexity
is high will be difficult for all firms. Our focus in this study is to explain the sustainability of superior
performance. Hence, our theoretical arguments are premised on some firms achieving superior performance,
and we focus on the difficulty of innovative search for follower firms (e.g., Rivkin, 2000).
6
It is possible that at very high levels of complexity, complementors with superior performance may also find
it difficult to innovate and maintain their leadership position. Hence, the difficulties with respect to innovation
encountered by both leader and follower firms at very high levels of ecosystem complexity might offset each
other. However, imitation by followers will still be difficult at such high levels of complexity. Therefore, in
considering the two mechanisms of innovation and imitation, the overall effect at very high levels of
ecosystem complexity might depend on the relative impact of these individual mechanisms for the leader and
the follower firms. We also note that such an extreme scenario of ecosystem complexity is unlikely to occur
in platform-based ecosystems because of the somewhat modular nature of the interfaces between the platform
and the complements.
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performance, will help confer several types of learning-based advantages on leader
firms. Sustaining superior performance requires leader firms to continuously search and
identify higher performing configurations. Experience facilitates the development and
improvement of routines, making search process underlying leader firms’ innovation
efforts with respect to other interdependent components more reliable (i.e., less prone to
mistakes) (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Experience also helps
improve the efficiency of leader firms’ search processes by reducing the cost of
experimentation and, hence, making it less costly for firms to innovate over time (Zott,
2003).
In addition to the abovementioned learning-by-doing advantages, an important
type of learning in ecosystems is what Rosenberg (1982) referred to as learning-byusing. This type of learning is not a function of the experience in developing and
producing the product per se, but rather is a function of the experience in the product’s
utilization by its users in conjunction with the rest of the system. Rosenberg (1982)
provided a valuable illustration of learning-by-using by aircraft manufactures and
suggested that this type of learning is especially important when the use of the product is
influenced by its interaction with other components. The existence of numerous
technological interdependencies within a platform-based ecosystem makes it difficult for
firms to know in advance how the product will perform during use and, hence,
experience that is rooted in the usage of the product by the users plays a vital role in
helping firms innovate and improve their products over time. A leader firm, by virtue of
having a large user base for a platform, will derive a significant advantage through
learning-by-using.
In our interviews, a senior engineer from a leading app developer firm elaborated
on the importance of experience as it relates to both learning-by-doing and learning-byusing:
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"Experience plays a critical part in our product lifecycle. From pure engineering
perspective…most of the knowledge and skills are acquired through the
development efforts over time. It is not easily accessible from outside-firm
sources, and it [is] essential for building a high quality, user delightful
application…The application keeps evolving at design and feature level, through
responding to user feedbacks and data. Engineering team also benefits from this
mostly capturing edge cases which is rarely producible in the internal
environment.”
Finally, experience in an ecosystem enables firms to accumulate knowledgebased assets such as new product development and marketing capabilities. Firms
imitating such assets will be subject to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and
Cool, 1989), making it easier for the leader firms to sustain their performance superiority.
Hence, experience in an ecosystem is likely to confer a high performing complementor
with both learning-by-doing and learning-by-using advantages as well as make it more
difficult for followers to replicate its knowledge-based assets.7 Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the complementor’s ecosystem experience, the
more likely the complementor will sustain its superior performance within
the ecosystem.
Complementor’s experiential advantage within an ecosystem may be impacted
by the level of ecosystem complexity. Greater ecosystem complexity increases
complementor’s internal complexity with respect to the choices that complementors
make regarding their products, tasks, and organization. This increase in internal
complexity can raise the opportunities for learning-by-doing (Balasubramanian and
Lieberman (2010)), making it more difficult for followers to catch up with experienced
leaders. In addition, the greater the degree of ecosystem complexity that a focal
complementor’s product is subjected to, the more uncertain will be the interactions
7

Our focus here is on theorizing with respect to complementors’ experience-based advantages for a specific
platform-based ecosystem. These advantages stem from learning-by-doing, learning-by-using and time
compression diseconomies associated with knowledge-based assets. Experience-based advantages in an
ecosystem could also stem from firms’ accumulation of other assets such as brand, customer loyalty, as well as
firms having a broader portfolio of products over time. We account for these drivers in our empirical analysis,
and we also show that complementor’s platform-specific experience (e.g., smartphone apps for iOS platform)
has a much greater impact on its sustainability than its general experience in the industry (e.g., smartphone
apps).

54

between the product and the rest of the system and, hence, the more valuable will be
learning-by-using. Finally, time compression diseconomies associated with the
followers’ imitation of knowledge-based assets accumulated by the leader firms are also
likely to increase in complexity (Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2010). Hence, we expect that
complementors’ ecosystem experience would be more valuable in sustaining their
superior performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low:
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of a complementor’s ecosystem
experience on the sustainability of its superior performance will be
stronger when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.
Generational Transitions by Platform Firms
Finally, we consider the impact of generational transitions initiated by platform
firms on the complementors’ ability to sustain their superior performance. While extant
literature has explored how technology transitions in the focal industry impacts firm
performance (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen,
1997), we explore how technology transitions initiated by platform firms may impact
complementors’ performance in the ecosystem. Therefore, we highlight an important
evolutionary feature of platform-based ecosystems in which a technological shift
orchestrated by the platform firm can have important consequences for the
complementors.
Transitioning to a new platform generation is an important mode by which
platform firms compete and create value. New platform generations typically offer
improvements in existing functionality and also add new functionality. In so doing, they
alter the interactions among components within the ecosystem (Venkatraman and Lee,
2004; Ansari and Garud, 2009; Adner and Kapoor, 2010). Hence, a new platform
generation may represent a case of an architectural change as discussed by Henderson
and Clark (1990), where the core design concepts and the associated knowledge are not
overturned but there is a change in the nature of interactions between the platform and
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the complements. This renders the strategic configurations of the high performing
complementors from the previous platform generation less effective. Put at a more
abstract level, the fitness landscape (i.e., mapping between strategic configurations and
performance) is re-specified (Levinthal, 1997). For example, when Apple introduced the
new mobile operating system named iOS 6, some of the music apps stopped working.
After updating to the new operating system, many users found that their music data had
disappeared. App developers had to optimize and retest their apps with the new
operating system to ensure smooth functioning of their apps. During our interview, a
senior engineer from an app developer firm also elaborated on this challenge:
“Although OS [Operating System] upgrades do a good job of the issue of
backward compatibility, but the new OS will depreciate some APIs from the older
version.8 If the apps are using the API from the older version, it is going to crash.
Further, we also try to use latest APIs in the new OS. If the user tries to run the
latest APIs on the older version, the app is going to crash.”
In another interview, a cofounder of a leading app developer firm discussed how
a recent transition in iOS impacted the functioning of his firm’s app:
“In iOS 7 [released in September 2013], Apple changed some parts of the
background infrastructure [API] the way an app interacts with the
operating system, in order to enhance the graphics on its new hardware.
And because of this change, our app literally stopped working on the new
version, when it was working perfectly in the previous version.”
At the same time, features introduced in the new platform generation can provide
opportunities for new complementors to enter the ecosystem and to effectively compete
against leader firms. Hence, while platform transitions are important for sustaining
technological progress within an ecosystem, they may present challenges for
complementors to sustain their superior performance:
Hypothesis 4: Generational transition initiated by the platform firm will
make it more difficult for the complementor to sustain its superior
performance within the ecosystem.
8

API stands for application program interface. In the context of smartphone ecosystems, these are software
protocols provided by platform firms such as Apple and Google for app developers to create apps for their
platforms.

56

In the face of a platform transition, complementors need to adapt so as to identify
new strategic configurations that can yield high performance. We now consider how
ecosystem complexity affects these firms’ ability to adapt — i.e., we explore the
interaction between platform transitions and ecosystem complexity. When ecosystem
complexity is low, adaptation through local search performed in the neighborhood of a
firm’s previous configuration is effective (Levinthal, 1997). Hence, a complementor with
a superior performance configuration in the previous platform generation will find it
relatively easier to identify and to move to a high performance configuration in the new
platform generation. In contrast, when ecosystem complexity is high, adaptation through
local search might not be very effective. Successful adaptation would require a greater
degree of change (i.e., often referred to as a long jump on a fitness landscape).
However, at the same time, greater complexity among firms’ choices makes such a
large-scale change very risky, as a small error or miscalculation can result in subpar
performance (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Therefore, complementors may find it much
more difficult to sustain their superior performance in the face of a platform transition
when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low:
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of platform transition on the
sustainability of a complementor’s superior performance will be stronger
when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.
Methodology
The empirical analysis is carried out in the context of the iOS and Android
smartphone ecosystems within the U.S. market. The focal complementor firms are
application software developers who were able to attain superior performance in these
ecosystems from January 2012 to January 2014. Smartphones based on iOS and
Android operating systems represented more than 90% of the U.S. smartphone installed
base during this period. Both Apple and Google provide a daily list of Top 500 apps by
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revenue. We use that information to identify the focal firms. The context is
hypercompetitive, where hundreds of thousands of app developers are frequently
introducing new apps or improved versions of their existing apps. Such high intensity of
competition makes it very difficult for app developers to sustain their superior
performance, even for a few months.
This setting also provides a valuable context in which we can observe two
ecosystems with varying levels of complexity for the app developers within the same
industrial context. This difference arises primarily due to the difference in the strategies
used by Apple and Google for controlling and governing their respective ecosystems.
Apple’s strategy is often described as a closed strategy, as it exercises strong control
over the entire ecosystem, with the objective of providing high quality experience to the
user (Ghazawneh and Henfidsson, 2013). Most notable is Apple’s strict control and
ownership of both the handset and the iOS operating system. In contrast, Google’s
strategy is premised on Android as an open-source operating system, which allows for
its development and distribution by various original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
such as HTC, LG, and Samsung. Hence, an app in the Android ecosystem interacts
with multiple handset and operating system combinations offered by various OEMs. As
a result, an app developer firm in the Android ecosystem operates in a relatively more
complex ecosystem compared to the one operating in the iOS ecosystem. The two
ecosystems also collectively underwent three episodes of platform transitions during our
observation period, which allowed us to examine the impact of platform transition on
complementors.
Data
The primary sources for our data are App Annie (www.appannie.com) and
appFigures (www.appfigures.com), two of the leading analyst firms in the mobile
computing sector. App Annie has been tracking and archiving information related to all
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the apps developed for iOS and Android platforms. Its data is extensively used by app
developers, venture capital firms, and financial analysts. Similarly, appFigures has
developed a comprehensive database of all apps in the iOS and Android ecosystems.
We used appFigures as a supplementary data source in order to validate the data
received from App Annie and to also extend the data to incorporate a more recent time
frame.9 Note that both App Annie and appFigures do not generate their own data, but
accumulate daily data from Google Play and Apple iTunes App stores over time and
offer their users easy-to-use tools for analyzing trends.
The dataset comprises information on app developers whose apps attained topranking positions by revenue (i.e., Top 500) in either the iOS or Android ecosystem from
January 2012 to January 2014. The dataset does not include some e-commerce apps
such as those from Amazon and Walmart, that do not generate revenues through paid
apps or in-app purchases via Apple iTunes or Google Play App stores. The revenue
distribution for smartphone apps is heavily skewed. For example, based on the survey
of more than 10,000 app developers, it was found that the top “1.6% of developers make
multiples of the other 98.4% combined” (VisionMobile, 2014).10 Therefore, having an
app in the Top 500 list offers clear evidence of performance superiority among hundreds
of thousands of app developers. Such a list is also keenly followed by industry
observers and analysts as a reference for successful app developers. We use this
revenue ranking to characterize firms’ superior performance. Ideally, we would have
also liked to have information on the actual revenues and profits within an ecosystem for
each of the app developers in the sample. However, such data is not made available by
app developers. Despite this constraint, rank-based relative performance information
9

Originally, App Annie was the primary source of data for the paper. We had received data from App Annie
from January 2012 to June 2013. We subsequently received data from appFigures that allowed us to extend
the timeline to January 2014.
10
The report is available at http://www.developereconomics.com/reports/developer-economics-q3-2014/. Last
accessed on March 10, 2016.
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provides us with an approach to capture the relative performance superiority of app
developers in an ecosystem that is consistent with our theory and is also consistent with
how industry analysts evaluate performance superiority among app developers.
The majority of firms whose apps appear in the Top 500 list do not stay in that list
for more than six months, a finding that is consistent with the context being
hypercompetitive. Unpacking such finer-grained performance dynamics requires
choosing an observation window that is shorter than the annual window typically
employed in strategy research (D’Aveni et al., 2010). We chose the period of
observation to be a given month that would allow us to explain greater variance in the
app developer’s sustainability of superior performance without being subject to
exogenous intermittent fluctuations in the Top 500 ranking associated with daily or
weekly observations. This required aggregating the daily revenue rank data into monthly
data. Because of the skewness of the distribution of revenues across the Top 500 apps,
taking a simple average of apps’ daily ranks to compute monthly ranks is problematic.
To adjust for this skewness, we followed a procedure guided by prior research.
Researchers have attempted to infer revenue and sales data from rank data by
conducting experiments, collaborating with focal firms, or using publicly available
information (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester, 2003; Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003;
Garg and Telang, 2013). These studies have found that the relationship between
revenue (or sales) and rank closely follows a Pareto distribution according to which:
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑏 ∗ (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘)−𝑎 + ∈
where b is the scale parameter that is a function of the total revenue and a is the
shape parameter of the underlying distribution that drives the difference in revenues
across ranks. Moreover, the shape parameter for the Pareto distribution for this
relationship has been found to be proximate to 1. For example, in a recent study by
Garg and Telang (2013), shape parameters for the iOS and Android apps were
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estimated to be between 0.86 and 1.16. Hence, to account for the Pareto distribution in
our data, we assume the daily revenue for an app in the Top 500 list to be inversely
proportional to its rank.11 Further, we assume the scale parameter for each ecosystem
to be constant during a given month. This allows us to calculate an app’s monthly
revenue rank for both the iOS and the Android ecosystems.
In addition to data on app developers whose apps achieved a Top 500 rank by
revenue, we also obtained monthly data on the total number of apps and firms within
each category of apps (e.g., games, social networking, productivity). We supplemented
data from App Annie and appFigures with data from firms’ websites and LinkedIn
(www.linkedin.com) to gather information on the number of employees and firms’
participation in businesses other than smartphone apps. We also directly contacted
some firms to obtain information on their number of employees. To measure ecosystem
complexity faced by app developers within the Android ecosystem, we obtained data on
the monthly share of the U.S. installed base for each of the smartphone OEMs from
comScore (www.comscore.com). We also used the aggregate statistics on installed
base, the number of app developers, and the number of apps for both iOS and Android
to rule out that the observation period (Jan’ 2012 – Jan’ 2014) is not idiosyncratic in
ways that may impact our inferences. The level of analysis is firm-ecosystem-month,
and the final dataset comprises 12,691 observations from 1,516 app developer firms.
Measures
Dependent variable: We examine the sustainability of superior performance for
app developers by observing whether their apps continue to be among the Top 500 apps
by revenue in the iOS or the Android ecosystem. These ecosystems represented most
of the economic opportunities for smartphone app developers during the observation

11

Note that the inversely proportional relationship between app revenue and rank also follows from Zipf’s law
that is frequently used to approximate actual data from rank data in physical and social sciences.
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period. Revenues in other smartphone ecosystems such as RIM’s Blackberry,
Microsoft’s Windows Mobile and Nokia’s Symbian were relatively negligible. Hence,
being ranked in the Top 500 apps by revenue in iOS or Android corresponds to
significant economic performance for app developers. For about 80% of the cases, a
firm had a single app in the Top 500 list in the same month. Since our level of analysis
is a firm and not an app, if a firm had more than one app in the Top 500 list in the same
month, we treated those cases as a single firm-level observation. A related issue with
our measure is that for some firms, sustainability in an ecosystem may be driven by
different apps (i.e., App A is in Top 500 list in month t and App B (not App A) is in Top
500 list in month t+1). It is possible that App B may be a close substitute to App A or
that App B is a “new” app focusing on a different use. We discuss this issue in the
robustness checks section and conduct an additional analysis by including firms which
only had a single app in the Top 500 list.
Similar to Wiggins and Ruefli (2002, 2005) and Hermelo and Vassolo (2010), we
consider a firm’s superior performance to be eroded if it exits the superior performance
stratum (i.e., the Top 500 list). In order to ensure that the exit is somewhat persistent
rather than intermittent, we use a window of three months to record the exit event (i.e.,
firm’s app is not present in the Top 500 list for three consecutive months after being in
that list in the previous month). Hence, a firm is assumed to sustain its superior
performance if its app continues to be in the Top 500 list in at least one of the following
three months. We also performed sensitivity checks by using windows of two and four
months respectively.
On average, an app developer remains in the Top 500 list for a longer duration in
the Android ecosystem (7 months) than in the iOS ecosystem (5 months). Moreover, in
the iOS ecosystem, about half of the firms exit the Top 500 list in less than two months,
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whereas in the Android ecosystem, this duration is about five months. This pattern is
consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 1.
Independent variables: Complexity has been defined and measured in many
different ways across different scientific fields (Lloyd, 2001). This is because no single
approach can capture what scientists from different fields mean by complex (Page,
2010). In general, most definitions and associated measures consider complexity
based on the difficulty of describing or creating an object, or based on the degree of
organization with respect to the object (e.g., structural linkages between parts of a
system). Our measure of ecosystem complexity needs to account for the technological
interdependencies that an app developer is subjected to with other components within a
smartphone ecosystem. Therefore, our approach here is consistent with characterizing
complexity in terms of the degree of organization. For smartphone ecosystem, the most
obvious interdependencies for an app developer are with respect to the operating
system and the handset. Hence, the greater the number of operating system and
handset combinations that an app developer is subjected to, the greater is the
ecosystem complexity faced by the app developer. As Apple controls both the operating
system and handset, an app in the iOS ecosystem interacts only with the combination
offered by Apple. In the case of the Android ecosystem, although the core operating
system is designed by Google, each smartphone OEM customizes the operating system
and the handset. As a result, an app in the Android ecosystem interacts with handset
and operating system combinations from many different OEMs. Our interviews also
confirmed that app developers typically do not develop different apps for different OEMs
in the Android ecosystem. It is the same app that works across different handset and
operating system configurations provided by the OEMs.
Since ecosystem complexity faced by app developers is rooted in the diversity in
the operating system and handset combinations offered by OEMs, we use a Simpson
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index-based diversity measure to operationalize ecosystem complexity (Page, 2010).12
The measure ecosystem complexity is the sum of the squares of the monthly shares of
the U.S. installed base for smartphone OEMs in an ecosystem.13 It takes a value of 1 for
the iOS ecosystem and ranges from 0.28 to 0.40 for the more complex Android
ecosystem. We multiplied the measure by -1 so that higher values indicate higher
ecosystem complexity.
We measured ecosystem experience as the total number of months that a firm
gained experience in a given ecosystem. To obtain this measure, we first identified the
month in which the firm introduced its first app in the ecosystem (i.e., month of entry)
and then computed the number of months between the observation month and the
month of entry. We identified the effect of platform transition using a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if a new generation of smartphone operating system was
introduced within the prior three months.14 The reason for the three-month window is
that it often takes users several weeks to adopt the new generation of operating system
and a similar time frame for app developers to adapt and reconfigure their apps. During
12

An alternative could be a measure based on the Shannon index. The two indices differ with respect to the
relative weights that they ascribe to each OEM’s installed base. The Simpson index uses the proportion of
each OEM’s installed base as weights to calculate the weighted arithmetic mean of the share of installed base
for each OEM. The Simpson index thus gives higher weights to the OEMs which have high installed base. In
contrast, the Shannon index uses weights based on natural logarithm of the proportion of installed base of each
OEM and thus ascribes relatively higher weights to the OEMs with the low installed base. Hence, the measure
is somewhat inconsistent with the fact that app developers focus most of their efforts on OEMs with high
installed base. The Simpson index is mathematically equivalent to the popular Herfindahl index used in
economics and management literature to measure industry concentration. Herfindahl index is based on the
sales of different firms within an industry whereas our measure is based on the installed base of the different
OEMs within an ecosystem.
13
Note also that our measure is based on the share of OEMs installed base and not the share of their sales.
This is because the market for apps is not only confined to new smartphones being sold but it also
encompasses existing smartphones being used. As an additional alternative measure, we could have also used
a count-based measure of the number of smartphone OEMs or the number of the different types of
smartphones in a given ecosystem. However, in our interviews, industry participants repeatedly asserted that
their firms focus their app development efforts on the small subset of more commonly used handsets. For
example, in Android, they consistently referred to focusing their efforts so that the same app works on 6-8
leading smartphones from multiple OEM firms. The Simpson index-based measure helps to account for this
concentration effect.
14
New generations of smartphone operating system were identified based on change in the code name (e.g.,
change from Ice Cream Sandwich to Jelly Bean in the case of Android, and from iOS 5 to iOS 6), a standard
practice in this industry. In addition to launching new generations of operating system, both Apple and
Google also offer minor updates which are predominantly “bug fixes” within the existing generation.
Therefore, we do not consider these minor updates as platform-level generational transitions.
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the period of study, there were two major platform transitions in the iOS ecosystem
(launch of iOS 6 in September 2012 and launch of iOS 7 in September 2013) and one
major transition in the Android ecosystem (launch of the Jellybean 4.1 operating system
in July 2012). Although Google officially launched Jellybean 4.1 in July 2012, it became
available to the majority of U.S. consumers through the different OEMs only in
December 2012. We verified this information by searching for news articles discussing
the launch of Jellybean 4.1 by OEMs such as Samsung, HTC, and Motorola, often with
new generations of handsets. Hence, for the Android ecosystem, we considered the
period of platform transition to last from January to March of 2013.
To ensure that our coding of these platform transitions matches with our
theoretical premise of challenges faced by complementors during such episodes, we
used data from Google Trends for searches made on Google in the U.S. with the search
term “app not working.”15 Figure 3.1 plots the normalized weekly trend of search volume
from January 2012 to January 2014. It shows clear instances of peaks during the
months in which new generations of operating system are introduced within the iOS and
Android ecosystems. Hence, these trends confirm our coding schema and provide
evidence of the challenges faced by app developers during periods of platform
transitions.16
(Insert Figure 3.1 about here)
Control variables: We controlled for a number of covariates that may influence an
app developer’s ability to sustain its superior performance. We used the total number of
employees as a proxy for firm size and used this variable to control for scale-related

15

Results can include searches containing "app" and "not working" in any order. Other related terms may be
included in the search results, like "music app not working."
16
We note that the introduction of new generations of smartphone operating system are also typically
accompanied by the introduction of new handsets by OEMs. However, the older handsets still account for the
majority of users during the transition period. Hence, for both iOS and Android ecosystems, the major driver
of app developers’ performance as well as their adaptation requirements during generational transitions stem
from the change in the operating system rather than from the launch of the new handsets.
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effects. Data on the total number of employees was collected from the firm’s website or
LinkedIn. For those firms for which this information was not available, we contacted
them via e-mail and received a 78% response rate.
About 64% of firms in the sample participated in both the iOS and Android
ecosystems. Participation in both ecosystems may create challenges with respect to
resource allocation over time. We controlled for this effect through the variable dual
participation, which takes a value of 1 if the firm had an app in both the iOS and Android
ecosystems in a given month and 0 otherwise. We also controlled for the firm’s
presence in markets other than smartphone apps that may confer advantages such as
those with respect to brand, customer loyalty, and economies of scope. The variable
other online business takes a value of 1 if a firm is active in other web- or PC-based
businesses like owning a social networking website or developing software for PC. The
variable other offline business takes a value of 1 if the firm’s scope of businesses
expanded beyond the internet and PC domain, such as console games.
App developers often try to gain visibility by providing free apps. We controlled
for this effect through a dummy variable Top 500 free ranking that takes a value of 1 if
any of the apps developed by the firm were also part of the Top 500 ranking based on
the number of downloads for free apps in a given month. We also controlled for the
overall quality of firms’ apps by using data on consumer ratings received by all apps
developed by the firm. We are unable to observe the change in ratings for all apps over
time. Hence, we used a time-invariant firm-level control to capture firm-level differences
in app quality. Consumers can rate an app from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 being the highest
quality. The variable firm app rating is the average rating of all apps developed by the
firm in a given ecosystem as of March, 2014. We also controlled for the price of the
focal app that is in the Top 500 list (by revenue). For firms that had more than one app
in the Top 500 list in the same month, we used the price for the app with the highest
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rank. Many app developers derive their revenues through in-app purchases, and hence,
their revenues include recurring revenues from existing customers. To account for this
feature of the business model, we include a variable In-app purchases, which takes a
value of 1 if the focal app has an in-app purchase option. This would also help us to
control for the benefits that firms may derive from customer loyalty or customer switching
cost.
Firms predominantly offered apps in a specific category such as games, music,
social networking or productivity. We controlled for this category-level heterogeneity
through category fixed effects and other category-level time-varying controls.17 A firm
can continue to have its apps in the Top 500 ranking if there is a high level of demand
for a particular category of apps in which the firm is active in. We account for this
possibility using the variable apps in top 500, which is the total number of apps in the
Top 500 list in a given month within the same category as the focal firm’s app. While the
context in general is hypercompetitive, there may be differences in the competitive
intensity across categories over time. We included two variables to account for these
differences. First, we included the total number of new apps that were introduced in a
category in a given month. This variable captures apps launched by both new and
existing firms. Second, we included the total number of new firms that entered the
category in a given month. The two variables are log-transformed to account for
skewness.
Analysis
We tested our hypotheses using continuous time event history analysis to
estimate the hazard rate of app developers exiting the superior performance stratum.
This approach is consistent with prior studies which have focused on studying the

17

In the few cases where firms offered apps in multiple categories, we used information for the highest
ranking app to calculate values for the category-level control variables.
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sustainability of firms’ superior performance (e.g., Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002, 2005;
Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010). Many firms in our sample did not exit the superior
performance stratum during the observation period. Hence, our data is right censored.
Event history models are well suited to account for right-censored observations (Allison,
1984). Since we are studying only those firms that made it to the Top 500 ranking and
were subjected to the risk of exiting the superior performance stratum, our data does not
have left censoring. Some firms in our sample entered the superior performance
stratum before the start of the observation period. Hence, our data is left truncated. We
checked for potential biases due to left truncation through an additional robustness
check. We did this by including observations for firms that only entered in the iOS or
Android ecosystems from January 2012 onwards. We report this analysis in the
robustness checks section after presenting our main results.
We constructed data in the long form to account for time-varying covariates. We
used the Cox proportional hazards model, a robust technique for hazard rate analysis
that does not require making an additional assumption about the shape of the baseline
hazard, which may be increasing, decreasing, constant, or non-monotonous (Cox,
1975). This helps address concerns with respect to incorrect distributional assumptions
yielding biased estimates (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002), and the choice of parametric
specification based on observed data generating inconsistent results (Carroll and
Hannan, 2000). Further, we tested for proportionality hazard assumption by checking if
the slope of the regression equation of scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time is nonzero
for full model as well as for all predictor variables (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). We
found that the proportionality hazard assumption was not satisfied for Top 500 free
ranking and price variables. To overcome this issue, we followed the recommended
approach in the literature by including interaction terms between time (in months) and
the respective variables to allow for the effect of these variables to vary over time. As a
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robustness check, we also performed our estimations using the piecewise constant
model with month-specific effects. The estimates from these models were consistent
with those obtained from the Cox model.
Results
We report the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates in
Table 3.1. We report the results from the Cox model in Table 3.2. The model estimates
the hazard rate that a firm exits the superior performance stratum and, hence, its inability
to sustain its superior performance. The reported coefficients can be exponentiated to
obtain hazard ratios, which are interpreted as the multiplier of the baseline hazard of the
firm exiting the superior performance stratum when the variable increases by one unit
(Allison, 2000). An increase in hazard can also be interpreted as shortening the time
period for which a firm sustains its superior performance. All standard errors reported
were corrected for non-independence across multiple observations faced by the same
firm by clustering observations for each firm. Model 1 is a baseline model. Models 2, 3,
and 4, include ecosystem complexity, ecosystem experience, and platform transition to
test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, respectively. Model 5, includes the interaction term
between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience to test Hypothesis 3. Model
6, includes the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform transition to
test Hypothesis 5. Model 7 is the fully specified model with all of the independent
variables and the interaction terms.
(Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here)
The results from the baseline model (Model 1) suggest that the likelihood of app
developers sustaining their superior performance increases with their firm size, if they
offered in-app purchases, and if they had other web- or PC-based online businesses.
Also, app developers who offered apps in both ecosystems and who offered free apps
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that were ranked among the Top 500 free apps in terms of downloads were likely to
sustain their superior performance.
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that higher ecosystem complexity will be
associated with greater likelihood of complementors sustaining their superior
performance. This prediction was supported in all of the models (Models 2, 5, 6, 7). The
coefficient for ecosystem complexity is negative and statistically significant (p-value <
0.01). In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficient in Model 2, we find that an
increase in ecosystem complexity by one standard deviation reduces the app
developer’s likelihood of exiting the superior performance stratum by 22%.
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that firms with greater experience within the
ecosystem will be more likely to sustain their superior performance. We find support for
Hypothesis 2, as the coefficient for ecosystem experience is negative and statistically
significant in Models 3, 5, and 7 (p-value < 0.01). In considering the magnitude of
estimated coefficients, an increase in an app developer’s experience by one standard
deviation (16 months) decreases its likelihood of exiting the superior performance
stratum by 13%. In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that generational transitions initiated by
platform firms will make it more difficult for complementors to sustain their superior
performance. We find support for this prediction as the coefficient for platform transition
is positive and statistically significant in Models 4, 6, and 7 (p-value < 0.01). In
considering the magnitude of estimated coefficient in Model 4, we find that an app
developer’s likelihood of exiting the superior performance stratum increases by about
44% during the platform transition.
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effect of complementor’s ecosystem
experience on the sustainability of its superior performance will be moderated by
ecosystem complexity such that the effect will be stronger when ecosystem complexity is
high than when it is low. We find support for Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient for the
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interaction term between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience is negative
and statistically significant (p < 0.10) in both Models 5 and 7. Finally, the coefficient for
the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform transition is positive
and statistically significant in both Models 6 and 7 (p < 0.05). Hence, we find support for
Hypothesis 5 that platform transitions make it more difficult for complementors to sustain
their superior performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.
Figure 3.2 illustrates these interaction effects by plotting the average marginal effects of
ecosystem complexity for different values of ecosystem experience and platform
transition based on estimates in Model 7, holding all other variables at their mean
values. The standard errors for the average marginal effects are estimated using the
delta method and are calculated by the margins routine in STATA.

(Insert Figure 3.2 about here)
Robustness checks
We conducted a number of additional checks to establish the robustness of our
findings. The robustness checks are summarized in Table 3.3 and the results are
reported in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. In Table 3.4, we explore alternative
explanations that could drive our main results, and in Table 3.5, we focus on the
sensitivity of our results to alternative measures and operationalization.
(Insert Table 3.3 about here)
Alternative Explanations
Firms may be self-selecting into the iOS or Android ecosystems, and this may
subject our estimates to a firm-level selection bias. To address this concern, we
estimated a model by including data for only those firms that participated in both
ecosystems. The coefficient estimates are reported in Model 8 and exhibit similar
patterns as our main results. The only exception was that the interaction term between
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ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience is marginally insignificant (p-value =
0.15). Another type of a “selection” issue is that that certain types of firms (unobservable
to us) are more likely to achieve superior performance in an ecosystem of a given
complexity. If we are not able to characterize the type based on the observables, our
inferences with respect to ecosystem complexity might be particularly problematic. To
address this concern, we ran an additional check by using the sample of 278 firms that
achieved superior performance in both iOS and Android ecosystems, and we included
firm-fixed effects in that analysis. The results are reported in Model 9 and are
qualitatively similar to our main results. The standard errors for a fixed-effects model
with a much smaller sample size are somewhat higher with the interaction terms being
marginally insignificant.
(Insert Table 3.4 about here)
In order to ensure that the significant effect of app developers’ ecosystem
experience is not simply an artifact of their general experience with apps, we performed
a supplementary analysis on firms that participated in both ecosystems. We controlled
for the app developers’ general experience – the total number of months that an app
developer has been active in the smartphone app market for iOS and Android apps.
Firms with greater general experience may benefit through superior app development
and marketing capabilities as well as having a stronger brand. The results are reported
in Model 10. While the coefficient for general experience is negative and statistically
significant, the coefficient for ecosystem experience remains statistically significant, and
its magnitude is almost twice as that of the coefficient for general experience. Hence,
this check helps to reinforce that complementors’ experiential benefit has a strong
ecosystem-specific component.18

18

We performed an additional check to ensure that the experience effect is not simply driven by customer
loyalty resulting in high app revenues through continued in-app purchases. To do so, we re-ran Model 5 on a
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We also explore other possible explanations with respect to different types of
firms and their strategies.19 Firms in our sample include those that are pure app firms
which derive all of their revenues from app stores and those firms which also have other
online or offline businesses. To check if there are any systematic differences between
these firms, we estimated separate models for pure app firms (Model 11) and for firms
which also had other businesses (Model 12). The coefficient estimates are qualitatively
similar to our main results. The interaction term of ecosystem complexity*experience
loses statistical significance possibly because of smaller sample size and the fact that
pure app firms are generally younger than the other firms. It is also possible that app
developers may differ in terms of their innovations and investments in apps, and the size
of their app portfolio. These differences may be correlated with their experience or
ecosystem complexity. To rule out these explanations, we collected additional data on
the total number of apps and the number of updates to the focal apps for the firms which
were active in Jan’ 2016. For this sample of firms, we included controls for the total
number of updates, and the total number of updates in the previous three months (Model
13), and the total number of apps in a given month (Model 14). Finally, while both iOS
and Android were dominant smartphone platforms during the observation period, there is
variation in their overall sales growth over time. To ensure that our results are not
impacted by the relative differences in sales growth between iOS and Android, we
obtained quarterly unit sales data from IDC (the data was not available at monthly
intervals), and included it as an additional control in Model 15. The results with these
additional control variables continue to support our predictions, and give us greater
confidence in our findings.
sample of 467 firms whose apps in the Top 500 list did not include an in-app purchase option. The experience
effects continued to be significant even for a very small sample, giving us additional confidence with respect
to our inferences.
19
We thank the two anonymous reviewers for suggesting these analyses in order to rule out alternative
explanations.
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Alternative Measures
A potential concern with the analysis could be that our measure for ecosystem
complexity, based on the OEMs’ installed base, does not account for the diversity of
handset configurations within OEMs. For example, in the case of iOS ecosystem, the
measure remains constant throughout the observation period and does not capture
differences with respect to the types of phones, especially does with different screen
sizes (e.g., iPhone 4s and 5). For an app developer, screen size in addition to OEM
operating system configuration can be an important driver of the variety of the handset
and operating system combinations that their app interacts with. While designing an
app, the developer needs to carefully ensure that its app fits and works seamlessly
across the different screen sizes of the different OEMs (Panzarino, 2012). Further, since
the measure of ecosystem complexity is significantly correlated with the type of platform
(i.e., iOS or Android), it might be capturing some unobserved differences with respect to
platform firms’ strategies or user-characteristics across these platforms. These
differences may impact the relative ease with which app developer firms can sustain
their superior performance in a given ecosystem, and may make some of our inferences
problematic. To address this possibility and to account for OEM-level screen size
variations faced by app developers, we obtained detailed data on installed base of
handsets and user characteristics from comScore. comScore conducts a monthly
survey of about twelve thousand U.S. smartphone users and collects data on their
handset profiles, user demographics and the app usage patterns. The survey data for
each month is then adjusted to account for national demographics. Due to high cost of
this survey data, we were only able to obtain this information for the period from
January, 2012 to May, 2013, which also resulted in the exclusion of observations for an
iOS platform transition (i.e., iOS 7).
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We explore the robustness of our results by including a finer-grained measure of
ecosystem complexity based on the number of unique OEM firm and screen size
combinations. The use of this measure also allows us to control for the focal platform.
The variable iOS takes the value of 1 if the app developer is participating in the iOS
platform and 0 if it is participating in the Android platform. To account for differences in
demographics and app usage between the iOS and Android users, we include three
control variables. The variable App download measures the percentage of users who
download 5 or more apps in a given month in the focal platform. The variables Female
user and Age measure the percentage of female users and the percentage of users of
age between 18 and 45 years. We report the results in Models 16-18. Model 16
includes the new measure of ecosystem complexity and with controls for user
characteristics. Model 17 includes the additional control for iOS. The coefficient
estimates continue to support our predictions. Model 18 includes the interaction terms.
The coefficients for the interaction terms have large standard errors possibly because of
multicollinearity with respect to some of the key variables with individual variance
inflation (VIF) factors well above the recommended cutoff level of 10 (VIF is 47 for
ecosystem complexity, 46 for iOS, and 13 for the ecosystem complexity and experience
interaction term), and the fact that there are fewer episodes of platform transitions.
Moreover, our theory and our measures are at the level of the firm in an
ecosystem. However, in our empirical design, it is possible that for some firms,
sustainability in an ecosystem may be measured across different apps i.e., App A is in
top 500 list in month t and App B (not App A) is in top 500 list in month t+1. In our
sample, of the 9672 sustainability events for iOS and Android ecosystems (i.e., focal firm
has an app in the Top 500 list for two consecutive months), there were only 661
sustainability events where the focal firm had a different app in the Top 500 list in the
subsequent month. As an additional robustness check, we only used the sample of
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firms that had a single app in the Top 500 list in a given ecosystem. The estimates
reported in Model 19 continue to support all of the predictions.
In our main results, we considered a firm to be in the superior performance
stratum if its app appeared in the Top 500 list by revenue, and we used a three-month
observation window to assess whether the firm sustains its superior performance or not.
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to these choices, we used a higher
performance threshold based on a firm’s app in the Top 250 list by revenue (Model 20),
and we also used windows of two and four months (Models 21 and 22). The coefficient
estimates for all the three models continue to support our predictions.

(Insert Table 3.5 about here)

Finally, some firms in our sample entered the superior performance stratum
before the start of the observation period. Hence, our data is left truncated. We tested
for any potential biases due to left truncation by only including observations for those
firms that entered these ecosystems from January 2012 onwards (Model 23). The
coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar as our main results with the exception of the
interaction term between ecosystem complexity and firm experience exhibiting similar
magnitude and sign, but the estimates are not precise enough for statistical significance.
This is possibly due to the fact that these estimations are based on a smaller sample
and that too of younger app developer firms. Overall, these additional analyses with
alternative measures help to further establish the robustness of our findings.
Discussion
We study the increasingly prominent phenomenon of platform-based ecosystems
in which value is created through a network of firms offering complementary products
and services around a platform. Value creation in such ecosystems is shaped by
platform firms who own the underlying technical architecture and set the rules for
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complementors’ participation. We explore the strategic implications for complementors
by considering how ecosystem-level interdependencies affect the extent to which
complementors can sustain their value creation in an ecosystem. We offer a novel
perspective of complementors’ ecosystem-level interdependencies that is rooted in the
structural and evolutionary features of the ecosystem. The structural feature is based on
the technological interdependence between complementors’ products and other
components in the ecosystem. We refer to this feature as ecosystem complexity faced
by the complementor. We incorporate the evolutionary features by taking into account
the technology transitions initiated by platform firms and the experience gained by
complementors in an ecosystem over time.
We test our arguments on app developers in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android
smartphone ecosystems from January 2012 to January 2014. During the period of
study, both of these ecosystems were populated by hundreds of thousands of app
developers that offered a wide variety of specialized software applications to smartphone
users. The stark contrast between Apple’s “closed” model and Google’s “open” model,
in addition to several episodes of platform transitions initiated by these firms, allowed us
to examine how ecosystem complexity and platform transitions faced by app developers
impacted the ease with which they could sustain their superior performance within an
ecosystem. Consistent with our arguments, we find that higher ecosystem complexity
and ecosystem experience helps app developers sustain their superior performance
whereas platform transition makes it more difficult. We also find that on the one hand,
ecosystem complexity enhances the benefit of ecosystem experience whereas it
exacerbates the impact of platform transition
Our study's findings make important contributions to the literature streams in
strategy on business ecosystems, platforms, technological change and to the
evolutionary economics perspective in general. Scholars studying business ecosystems
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have focused on the coordination and technological challenges with respect to
complementors and the resulting implications for firms’ organizational choices and value
creation (e.g., Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2014; Kapoor and Lee,
2013; Kapoor, 2013). Scholars studying platforms have focused on the strategies used
by platform firms to attract complementors and to compete against rival platforms
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010;
Eisenmann et al.; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). While these literature streams have shifted the
theoretical emphasis from industries and products to business ecosystems and
platforms, the primary mode of inquiry is to illustrate how firms manage their
interdependence with complementors so as to create and appropriate value.
In this study, we focus on the other side of the phenomenon, beyond the platform
firms and illustrate how complementors’ value appropriation is shaped by the structural
and evolutionary features of the ecosystems. Our findings have implications for both
platform firms such as Apple and Google that set the rules and own the platform and
complementors such as app developers that follow the rules and leverage the platform.
We show how the strategies of the platform firms may play a significant role in the
complementors’ ability to appropriate value over time. While major technological
changes within the platform are important for sustaining the progress of the ecosystem
over time, these platform transitions can create high uncertainty and disrupt the
leadership position of complementors who are significant contributors to value created in
the ecosystem. At the same time, platform transitions can present new opportunities for
other complementors to create value in the ecosystem. Hence, we shed light on the
challenges and the trade-offs that platform firms and complementors face in their quest
for value creation and appropriation over time.
By showing how platform firms’ strategies can shape the level of complexity and
uncertainty faced by complementors, we depart from the existing treatments of firms’
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environments that are typically premised on complexity and uncertainty being a general
feature of the industry (e.g., Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson and Tushman, 2001;
Eisenhardt, 1989). In so doing, we offer a new lens on the interactions between firms
and their environments through which complexity and uncertainty faced by
complementors is explicitly determined by the strategies of platform firms. This can also
result in the same firm being subject to different types of environments in the same
industry. Further, literature on technological change has shed light on how technology
transitions impacts the performance of firms in the focal industry (e.g., (Tushman and
Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997). We contribute to this
literature by highlighting how technology transitions initiated by platform firms can impact
the performance of complementor firms within an ecosystem. Hence, we highlight that
technological interdependencies between platform firms and complementors in related
industries can have important consequences for complementors during periods of
platform transitions. Relatedly, the evidence in the study also points to the difficulties of
coordinating technology transitions at the level of the ecosystem. Even if platform firms
intend to create a smooth generational transition for all of their complementors, the
system-level interdependencies and technological uncertainties make such coordination
difficult.
The study is also among the first to provide systematic empirical evidence
regarding the role of complexity on firm performance as theorized within the evolutionary
economics perspective (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti
and Levinthal, 2004). While scholars have drawn on a variety of theoretical approaches
to model firms’ search processes and their performance outcomes at different levels of
complexity, empirical evidence regarding the role of complexity on firm performance has
been somewhat lacking (Lenox et al. (2010) is an important exception). We show that
complexity plays an important role in sustaining superior performance in business

79

ecosystems, and its impact is especially strong for firms with greater ecosystem-specific
experience and during periods of platform transitions. Finally, we also offer an empirical
contribution to the strategy literature by going beyond the typically used annual datasets
to shorter temporal windows of months. We show that finer-grained observational
periods can be useful in deciphering performance dynamics in hypercompetitive settings
such as the smartphone context.
The findings and the inferences from the study are subject to a number of
caveats that offer opportunities for future research. First, they are limited to a single
empirical context, and their validity needs to be established across other settings.
Relatedly, Apple’s closed model and Google’s open model played a significant role in
determining the extent of ecosystem complexity faced by smartphone app developers.
However, theoretically, this correlation does not imply that a closed model will always
result in low ecosystem complexity for complementors. The origins of ecosystem
complexity might not only be rooted in the choices of the platform firms across different
ecosystems but also in the choices of the complementors within the same ecosystem
(Agarwal and Kapoor, 2017). Further, while we focus on the short-run impact of platform
transitions on complementors, platform transitions can also have a long-run impact on
the ecosystem complexity faced by complementors. Second, our measure of superior
performance is premised on whether firms’ apps are ranked within Top 500 apps in
terms of revenue in the two dominant smartphone ecosystems. Although this measure
is consistent with our theory and is widely accepted as a proxy for superior performance
in these ecosystems, it may not represent superior economic performance for firms in
general. Specifically, the measure does not account for the costs of participation in an
ecosystem, and is not sensitive to the differences between ecosystems in terms of total
revenue. It is possible that a firm may have a high revenue-based rank in an ecosystem
with low total revenue (i.e., large share of a small revenue pie), or a firm may incur high
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cost of participation. Both of these possibilities might result in firms with low
performance (revenue/profits) at the level of the industry being categorized as ones with
superior performance at the level of the ecosystem. Hence, the applicability of our
measure with respect to overall economic performance for the firm is subject to some
important boundary conditions. Our finding with respect to the interaction effect between
ecosystem experience and ecosystem complexity is less robust than our other findings.
This could imply that our theorized mechanism may be subject to some boundary
conditions or that our measures are somewhat limited in their ability to tease out this
effect. Finally, our dataset is limited to only 25 months, and while we observe significant
fluctuations within the competitive landscape over this relatively short period, we are
unable to draw inferences over longer time frames.
Despite these and other limitations, the study offers one of the first explorations
of performance of complementor firms in platform-based ecosystems. We propose a
novel perspective of complementors’ ecosystem-level interdependencies that is rooted in
the structural and evolutionary features of the ecosystem, and show that such a
perspective is useful in explaining the extent to which complementors can appropriate
value within an ecosystem over time. In so doing, the study also sheds light on how the
performance of complementors in business ecosystems can be shaped by the rules and
the actions of the platform firms that orchestrate the ecosystem.
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Figure 3.1: Normalized weekly trend based on Google’s search data for the term
“app not working” for US-based searches

(Data source: Google Trends; http://www.google.com/trends/: Data last accessed on
August 29, 2014)
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Variable
Ecosystem
complexity
Ecosystem
experience
Platform
transition
New apps
New firms
Apps in Top
500
Firm size
(employees)
Other online
business
Other offline
business
Dual
participation
Firm app
rating
Top 500 free
app
In-app
purchases
App price

Mean

Std.
Dev.

1

-0.66

0.34

1.00

22.91

16.07

-0.55

1.00

0.18

0.38

-0.14

0.13

1.00

7.84

0.97

-0.14

0.07

0.11

1.00

6.35

0.77

-0.03

-0.01

0.07

0.95

1.00

199.01 162.78 0.06

-0.08

0.05

0.76

0.71

1.00

6.22

17.92

-0.04

0.17

0.00

-0.06

-0.07

-0.07

1.00

0.59

0.49

-0.03

0.10

0.01

-0.04

-0.04

-0.01

0.23

1.00

0.30

0.46

-0.03

0.12

0.01

-0.06

-0.09

-0.07

0.40

0.29

1.00

0.63

0.48

0.12

0.04

0.01

0.12

0.14

0.20

0.15

0.20

0.17

1.00

4.01

0.49

0.25

-0.29

-0.03

0.17

0.16

0.22

-0.23

-0.14

-0.18

-0.05

1.00

0.56

0.50

-0.17

0.16

0.01

0.11

0.12

0.13

0.07

0.03

-0.05

0.08

0.01

1.00

0.82

0.38

0.03

-0.02

0.03

0.22

0.21

0.29

0.01

-0.02

-0.12

0.08

0.06

0.20

1.00

3.55

30.90

-0.04

0.03

0.00

-0.08

-0.09

-0.10

0.01

0.01

0.04

-0.03

0.01

-0.10

-0.10

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1

Correlations greater than 0.01 or smaller than -0.01 are significant at p <0.05, N= 12,691
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Table 3.2: Cox proportional hazards estimates for firms exiting the superior
performance strata
Model 1
Ecosystem complexity

Model 2
-0.740***
(0.125)

Ecosystem experience

Model 3

Model 4

-0.008***
(0.002)

Platform transition

Model 5
-0.691***
(0.181)
-0.027***
(0.008)

0.365***
(0.082)

Ecosystem complexity*experience

0.763***
(0.258)
-0.016*
(0.008)

Ecosystem complexity*transition
New apps
New firms
Apps in Top 500
(Apps in Top 500)2
Firm size (employee)
Other online business
Other offline business
Dual participation
Firm app rating
Top 500 free app
Top 500 free app*time
In-app purchases
App price
App price*time
Category fixed effect
Total observation
Total firms
Total exit events
Log likelihood

Model 6
-0.784***
(0.134)

0.074
(0.164)
-0.182
(0.207)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.000*
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.217***
(0.080)
0.125
(0.096)
-0.481***
(0.078)
-0.089
(0.068)
-0.678***
(0.101)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.582***
(0.101)
-0.089
(0.062)
0.003
(0.003)

-0.485**
(0.193)
0.272
(0.233)
0.011
(0.007)
-0.000**
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.224***
(0.079)
0.146
(0.094)
-0.436***
(0.077)
-0.013
(0.068)
-0.826***
(0.107)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.568***
(0.099)
-0.117*
(0.063)
0.004
(0.003)

0.016
(0.166)
-0.104
(0.210)
0.006
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.217***
(0.080)
0.127
(0.096)
-0.474***
(0.078)
-0.081
(0.067)
-0.686***
(0.101)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.577***
(0.100)
-0.090
(0.062)
0.003
(0.003)

-0.350*
(0.194)
0.206
(0.230)
0.010
(0.008)
-0.000*
(0.000)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.226***
(0.078)
0.149
(0.094)
-0.410***
(0.076)
-0.072
(0.066)
-0.743***
(0.107)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.542***
(0.097)
-0.090
(0.061)
0.004
(0.003)

0.661**
(0.317)
-0.483**
(0.194)
0.274
(0.235)
0.010
(0.008)
-0.000*
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.223***
(0.079)
0.148
(0.094)
-0.436***
(0.077)
-0.012
(0.068)
-0.831***
(0.107)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.562***
(0.098)
-0.118*
(0.063)
0.004
(0.003)

Yes
12,691
1,516
1,774
-10,601.36

Yes
Yes
Yes
12,691
12,691
12,691
1,516
1,516
1,516
1,774
1,774
1,774
-10,571.66
-10,592.50
-10,592.08
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Yes
12,691
1,516
1,774
-10,545.74

Yes
12,691
1,516
1,774
-10,545.74

0.220
(0.166)
-0.295
(0.206)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.000*
(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.216***
(0.079)
0.122
(0.096)
-0.472***
(0.078)
-0.135**
(0.067)
-0.613***
(0.103)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.573***
(0.101)
-0.069
(0.061)
0.003
(0.003)
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Model 7
-0.751***
(0.182)
-0.027***
(0.008)
0.839***
(0.263)
-0.016*
(0.009)
0.785**
(0.325)
-0.346*
(0.195)
0.200
(0.232)
0.009
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.226***
(0.078)
0.152
(0.094)
-0.410***
(0.076)
-0.070
(0.066)
-0.749***
(0.107)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.536***
(0.097)
-0.090
(0.061)
0.004
(0.003)
Yes
12,691
1,516
1,774
-10,539.44

Table 3.3: Summary of robustness checks reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Model
8
9

10
11, 12
13
14

Robustness check
Included data for only those firms that
participated in both ecosystems
Included only those firms that achieved
superior performance in both iOS and Android
ecosystem with firm-fixed effects
Controlled for firm’s general industry
experience in smartphone apps
Ran separate models for pure app firms and
firms with other businesses
Controlled for total number of updates and
updates in the last 3 months for the focal app
Controlled for firm’s app portfolio

15

Controlled for unit handset sales for both iOS
and Android
16
Used alternative measure for ecosystem
complexity based on the number of unique
OEMs and screen size combinations.
16, 17, 18 Used alternative measure for ecosystem
complexity and controlled for the focal
platform, and user characteristics
19

Included data for only those firms that had a
single app in Top 500 list

20

Used a higher performance threshold based on
a firm’s app in the Top 250 list by revenue
Used two- and four-month windows
respectively to measure sustainability
Included data for only those firms that entered
an ecosystem after January 2012

21, 22
23

Rationale
Firms may be self-selecting into the iOS or
Android smartphone ecosystems
Certain types of firms may be more likely to
achieve superior performance in an ecosystem
of a given complexity
Ecosystem experience may simply be an
artifact of general industry experience
There might be systematic difference between
firms based on their business scope
Firms’ investments in apps might be
impacting sustainability
Firms’ app portfolio size might be correlated
with their ecosystem experience or ecosystem
complexity
Results may be driven by relative differences
in sales growth between iOS and Android
Main measure for ecosystem complexity does
not account for the diversity of handset
configurations within OEMs
Main measure for ecosystem complexity
might be capturing unobserved differences
with respect to platform firms’ strategies or
user-characteristics across these platforms
Sustainability of superior performance at firmlevel may be due to different apps launched by
the same firm
Results might be sensitive to the choice of
Top 500 list to measure superior performance
Results might be sensitive to the choice of the
three-month window to measure sustainability
Left truncation
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks (Alternative explanations)
Ecosystem complexity
Ecosystem experience
Platform transition
Ecosystem complexity * Experience
Ecosystem complexity * Transition
New apps
New firms
Apps in Top 500
(Apps in Top 500)2
Firm size (employee)
Other online business
Other offline business

Model 8
-0.814***
(0.216)
-0.029***
(0.010)
0.768**
(0.303)
-0.015
(0.010)
0.705*
(0.375)
-0.256
(0.257)
0.013
(0.301)
0.010
(0.012)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.201**
(0.097)
0.155
(0.105)

Model 9
-1.011*
(0.567)
-0.068*
(0.036)
1.281**
(0.565)
-0.047
(0.032)
1.245
(0.983)
0.179
(0.808)
0.074
(0.916)
-0.023
(0.031)
0.000
(0.000)

Dual participation
Firm app rating
Top 500 free app
Top 500 free app*time
In-app purchases
App price
App price*time

0.004
(0.086)
-0.791***
(0.125)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.573***
(0.133)
-0.205***
(0.077)
0.009**
(0.004)

0.464
(0.326)
-0.792*
(0.425)
0.005*
(0.003)
-0.321
(0.507)
0.072
(0.272)
-0.017
(0.020)

General experience

Model 10
-0.595***
(0.230)
-0.020*
(0.010)
0.769**
(0.304)
-0.015
(0.010)
0.711*
(0.375)
-0.208
(0.255)
-0.015
(0.298)
0.009
(0.011)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.196**
(0.097)
0.168
(0.106)

Model 11
-0.790***
(0.254)
-0.023*
(0.012)
0.696*
(0.389)
-0.010
(0.012)
0.629
(0.478)
-0.444*
(0.270)
0.138
(0.335)
0.009
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.067**
(0.030)

Model 12
-0.963***
(0.255)
-0.022*
(0.012)
0.993***
(0.362)
-0.011
(0.012)
0.946**
(0.450)
-0.309
(0.295)
0.312
(0.341)
0.007
(0.013)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.010***
(0.004)

-0.447***
(0.115)
0.001
-0.226**
(0.086)
(0.094)
-0.803*** -0.629***
(0.125)
(0.155)
0.002*** 0.001*
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.574*** -0.475***
(0.133)
(0.145)
-0.195** 0.025
(0.077)
(0.096)
0.009**
-0.002
(0.004)
(0.005)
-0.010**
(0.004)

-0.322***
(0.100)
0.111
(0.091)
-0.871***
(0.148)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.635***
(0.132)
-0.180**
(0.078)
0.007*
(0.004)

Update last 3m

Model 13
-0.760***
(0.199)
-0.019**
(0.009)
0.726***
(0.274)
-0.009
(0.009)
0.707**
(0.339)
-0.489**
(0.205)
0.447*
(0.246)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.220***
(0.081)
0.146
(0.097)
-0.429***
(0.080)
-0.016
(0.068)
-0.808***
(0.116)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.507***
(0.104)
-0.076
(0.066)
0.001
(0.003)

Model 14
-0.657***
(0.212)
-0.031***
(0.009)
0.969***
(0.308)
-0.021**
(0.010)
1.015***
(0.377)
-0.313
(0.220)
0.139
(0.264)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.158*
(0.089)
0.130
(0.104)
-0.515***
(0.087)
-0.003
(0.077)
-0.724***
(0.130)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.513***
(0.118)
-0.089
(0.078)
0.004
(0.004)

0.041***
(0.012)
-0.025***
(0.005)

Total updates
Platform sales growth

5.009*
(2.936)

Portfolio size
Category fixed effect
Firm fixed effect
Total observation
Total firms
Total events
Log likelihood

Model 15
-0.592***
(0.204)
-0.031***
(0.009)
0.722***
(0.267)
-0.019**
(0.009)
0.627*
(0.333)
-0.453**
(0.217)
0.046
(0.301)
0.015*
(0.009)
-0.000**
(0.000)
-0.010***
(0.004)
-0.228***
(0.080)
0.161*
(0.096)
-0.387***
(0.078)
-0.028
(0.068)
-0.742***
(0.118)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.491***
(0.099)
-0.080
(0.072)
0.003
(0.004)

Yes

Yes
Yes
9,999
4,253
993
278
1,236.00 361
-7,117.13 -1,503.29

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.002
(0.002)
Yes

9,999
993
1,236
-7,112.86

5,228
766
864
-4,346.84

7,463
750
910
-4,927.98

11,351
1,409
1,587
-9,241.47

9,510
1,095
1,290
-7,281.61

Yes
11,121
1,396
1,568
-9,306.81

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 3.5: Robustness checks (Alternative measures)
Ecosystem complexity
Ecosystem experience
Platform transition

Model 16
-0.665***
(0.223)
-0.017***
(0.004)
0.302**
(0.124)

Model 17
-1.055*
(0.565)
-0.016***
(0.004)
0.312**
(0.126)

Ecosystem complexity
*Ecosystem experience
Ecosystem complexity *
Platform transition
New apps
New firms
Apps in Top 500
(Apps in Top 500)2
Firm size (employee)
Other online business
Other offline business
Dual participation
Firm app rating
Top 500 free app
Top 500 free app*time
In-app purchases
App price
App price*time
Female Usersa
User Agea
User App Downloadsa

Model 19
-0.779***
(0.234)
-0.024**
(0.011)
1.388***
(0.344)
-0.019*

Model 20
-0.436**
(0.207)
-0.032***
(0.008)
0.831**
(0.357)
-0.022***

Model 21
-0.714***
(0.178)
-0.027***
(0.008)
0.644***
(0.239)
-0.016*

Model 22
-0.734***
(0.186)
-0.025***
(0.008)
0.817***
(0.281)
-0.013

Model 23
-0.866***
(0.298)
-0.058***
(0.020)
1.145**
(0.489)
-0.030

(0.010)
-0.579

(0.011)
1.341***

(0.008)
0.982**

(0.008)
0.581**

(0.009)
0.705**

(0.024)
1.116*

0.194
(0.276)
-0.205
(0.306)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.271***
(0.095)
0.010
(0.116)
-0.405***
(0.117)
-0.206**
(0.093)
-0.788***
(0.126)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.578***
(0.119)
-0.120*
(0.067)
0.018***
-0.120*
1.778
(3.736)
-0.169
(3.163)
-4.301
(4.201)

0.191
(0.277)
-0.234
(0.311)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.270***
(0.095)
0.010
(0.116)
-0.407***
(0.118)
-0.205**
(0.093)
-0.800***
(0.128)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.577***
(0.119)
-0.121*
(0.067)
0.018***
-0.121*
3.260
(4.240)
1.107
(3.614)
-3.458
(4.370)
-0.361
(0.496)

(0.642)
0.209
(0.278)
-0.244
(0.310)
-0.001
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.274***
(0.096)
0.013
(0.116)
-0.408***
(0.117)
-0.203**
(0.093)
-0.809***
(0.129)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.578***
(0.119)
-0.129*
(0.069)
0.018***
-0.129*
3.627
(4.281)
0.312
(3.701)
-1.813
(4.730)
-0.864
(0.731)

(0.425)
-0.207
(0.231)
0.074
(0.265)
0.014
(0.008)
-0.000**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.226**
(0.092)
0.049
(0.121)
-0.316***
(0.095)
-0.034
(0.079)
-0.564***
(0.147)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.484***
(0.128)
-0.025
(0.071)
-0.001
(0.004)

(0.416)
-0.357*
(0.210)
0.293
(0.265)
0.016**
(0.008)
-0.000**
(0.000)
-0.006**
(0.003)
-0.078
(0.086)
-0.032
(0.100)
-0.217***
(0.081)
-0.100
(0.074)
-0.466***
(0.144)
0.001**
(0.000)
-0.377***
(0.108)
-0.038
(0.046)
-0.000
(0.000)

(0.295)
-0.410**
(0.187)
0.340
(0.220)
0.008
(0.007)
-0.000*
(0.000)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.219***
(0.076)
0.167*
(0.093)
-0.382***
(0.074)
-0.067
(0.065)
-0.680***
(0.107)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.513***
(0.093)
-0.056
(0.058)
0.003
(0.003)

(0.344)
-0.383*
(0.196)
0.209
(0.235)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.225***
(0.079)
0.114
(0.098)
-0.435***
(0.077)
-0.063
(0.068)
-0.758***
(0.108)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.519***
(0.098)
-0.079
(0.062)
0.003
(0.003)

(0.578)
0.066
(0.386)
-0.174
(0.446)
0.021
(0.015)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.025
(0.019)
-0.333***
(0.116)
0.316**
(0.157)
-0.199*
(0.121)
0.075
(0.110)
-0.853***
(0.211)
0.003***
(0.001)
-0.451***
(0.164)
-0.015
(0.096)
0.003
(0.005)

Yes
8,715
1,311
996
-5,926.75

Yes
8,715
1,311
996
-5,926.49

Yes
8,715
1,311
996
-5,925.63

Yes
5,290
1,081
1,179
-5,975.38

Yes
6,565
933
1,188
-6,255.50

Yes
12,691
1,516
1,996
-11,864.49

Yes
12,691
1,516
1,641
-9,755.62

Yes
3,662
651
611
-2,847.90

iOS
Category fixed effect
Total observation
Total firms
Total events
Log likelihood

Model 18
-1.439*
(0.769)
-0.022***
(0.007)
0.065
(0.298)
-0.008

a

Variables are calculated based on proportion of total users in the ecosystem. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

87

4. PARTNERING IN A HAZE: INTERDEPENDENCE MISSPECIFICATION
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
INTRODUCTION

The strategic alliance literature points to inter-firm task interdependencies as a key link
between alliance governance choice and firm performance (Gulati and Singh, 1998;
Aggarwal, Siggelkow and Singh, 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). Alliances
involve the need to coordinate interdependencies across organizational boundaries
(Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), as well as the need to
select governance mechanisms for inter-firm decision making (Aggarwal et al., 2011;
Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). The nature of inter-firm interdependence has been
shown to influence governance mode choice (Kale and Puranam, 2004; Villalonga and
McGahan, 2005) as well as the performance implications of this choice (Sampson, 2004;
Mayer and Teece, 2008).
Prescriptive managerial advice stemming from this stream of the extant alliance
literature generally makes the implicit assumption that in the course of deciding on a
mode of governance, allying firms are “correct” in their representations of inter-firm
interdependencies. In practice, however, managers often enter into alliances with an
imperfect ex ante understanding of their true patterns of inter-firm interdependence
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Doz, 1996). This makes selection of a “correct”
structure likely to be an unrealistic assumption. Our aim in this paper is thus to better
understand the implications of relaxing the assumption that managers correctly
understand inter-firm interdependencies when selecting an alliance governance mode.
We focus on two forms of such interdependence misspecifications—over-specification
and under-specification—analyzing how these incorrect managerial representations of
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inter-firm task interdependencies influence firm performance in an alliance setting, under
varying interdependence and governance mode conditions.
A small set of studies lends credence to the notion that managers do not have a
fully correct understanding of their inter-firm task interdependencies when entering into
alliances (Doz, 1996; Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004; Gokpinar, Hopp and Iravani,
2010). Although these studies have made important strides in expanding our
understanding of the role of interdependence misspecifications, relatively little largesample empirical research has addressed this issue (many of these studies are single
case-based). One reason for the lack of research on this topic is the difficulty in
measuring managers’ ex-ante understanding of interdependencies. We consequently
have very little understanding of the relative performance implications of different forms
of interdependence misspecifications. To remedy this gap we develop a computational
model that allows us to simulate managers’ understanding of underlying task structures
under different scenarios. This approach, we believe, offers a first step in pushing the
literature toward a deeper understanding of how interdependence misspecifications
influence firm performance in the context of alternate governance mode choices.
A key benefit of employing a computational model is that such models naturally
overcome the limitation of not being able to observe counterfactuals, a critical constraint
in empirical work. Examining the antecedents of alliance governance choice (e.g., Kogut
and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Villalonga and
McGahan, 2005), for example, very often relies on observing only realized transactions.
A computational modeling approach allows us to develop insights by creating
counterfactuals and specifying scenarios that are difficult (or impossible) to observe
empirically.
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We build on a rich body of work that has used computational methods to develop
insights into issues in strategy (e.g. Levinthal, 1997). Such an approach enables us to
abstract away from industry and firm-level factors such as resource complementarity,
trust, and prior experience (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002), and
to focus instead on isolating the performance effects of errors associated with task
interdependence structure

assessment.

In particular,

we model various task

interdependence structures and their associated errors, a goal that would not be
possible to accomplish with empirical methods alone.20
Our results lead to several sets of insights. First, we find that interdependence
misspecifications lead to a loss in firm value, with the relative magnitude of this loss
varying by governance mode. Across-mode differences further suggest that normative
advice regarding governance mode selection in alliances should be conditional on the
relative level of ex-ante managerial certainty regarding the nature of inter-firm
interdependence. Second, we find that increases in the actual (correct) level of
interdependence reduce the underperformance penalty associated with interdependence
misspecifications. Finally, we find that under- and over-specification influence alliance
performance through their effect on the extent of exploration and the magnitude of
coordination failures experienced by the firms in the alliance. While over-specification
increases both exploration and coordination failures, under-specification decreases
these two effects. The relative magnitude of the two effects explains the resulting impact
on firm performance. When exploration and coordination itself are outcomes of interest
in an alliance setting, our insights further point to the possibility of a tradeoff between

20

Our study complements recent work examining misspecification of interdependencies in a single firm
setting (Martignoni, Menon and Siggelkow, 2015). This work differs from ours in important ways, with one
key difference being that Martignoni et al. (2015) focus on misspecification in a single-firm setting (versus
an inter-firm setting like ours in which governance mode issues are paramount).
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performance and non-performance outcomes, which may condition alliance governance
mode choice.
In the next section we briefly highlight the literature which serves to motivate and
frame our research question. In the subsequent sections we detail our computational
model and associated analyses, with the aim of more deeply understanding the
implications of interdependence misspecifications for firm performance in an alliance
setting. We end by discussing the implications of our study for theory and for future
research.

MOTIVATING LITERATURE

Alliances are complex inter-organizational relationships with high failure rates (Kale,
Dyer and Singh, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2009; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). A key
challenge in an alliance context is governing the joint set of activities of the partnering
firms. Recent work on alliance governance has underscored the importance of
coordination among partner firms as a critical determinant of relationship success (e.g,
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005; Reuer and Arino, 2007).
Coordination is often necessary as partners must engage in joint tasks without the
benefits of the structures and systems available in traditional hierarchies (Gulati and
Singh, 1998). Difficulties arise from decomposing tasks and from ensuring the division of
labor outside organizational boundaries, and coordination challenges persist even with
perfect

alignment

of

self-interest

among

the

interacting

parties

(Heath

and

Staudenmayer, 2000; Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008).
While firms can address coordination challenges through a variety of
mechanisms, including the use of detailed contracts that specify tasks, roles and
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responsibilities (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Reuer and
Arino, 2007), contingency plans and responses (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), and
information sharing and feedback (Argyres and Mayer, 2007), explicit governance
mechanisms are an over-arching channel through which coordination challenges are
often resolved in alliance settings (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Inter-firm interdependencies
influence both the nature of the desired alliance governance structure, as well as the
consequent performance of the relationship in the context of such a structure (Gulati and
Singh, 1998; Mayer and Teece, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda,
2015; Kim, Zhao and Anand, 2015).
What are the implications of employing particular alliance governance structures
when interdependencies are not correctly understood by managers? Though the
literature on this question is limited, as the typical assumption is one of perfect
knowledge regarding the nature and extent of task interdependencies (which in turn
dictates appropriate governance structure choice), several studies have used case
examples to illustrate the consequences of incorrect ex ante assessments of such
interdependencies (e.g. Doz, 1996; Sosa et al., 2004; Gopkinar et al., 2010). In a study
of the R&D alliance between Ciba Geigy and Alza to develop a drug called OROS, for
example, Doz (1996) finds that the allying firms started with an incorrect understanding
of the nature of interdependencies among their underlying tasks. Their assumption was
that the alliance would involve a simple “handover” of the drug from Alza to Ciba Geigy.
In reality, however, the alliance required a high level of coordination between the
downstream functions of both firms. Over the course of the alliance, as the firms realized
the need for tighter coordination, they then ended up over-specifying the level of
interdependence, selecting a governance structure that provided greater levels of
coordination than actually required. As a consequence of the firms’ interdependence

92

misspecifications (and sub-optimal governance choices), joint development of the drug
was slowed, and the alliance failed to meet its intended objectives.
Under-specified representations of task interdependencies can likewise be
problematic. Sosa et al. (2004; 2007) address the under-specification issue in their study
of a large commercial aircraft engine project. They find that a significant number of
interdependencies between sub-systems were invisible to system architects. As a
consequence, system architects did not set up appropriate structures to deal with
underlying

interdependencies,

with

the

misalignment

in

structure

and

task

inter-firm

task

interdependence resulting in significant cost and program delay.
Despite

the

fact

that

over-

or

under-specification

of

interdependencies is likely to be common in practice across many types of interorganizational relationships, there is little systematic evidence in the literature (with the
exception of a small set of case-based examples, two of which we mention above) as to
how interdependence misspecification might affect the performance of firms, particularly
under alternate modes of governing the alliance relationship itself. Our methodological
approach in this paper, therefore, is to employ a computational model to investigate the
link between misspecified levels of interdependence and alliance performance in a
systematic manner. This approach enables us to develop a set of theoretical insights
that might then serve as the basis for future empirical research. We turn to the details of
our computational model in the next section.

MODEL
Tasks and interdependencies
We draw on the NK approach to modeling firm decision making (Kauffman, 1993,
Levinthal, 1997), which conceptualizes firms as consisting of a set of inter-related
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activities, N, that can represent various organizational decisions such as those related to
firm strategy, organizational form, product design, and so forth (Rivkin, 2000). 21 The
canonical NK model assumes that these N activities are interrelated so that a change in
one activity affects the payoff to the other K activities. Firm performance is based on the
unique configuration of these N activities, with the topography (“ruggedness”) of the
performance landscape determined by the degree of interaction among the firm’s
activities (Levinthal, 1997).
We build on Aggarwal et al. (2011), who extend the canonical NK approach to a
two-firm alliance setting. In this model there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, each of
which makes decisions over a set of binary activities denoted by 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 . A subset of
the activities of each firm is considered to be part of the alliance relationship (the
“alliance activities”), denoted by 𝐴𝑖 , while the remainder of the activities are outside the
scope of the alliance (the “non-alliance activities”), denoted by 𝑁𝑖 . Firm 1’s activities are
thus denoted by 𝐹1 = {𝑁1 , 𝐴1 } while Firm 2’s activities are denoted by 𝐹2 = {𝑁2 , 𝐴2 }. The
two-firm system we model consists of a total of 12 activities, each of which is denoted by
𝑑𝑗 , with 𝑗 running from 1 to 12.22 Figure 4.1 illustrates the allocation of each of the 𝑑𝑗
activities to the four activity sets {𝑁1 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝑁2 }. For Firm 1, for example, the non-alliance
activities are represented by 𝑁1 = {𝑑1 , 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 , 𝑑4 } and the alliance activities are
represented by 𝐴1 = {𝑑5 , 𝑑6 }. Interdependencies among particular activities, which can
be either intra-firm or inter-firm, are indicated with an “X”.
[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE]
We then consider five different patterns of interdependence, as illustrated in
Figure 4.2, each of which contains a different set of interdependencies among the four
activity sets described in Figure 4.1. We select these patterns in order to model the
21

We use the term “activities” interchangeably with “choices” and “tasks” throughout this paper.
This value for N is consistent with prior NK literature (e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; Aggarwal et
al., 2011).
22
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characteristics of a broad range of interdependence forms. The patterns not only
increase in the overall level of interdependence, but each successive pattern introduces
a particular class of interdependence among the activity sets {𝑁1 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝑁2 } (e.g., going
from Pattern 1 to Pattern 2 introduces interdependencies within the alliance activities) so
that we can more easily isolate the implications of interdependencies of different types.
While these patterns are certainly not exhaustive, they collectively enable us to conduct
a set of analyses that can generate insights into the mechanisms underlying our core
research question around the impact of interdependence misspecifications.
Pattern 1, which we refer to as fully decomposable, has interactions only within
each of the four activity subsets {𝑁1 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝑁2 }: the activities within the 𝑁1 subset only
affect other activities in 𝑁1 , and the same holds for activities within 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 and 𝑁2 . In
Pattern 2, pure alliance interaction, we introduce interactions within each of the sets of
alliance activities of both the firms (i.e., within 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 ). In Pattern 3, firm own-alliance
interaction, we introduce interactions within the firm’s own non-alliance and alliance
activities so that activities within 𝑁1 interact with activities within 𝐴1 , and activities within
𝑁2 interact with activities within 𝐴2 . In Pattern 4, firm partner-alliance interaction, the
alliance activities of one firm interact with the non-alliance activities of the partner
(activities within 𝐴1 interact with activities within 𝑁2 , and activities within 𝐴2 interact with
those of 𝑁1 ). And finally, for Pattern 5, full interdependence, there is complete
interdependence, with all activities interacting with one other.
[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE]
Performance landscapes
Each unique configuration of the N activities in the two-firm system (in which, as
discussed above, the full set of N activities is divided into the subsets {𝑁1 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝑁2 })
has associated with it a particular performance level. To create the performance
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landscape we follow the standard approach in the NK literature (e.g. Levinthal, 1997;
Rivkin 2000): for each of the N activities, 𝑑𝑖 , in the system, we define a contribution
value function 𝐶𝑖 . Each 𝐶𝑖 takes as parameters the state (either 0 or 1) of 𝑑𝑖 , together
with the state of the 𝑘𝑖 other policies with which 𝑑𝑖 interacts (these interactions are
defined, as described above, by the interaction matrix associated with the particular
interdependence pattern being considered), and is initialized with a value drawn at
random from a uniform 𝑈[0,1] distribution for each possible combination of the various
states of 𝑑𝑖 and its 𝑘𝑖 interacting policies. The set of N contribution value functions 𝐶𝑖 is
defined at the outset, and remains unchanged as the simulation progresses.
The overall performance of the entire two-firm system for any given configuration
of activities 𝑑∗ (i.e., the N-dimensional vector of 𝑑𝑖 values) is the sum of the N 𝐶𝑖 values
for that particular configuration i.e. ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 . We can define the performance of Firm 1 for
a given 𝑑∗ as the sum of the contribution values of the activities specific to the firm itself,
plus a portion, 𝛼, of the alliance activities (we set 𝛼 = 0.5 throughout). The performance
of Firm 1, for example is ∑4𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑∗ ) + 𝛼 ∑6𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑∗ ). To reduce statistical artifacts we
follow the commonly employed approach in the NK literature in which the reported
performance values are normalized by dividing the raw performance by the performance
value at the highest peak in the landscape (see e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow [2003]).

Interdependence misspecifications
Modeling misspecifications in managerial representations of task interdependencies
requires that we model not only the true underlying interaction matrix among the firms,
but also that we model the misspecified representation of the interaction matrix that is
taken into account by managers as they make decisions. We do so by modeling two
matrices, with the true matrix used to determine the actual performance that managers
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observe as a consequence of their choices, and the misspecified matrix used to
determine the choice that managers actually make as they search the landscape.
More formally, we define two interaction matrices. The first interaction matrix, 𝑀0 ,
represents the true structure of the underlying pattern of inter-firm task interdependence,
and is used to determine the performance landscape as discussed in the prior section.
The second interaction matrix, 𝑀1 , represents firms’ own representation of the inter-firm
task interdependencies, and can differ from the true matrix 𝑀0 . The performance
landscape for 𝑀1 is derived from the true performance landscape 𝑀0 to ensure that the
(potentially misspecified) performance values are correlated with the true performance
values via the processes described later in this section.
Firms search by evaluating alternatives and making choices with respect to their
activities based on a set of governance structures which we describe in a subsequent
section. In the process of evaluating alternatives and making changes to their activities
𝑑𝑖 , the firms take into account performance values as determined by the (misspecified)
interdependence matrix, 𝑀1 . Once a choice is made in any given period, however, the
performance that firms actually experience is defined by performance values stemming
from the (true) interdependence matrix, 𝑀0 . While searching for high performing
configurations, firms compare the performance values of the alternatives based on the
𝑀1 matrix with the observed performance of the current configuration based on the 𝑀0
matrix.
Firms are said to have an under-specified view when the misspecified matrix 𝑀1
has a lower degree of interdependence than the true matrix 𝑀0 ; and firms are said to
have an over-specified view when the misspecified matrix 𝑀1 has a higher degree of
interdependence than the true matrix 𝑀0 . For the purpose of our analysis we will
consider misspecifications that differ by a single pattern difference as defined by the
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patterns in Figure 4.2. As an example, with a true Pattern 3 interdependence matrix (i.e.,
where 𝑀0 is based on Pattern 3), under-specification is defined as a situation where
there is an 𝑀1 based on Pattern 2, while over-specification is defined as a situation
where there is an 𝑀1 based on Pattern 4.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the processes for calculating the
performance values of the landscapes as a function of the under- or over-specification of
the 𝑀1 pattern. The performance levels for 𝑀1 (whether under- or over-specified) are
derived from the 𝑀0 performance levels. To accomplish this we first define the
performance landscape for 𝑀0 via the process described in the previous section; and we
then derive the performance landscapes for the under- and over-specified cases using
the procedures described next.
Under-specified interdependence matrix 𝑴𝟏 . What is the procedure we use to
construct a performance landscape for an under-specified matrix? The performance
values of the under-specified landscape should be correlated with the true landscape in
such a way that the under-specified landscape appears to be a slightly “blurry” (or less
rugged) version of the true landscape. How do we accomplish this? When the matrix 𝑀1
is under-specified, each decision 𝑑𝑖 is affected by 𝑘̅𝑖 other decisions, with 𝑘̅𝑖 < 𝑘𝑖 , where
𝑘𝑖 is the number of interdependencies associated with 𝑑𝑖 in the true matrix 𝑀0 . In order
to calculate the performance landscape for 𝑀1 we take averages of the contribution
values from the true interaction matrix 𝑀0 for each fixed configuration of 𝑑𝑖 and its 𝑘̅𝑖
interacting choices, an approach consistent with Gavetti and Levinthal (2000).
We can illustrate this process with an example. Assume that in the true matrix 𝑀0
a particular activity 𝑑1 interacts with activities 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 , and 𝑑4 . Also assume that in the
misspecified matrix 𝑀1 the activity 𝑑1 is represented by managers as interacting only
with activity 𝑑2 . The performance landscape 𝑀1 thus requires that we generate
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contribution values for each unique combination of the 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 activities. For ease of
notation, let 𝐶𝑖 refer to the contribution value function for activity 𝑑𝑖 for the true matrix 𝑀0 .
Furthermore, let the four arguments of 𝐶𝑖 ( ) refer to the states (which can be either 0 or
1) of each of the activities 𝑑1 through 𝑑4 . Thus 𝐶1 (0,0,0,0) refers to the contribution value
assigned to the true (𝑀0 ) matrix for activity 𝑑1 where activities 𝑑1 through 𝑑4 are all set
to 0. In our example, we would define the contribution values for 𝑑1 in the misspecified
matrix 𝑀1 for each of the four possible configurations of the 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 activities as
follows:
𝑑1 = 0 and 𝑑2 = 0: Average {𝐶1 (0,0,0,0), 𝐶1 (0,0,0,1), 𝐶1 (0,0,1,0), 𝐶1 (0,0,1,1)}
𝑑1 = 0 and 𝑑2 = 1: Average {𝐶1 (0,1,0,0), 𝐶1 (0,1,0,1), 𝐶1 (0,1,1,0), 𝐶1 (0,1,1,1)}
𝑑1 = 1 and 𝑑2 = 0: Average {𝐶1 (1,0,0,0), 𝐶1 (1,0,0,1), 𝐶1 (1,0,1,0), 𝐶1 (1,0,1,1)}
𝑑1 = 1 and 𝑑2 = 1: Average {𝐶1 (1,1,0,0), 𝐶1 (1,1,0,1), 𝐶1 (1,1,1,0), 𝐶1 (1,1,1,1)}
Over-specified interdependence matrix 𝑴𝟏 . Having discussed the procedure
for constructing an under-specified performance landscape, we turn next to the
procedure for constructing the performance values of an over-specified landscape. In
this case, rather than being a slightly “blurry” (or less rugged) version of the true
landscape (as it was in the under-specified case), the over-specified landscape can be
thought of as a more “granular” (or more rugged) version of the true landscape.
How do we accomplish this? When the matrix 𝑀1 is over-specified, each activity
𝑑𝑖 is affected by 𝑘̿𝑖 other activities, with 𝑘̿𝑖 > 𝑘𝑖 (where 𝑘𝑖 is the number of
interdependencies associated with 𝑑𝑖 in the true matrix 𝑀0 ). This implies that for each
unique combination of 𝑑𝑖 and the 𝑘𝑖 other activities affecting it in the baseline 𝑀0 matrix,
̿

there are 2 𝑘𝑖−𝑘𝑖 additional contribution values in the 𝑀1 matrix that must be created to
account for the additional 𝑀1 matrix interdependencies. To generate these additional
̿

contribution values we follow the following process. First, we generate 2 𝑘𝑖−𝑘𝑖−1 random
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numbers 𝜀𝑗 from the uniform distribution 𝑈[0, 𝑎], where 𝑎 is min(𝑐𝑖 , 1 − 𝑐𝑖 ), and 𝑐𝑖 is the
particular contribution value for 𝑑𝑖 for the specific configuration of 𝑑𝑖 and the 𝑘𝑖 other
policies affecting it (note that 𝑐𝑖 is based on the 𝐶𝑖 function that defines the landscape for
the 𝑀0 matrix). Second, for each random number 𝜀𝑗 we generate two contribution values
𝑐𝑖𝑗1 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗 and 𝑐𝑖𝑗2 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝜀𝑗 . Finally, we randomly assign 𝑐𝑖𝑗1 and 𝑐𝑖𝑗2 to the additional
̿

2 𝑘𝑖−𝑘𝑖 activity combinations for which we need the additional contribution values.
Constructing the landscape for the over-specified matrix in this way allows us to ensure
that the true and misspecified landscapes are correlated with one another in the same
way as they are in the under-specified case. More specifically: under-specifying (by one
pattern) an over-specified (by one pattern) landscape results in the original (correct)
landscape.
We can illustrate the over-specification procedure with an example. Assume that
in the true matrix 𝑀0 the activity 𝑑1 interacts with 𝑑2 and 𝑑3 , while in the over-specified
representation 𝑀1 , in addition to these interactions there are two additional interactions,
with activities 𝑑4 and 𝑑5 . In this case it is necessary to define four additional contribution
values for each possible configuration of 𝑑1 , 𝑑2 and 𝑑3 . In the case where the activity
configuration of (𝑑1 ,𝑑2 , 𝑑3 ) is (1,0,0), for example, we need to construct contribution
values for activity 𝑑1 where the (𝑑1 , 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 , 𝑑4 , 𝑑5 ) values take on the following set of four
possible configurations: (1,0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). To do this we
start with 𝑐1 = 𝐶1 (1,0,0). That is, we start with 𝑐1 , which is the specific contribution value
in the 𝑀0 matrix for the 𝑑1 activity where the configuration of (𝑑1 , 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 ) is (1,0,0). We
define 𝑎 = min(𝑐1 , 1 − 𝑐1 ), and then generate two error terms 𝜀1 and 𝜀2 from the uniform
distribution 𝑈[0, 𝛼]. These two error terms then allow us to generate the four contribution
values 𝑐11 = 𝑐1 + 𝜀1 , 𝑐12 = 𝑐1 − 𝜀1 , 𝑐13 = 𝑐1 + 𝜀2 , and 𝑐14 = 𝑐1 − 𝜀2 , which we
then assign at random to the four configurations noted above, (1,0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0,1),
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𝑀

(1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). E.g., if 𝐶1 1 (𝑑1 , 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 , 𝑑4 , 𝑑5 ) represents the function that
maps the particular configuration of 𝑑1 through 𝑑5 to a particular contribution value for 𝑑1
in the 𝑀1 matrix, then after generating the contribution values through the process
𝑀
described above, the random allocation could generate the following: 𝐶1 1 (1,0,0,0,0) =
𝑀
𝑀
𝑀
𝑐11 ; 𝐶1 1 (1,0,0,0,1) = 𝑐13 ; 𝐶1 1 (1,0,0,1,0) = 𝑐14 ; and 𝐶1 1 (1,0,0,1,1) = 𝑐12.

Governance modes

We turn next to the governance modes that determine how agents in our model search
the performance landscape. We draw on Aggarwal et al. (2011), considering four
governance modes that represent varying points along the spectrum of alliance
integration (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer et al., 2004;
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). At the opposite ends of the spectrum we have what we
refer to as the modular and integrated modes of governance. As hybrid forms we
consider what we refer to as the self-governing alliance and ratification modes. We
describe each of these modes in detail in the remainder of this section.
In the modular mode of governance both firms make choices simultaneously
within a given period and only consider the profits associated with the particular activities
within their scope. We model a 12 activity system, with performance values normalized
by the total value of the system at the highest peak of the landscape (performance at the
landscape peak is denoted by Π ∗ ). In the modular mode Firms 1 and 2 control their
respective alliance and non-alliance activities independently, with each firm thus
controlling 6 of the 12 activities in the system. In each period Firm 1 evaluates
alternatives for activities 𝑑1 through 𝑑6 based on the expected value of the configuration
stemming from 𝑀1 , comparing these alternatives against the realized performance from
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the prior period as determined by 𝑀0 , and selecting a choice if it increases their
expected performance. Firm 2 does the same for its own set of policy choices.
More precisely, in the modular mode, Firm 1 evaluates alternatives based on its
𝑀
expected profit, ∑6𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 1 (𝑑̅𝑡 ) / Π ∗, comparing this against the prior period realized
𝑀
performance, ∑6𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 0 (𝑑̅𝑡−1 ) / Π ∗ . Similarly, Firm 2 evaluates its alternatives based on
𝑀1 ̅
𝑀0 ̅
12
∗
∗
its expected profit ∑12
𝑖=7 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡 ) / Π , comparing this against ∑𝑖=7 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡−1 ) / Π . In this
𝑀0

notation 𝐶𝑖

𝑀1

and 𝐶𝑖

respectively represent the contribution values for activity 𝑑𝑖 based

on the 𝑀0 and 𝑀1 matrices respectively. Vector 𝑑̅𝑡 refers to the configuration of the
activities being evaluated in the current period, while vector 𝑑̅𝑡−1 refers to the existing
configuration of activities, as of the end of the prior period. Firm 1 and Firm 2 can
change up to two activities in any given period, and agents for each firm evaluate all
possible alternatives when making decisions in a given period. For each agent, and for
each alternative being considered by each agent, the vector 𝑑̅𝑡 , which represents the
vector being evaluated by the agent, is thus allowed to differ from the prior round’s
realized configuration 𝑑̅𝑡−1 by up to two activities. 23
While the modular mode can be conceptualized as a simple case of an armslength relationship where both firms work independently with full control of their
activities, the integrated mode lies at the other end of the spectrum. In the integrated
mode Firms 1 and 2 operate as a single entity that makes decisions with respect to all
12 policy choices. Examples of integrated governance structures can be found in longterm equity-based alliances where decision making is fully integrated, and where firms
23

Prior work has parameterized the number of activities that can be changed in any given period, as well as
the number of alternatives considered, referring to these values as “search radius” and “alternatives”
(Siggelkow and Rivkin [2005]; Aggarwal et al. [2011]). In our study we hold these parameters constant,
allowing each agent to have a search radius of 2, and to evaluate all possible alternatives associated with
this search radius in any given period. We thus map to what Aggarwal et al. (2011) refer to as “Capability
Level D”. Our results and insights, however, are qualitatively similar and robust to variation in these
parameters. For ease of exposition we report all results based on these fixed settings of “search radius” and
“alternatives.” Results on alternative settings are available upon request.
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behave as if they were a single entity (e.g., the alliance between Renault and Nissan, in
which there is an integrated governance structure under a single leadership).
In our model of the integrated mode, the single agent takes into account the total
combined profit of Firms 1 and 2 when evaluating alternatives, comparing this against
the profit from the prior round’s full configuration. Formally, the quasi-integrated entity
evaluates

alternatives

based

on

𝑀1 ̅
∗
∑12
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡 ) / Π ,

comparing

these

against

𝑀0 ̅
∗
̅
∑12
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡−1 ) / Π , where 𝑑𝑡 is the vector being evaluated, which differs from the prior

round’s configuration 𝑑̅𝑡−1 by up to two activities. Though profit is calculated at the level
of the system, we can also report profit for each firm; since the firms are symmetric in
our analyses, profit for each individual firm is simply ½ of the the profit of the entire
system.
In addition to the modular and integrated governance modes which lie on
opposite ends of the governance spectrum, we consider two hybrid modes: selfgoverning alliance and ratification, in line with Aggarwal et al. (2011). In both cases the
alliance function is managed independently by a third agent (e.g., a joint committee
formed by both firms to manage the alliance). The agents for Firms 1 and 2 are
responsible solely for their respective non-alliance activities (𝑑1 through 𝑑4 and 𝑑9
through 𝑑12 respectively), but in the process of evaluating alternatives and making
decisions each takes into account their individual total profit, which for each firm is
defined as the profit of the firm’s non-alliance activities plus a portion, 𝛼, of the profit
from the alliance activities (we set 𝛼 = 0.5 throughout). The alliance agent considers
profit from only the alliance activities (i.e., 𝑑5 through 𝑑8 ) when evaluating alternatives
and making decisions.
More precisely, with the self-governing alliance and ratification modes, in each
period the Firm 1, Firm 2, and Alliance agents each make the following comparisons
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when evaluating alternatives, with each agent able to make up to two changes to the
(four) activities under each of their individual purview (i.e., in each case the Ndimensional vector of binary values 𝑑̅𝑡 differs from 𝑑̅𝑡−1 by at most two activities):
Firm 1 compares:

∑4𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖𝑀1 (𝑑̅𝑡 ) / Π ∗ + 0.5 ∗ ∑8𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖𝑀1 (𝑑̅𝑡 ) / Π ∗
𝑀
𝑀
against: ∑4𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 0 (𝑑̅𝑡−1 ) / Π ∗ +0.5 ∗ ∑8𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖 0 (𝑑̅𝑡−1 ) / Π ∗

Firm 2 compares:

𝑀1 ̅
𝑀1 ̅
8
∗
∗
∑12
𝑖=9 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡 ) / Π + 0.5 ∗ ∑𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡 ) / Π
𝑀0 ̅
𝑀0 ̅
8
∗
∗
against: ∑12
𝑖=9 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡−1 ) / Π +0.5 ∗ ∑𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖 (𝑑𝑡−1 ) / Π

Alliance compares:

∑8𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖𝑀1 (𝑑̅𝑡 ) / Π ∗
𝑀
against: ∑8𝑖=5 𝐶𝑖 0 (𝑑̅𝑡−1 ) / Π ∗

Although the way the self-governing alliance and ratification modes compare
alternatives is the same, the two modes differ in the level of independence and degree of
oversight over the alliance agent. In the self-governing alliance mode, the alliance agent
operates independently, without any oversight from the firms. In any given period the
alliance agent makes its decisions. Firms 1 and 2 then select their policies
simultaneously, taking into account the policy choice made by the alliance agent.
In the ratification mode, by contrast, in any given period the Firm 1 and Firm 2
agents decide on their activity set changes, followed by the alliance agent. Firm 1 and
Firm 2 then have veto power over the activity changes suggested by the alliance agent.
That is, before implementing any activity change, the alliance agent needs to have its
proposed change ratified by the agents of the two firms. Ratification requires that both
firms accept the proposed policy change, with a firm accepting any proposed policy
change only if it does not reduce the firm’s own profit.
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ANALYSIS

We model a 12-policy choice system of two firms, with four activity subsets
{𝑁1 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝑁2 }, sub-divided as depicted in Figure 4.1, and with patterns of
interdependence as depicted in Figure 4.2. The model is symmetric for both firms such
that the performance results of each are equal when run over a large number of
landscapes. We thus focus on analyzing the difference in overall performance of the
two-firm alliance system under varying combinations of interdependence pattern and
governance structure. We are interested in situations of over- or under-specification,
which we define as a single pattern higher or lower, respectively in interdependence (for
example, with the patterns in Figure 4.2, over-specification for Pattern 3 would be
Pattern 4, while under-specification for Pattern 3 would be Pattern 2). We assume that
both firms and the alliance agent (in the case of self-governing alliance and ratification)
have the same misspecified view of the underlying task structure. Each time period in
the simulation consists of agents making a set of decisions with respect to their activities
(per the mode governing their decisions as described in the previous section). We run
the simulation for 200 periods on a particular landscape in order to observe the long-run
performance of firms in the system, and then take an average over 10,000 different
simulation runs in order to minimize the effects of any statistical artifacts.

Performance implications of over- and under-specification

As a starting point for our analysis we compare long-term performance outcomes, i.e.
performance at the end of period 200, for the alliance system in the case of
misspecification to the case where all the agents in the system have a correct
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understanding of their task interdependencies. We refer to the percentage decline in
overall performance as the “value-loss” due to the misspecification of task
interdependence.
Over-specified case. We begin with the situation where the firm agents (and
alliance agent in the case of the self-governing alliance and ratification modes) have an
over-specified view of the underlying task structure. We consider performance for the
four different forms of governance under the various interdependence patterns. Table
4.1 compares the performance outcomes of the four governance modes under Patterns
1 through 4 for firms with the over-specified view. We find that the average long-run
performance for firms with an over-specified view decreases for all patterns. Pattern 1
has a lower value loss compared to the rest of patterns, due primarily to the difference in
the additional number of interdependencies agents consider in the search landscape.24
Moving on to the rest of the patterns, we find that the overall value loss decreases as we
move from Pattern 2 to Pattern 4. For example, for the modular governance mode, the
overall value loss is -18.6% for Pattern 2 as compared to -14.8% for Pattern 4. Similarly,
for the self-governing alliance mode the overall value loss is -15.0% for Pattern 2
whereas it is -4.6% for Pattern 4. Further, for the ratification mode the overall value loss
is -18.8% for Pattern 2, while it is -8.3% for Pattern 4. For the integrated mode the
overall value loss is -20.0% for Pattern 2 and -11.3% for Pattern 4.
Our findings on the effects of over-specification are consistent with intuition. The
overall loss in value for the firm with an over-specified view is directly linked to the error
introduced into the search process as a consequence of the over-specification. For

24

Pattern 1 differs from other patterns with respect to the total number of interdependencies that the agents
consider in their search landscape (an additional 8 interdependencies with an over-specified view). For the
other patterns the search landscape has an additional 32 interdependencies.
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example, in the case of Pattern 1, while searching for higher performance the firm
assumes that the alliance activities of the two firms are interdependent, impacting its
performance. In reality, however, the underlying task is fully decomposable, with no
interdependence between the alliance activities of the two firms. This misspecification of
interdependence leads to an error in the search process, decreasing performance.
Under-specified case. We turn next to examining how under-specification
affects the performance of both firms. Table 4.2 shows performance outcomes of the
various modes under Patterns 2 through 5 for firms with the under-specified view. We
find that under-specification leads to lower performance on average. Similar to the overspecification results we find that Pattern 2 has a lower value loss compared to the other
patterns with under-specification, primarily due to the difference in the characteristics of
interdependencies that agents consider to be missing in the case of Pattern 2 and the
other patterns.25
In the under-specified case we also find that the overall value loss decreases as
we move from Pattern 3 to Pattern 5. In fact, for Pattern 5, we find that the overall
performance increases for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. For example,
in the case of the modular governance mode, the overall value loss is -19.1% for Pattern
3 as compared to a 7.8% gain for Pattern 5. Similarly, the overall value loss for Pattern 3
in the case of the self-governing alliance is -17.3%, while it is -1.0% for Pattern 5. For
other modes the overall value losses for Pattern 2 with the ratification and integrated
modes are -15.6% and -21.6% respectively, while they are -2.5% and -9.5% for Pattern
5 with the ratification and integrated modes.

25

Firms consider a total of 8 interdependencies within the alliance agent to be missing when considering
the under-specified view of Pattern 2. For the rest of the patterns, firms consider their search landscape to
have 32 fewer interdependencies as compared to that of the true landscape.
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We can then observe the governance structure that provides the highest
performance level when agents have the correct view as compared to when they have a
misspecified view. Interestingly, we find that misspecification of task structure often
results in a different governance mode providing the optimal level performance. For
example, the integrated governance mode provides the highest performance for Pattern
4 when firms have the correct view, while the self-governing alliance mode provides the
highest performance with both under- and over- specified views. On average, we find
that the self-governing alliance mode provides the highest performance across patterns
for both forms of misspecification (Pattern 1 with the over-specified view is an exception
where the modular governance mode performs better). We turn to the mechanisms
driving these results in the next section.
[INSERT TABLES 4.1 AND 4.2 HERE]
Coordination failures and exploration as intermediate explanatory mechanisms

To more deeply understand the reasons for the differences in value loss among the
various interdependence pattern-governance mode combinations, we turn next to the
mechanisms that may influence firm performance in an alliance setting, building on
Aggarwal et al.’s (2011) discussion of the role of coordination and exploration in
influencing the performance effects of alliance governance. Figure 3 illustrates the overarching conceptual framework we explore in the remainder of this section: coordination
failures and exploration achieved are intermediate measures that link misspecification,
governance mode and level of interdependence with firm performance in an alliance
setting.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
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Why do we focus in particular on the dimensions of coordination and exploration?
Coordination concerns are pervasive in an alliance context (Litwalk and Hylton, 1962),
influencing governance mode decisions (Gulati and Singh, 1998). The ability to
effectively coordinate activities among alliance partners, moreover, influences alliance
performance (Zollo, Reuer and Singh, 2002; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005). In
addition to effective coordination, exploration is a key determinant of alliance
performance as well (Child, 2001; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf,
2006). We thus aim to understand how interdependence misspecifications, together with
governance modes and actual patterns of interdependence, link to firm performance via
the mediating effects of coordination and exploration.
Constructing the intermediate measures of coordination and exploration.
We construct the measure, coordination failures, which we define, in any given period, to
be the total number of incidences up to and including the current period in which firms (in
total) experience a profit decline as compared to the previous period due to
simultaneous decision making by the two firms. Total (Firm 1 + Firm 2) profit can decline
both because of simultaneous movement of the agents, as well as because of errors in
the search process due to landscape misspecification. We isolate the former by stripping
out situations of search-related error.26 For our analyses in this paper we consider
coordination failures at period 200, which is the point at which the two-firm system has
reached a steady-state level of performance.

Due to differences in the contribution values between the search (𝑀1 ) and true (𝑀0 ) landscapes,
configurations leading to high performance on the search landscape may not lead to high performance on
the true landscape. An agent using a misspecified landscape for search may commit to a policy
configuration that can lead to a decline in performance on the true landscape. We refer to this decline in
performance due to differences in contribution values between the true and search landscapes as “searchrelated error.” We strip out such search-related errors from the measure of coordination failures so that the
measure reflects only situations where agents simultaneously make a choice that may be correct for each
firm individually, but that ends up being performance reducing for the total profits of both firms as a whole.
26
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We also construct the measure exploration achieved by calculating the total
number of unique contribution values (𝐶𝑖 ’s) evaluated by the agents in the system over
time, normalized by the total number of possible contribution values that exist for the
given landscape (Aggarwal et al., 2011).27 The evaluated and total contribution values
used as inputs to our exploration achieved measure come from the true landscape (𝑀0 ),
and are based on the agents’ search history on the misspecified landscape (𝑀1 ). More
precisely, for each policy configuration evaluated by the agents on the search landscape
(𝑀1 ) up to and including the focal period, we take the corresponding configuration on the
true landscape (𝑀0 ) and identify whether the contribution values for that policy
configuration, as derived from the 𝑀0 landscape, have been considered by the agents in
the search process up to and including the focal period.28 We count the total number of
such cases where a particular contribution value has been evaluated, and divide this by
the total number of distinct contribution values based on 𝑀0 . As we do with coordination
failures, we consider exploration achieved in the steady-state at period 200.
Implications of over-specification for intermediate measures. How does
over-specification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and
exploration? In the over-specified case the landscape searched by the agents becomes
more rugged than that of the true landscape. Additionally, values of adjacent locations
on the landscape are less correlated as compared to that of the true landscape. This
increases the number of alternatives the agent considers, as well as the duration of the
27

For instance, the total number of possible contribution values for Pattern 1 is 144, and for Pattern 5 it is
49,152.
28
Note that any given policy configuration will exist on both landscapes (M 0 and M1). However, whether or
not the corresponding contribution values are “distinct” is a function of the interdependence structure of
that landscape (which of course differs between M0 and M1). As an example, suppose we take a simple
system in where there are only two possible binary policy choices {d 1, d2}. When an agent evaluates the
move from the existing policy configuration {0,0} to a new policy configuration {0,1}, the number of
distinct contribution values she considers will differ depending on whether the two policy choices are
interdependent or not. If they are interdependent, then there would be two unique contribution values,
C1(0,1) and C2(0,1), which would be taken into account; if they are not interdependent, then only one
unique contribution value, C2(0,1) would need to be considered.
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search process before an agent locks itself into a policy configuration. While this
increase in the number of alternatives considered leads to a higher degree of exploration
achieved, the increase in search time also leads to higher levels of coordination failure.
With multiple agents searching the landscape at the same time, the chances of
coordination failure increases as policies selected by one agent may not be optimal for
the other. The degree of coordination failures between agents thus depends on the
duration over which agents search the landscape simultaneously.
We report the results of the effect of over-specification on exploration achieved
and coordination failures in the middle two columns of Table 4.3 (falling under the
heading “symmetric view”). Similar to Tables 4.1 & 4.2, we compare the performance
metric (in this case exploration achieved or coordination failures) for the misspecified
case relative to the correctly-specified case at the end of period 200. The table shows
that the overall degree of exploration achieved by the agents increases with the overspecified view. Furthermore, the effect of over-specification is more prominent at
patterns with a higher degree of interdependence, and with the modular and selfgoverning alliance modes. In addition, agents with the over-specified view face a higher
level of coordination failure. For example, under Patterns 3 and 4 with the self-governing
alliance mode, coordination failures increase by 3.5% and 1.6% respectively.
Implications of under-specification for intermediate measures. How does
under-specification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and
exploration? In the under-specified case the search space for the agent is simplified. The
agent searches on a landscape with a lower degree of interdependence that is
consequently less rugged as compared to the true landscape. Each policy on the search
landscape corresponds to a cluster of policies on the actual landscape. This
simplification of the search landscape speeds the agent’s search processes (e.g.,
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Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), enabling the agent to relatively quickly identify a peak with
respect to its search landscape. Thus, the degree of exploration achieved with the
underspecified-view decreases, as Table 4.4 (middle two columns, under the heading
“symmetric view”) reports. The increase in search speed is particularly helpful in
reducing coordination failures: with an increase in search speed agents identify optimal
performance configurations with relatively fewer activity changes, reducing the overall
number of associated coordination failures.
[INSERT TABLES 4.3 AND 4.4 HERE]

Concordance with conceptual framework. Having discussed the implications
of misspecification for coordination and exploration, we now return to Figure 4.3, with the
aim of testing the conceptual framework depicted there. To do so we construct a dataset
based on our simulation results at period 200 with 320,000 observations: we run 10,000
trials for each combination of misspecification-pattern-governance mode combination;
and we then employ seemingly unrelated regression (SUREG) to analyze the results,
using the framework depicted in Figure 4.3. We estimate three equations
simultaneously: (1) the impact of misspecification on exploration achieved; (2) the impact
of misspecification on coordination failures; and (3) the impact of exploration achieved
and coordination failures on total performance. Seemingly unrelated regression
(SUREG) allows for correlation between the error terms of these equations (Zellner,
1962, 1963), a likely situation given the approach used to construct our dataset.
In our SUREG models the variable, misspecification, takes the value of one when
the observation is under a misspecified view, and 0 otherwise. We estimate models for
over- and under- specification separately. To control for the effects of patterns and
governance modes we include dummy variables for these factors. The modular
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governance mode is used as the base mode against which to compare the effects of the
other modes; and Pattern 2 is used as the base pattern against which to compare the
effects of the other patterns.29
Estimated standardized coefficients for the two models (over- and underspecified) are reported in Table 4.5. We do not show p-values of the estimated
coefficients to avoid redundancy, as all the p-values are less than 0.001 (with the
exception of the effect of misspecification on coordination failures in the case of the
over-specified view). As Model 1 shows, the coefficient of misspecification on exploration
is positive, suggesting that over-specification of task structure is associated with higher
exploration. On average, firms with the over-specified view tend to explore more by 0.10
standard deviation. Similarly, in Model 2, the coefficient of misspecification on
coordination failures is negative, suggesting that under-specification is associated with
fewer coordination failures. Though we do not find statistically significant effects of overspecification on coordination failures, we do find that under-specification increases
coordination failures by 0.19 standard deviations. Furthermore, consistent with earlier
research we find that the coefficient of exploration on overall performance is positive,
and the coefficient of coordination failures on overall performance is negative, for both
Model 1 and Model 2. We find that a standard deviation increase in coordination failures
decreases overall performance by -0.21 and -0.37 standard deviations for over- and
under-specification respectively. Similarly we find that a standard deviation increase in
exploration increases overall performance by 0.38 and 0.45 standard deviations for overand under-specification respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE]
29

Since we do not have any observations for Pattern 1 in the case of the under-specified view, and for
Pattern 5 in the case of the over-specified view, we use Pattern 2 as the base pattern, as it is common across
both forms of misspecification.
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Implications for governance mode choice: asymmetric view

In a final set of analyses we consider the situation in which only one partner has either
an under- or over-specified view. The results of the “asymmetric” perspective on
coordination and exploration outcomes are shown in the right two columns of Tables 2A
and 2B (under the heading “asymmetric view”). The asymmetric view is one in which the
focal firm has the correct representation, while the partner has the misspecified view.
These results help address the question of what governance mode managers should
choose (or rather, negotiate for ex ante), conditional on their assessment of their
partners’ likely representation of interdependencies.
As Table 4.3 suggests, if managers believe their partner to be over-specified,
higher levels of exploration can be obtained by selecting the modular governance mode,
and coordination failures can be minimized by selecting the self-governing alliance
mode. If on the other hand managers believe their partner to be under-specified, as
Table 4.4 illustrates, they can minimize exploration losses by using the modular mode
when in a lower interdependence situation (Patterns 2 and 3) and by using the
ratification mode when in a higher interdependence situation (Patterns 4 and 5).
Governance choice thus depends on managers’ understanding of their task structure,
their partner’s level of misspecification, and the ultimate objectives of the alliance
(whether this is firm performance itself, achieving high levels of exploration, or avoiding
coordination failures).

DISCUSSION
Our aim in this paper was to use a computational model to understand the implications
of incorrect managerial representations of inter-firm task interdependencies in the
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context of alliance relationships, focusing on the effects of under- and over-specification
under varying combinations of true inter-firm task interdependence and modes of
alliance governance. We derive three sets of results.
First, we find that managerial misspecification of interdependence structures
leads to a decline in firm performance, a result consistent with prior case-based work
(Doz [1996]; Sosa et al. [2007]). Our results suggest a number of interesting nuances.
We find that while over- and under-specification of interdependence have similar effects
on performance, the degree of value loss due to misspecification varies by governance
mode. The decline in performance is on average lower for the modular and selfgoverning alliance modes. This difference in the effect of misspecification on various
governance modes has important implications. When both firms have a correct
understanding of their interdependencies, the integrated mode provides better
performance at patterns with higher interdependence (Patterns 4 and 5). As we relax the
assumption of a correct understanding, however, we find that the self-governing alliance
mode provides better performance than the integrated mode. The degree to which firms
have an understanding of their underlying interdependencies is thus important in
deciding on the optimal mode of governance.
A second set of results is that the pattern of interdependence has a crucial
impact on the level of decline in alliance performance due to misspecification.
Interestingly, the decline in performance decreases with an increase in the degree of
interdependence in the underlying task structure. As illustrated in Tables 1A and 1B, the
value loss for the alliance is lowest with Patterns 4 and 5 for both forms of
misspecification. We are able to explain these results using the intermediate measures
of coordination and exploration.
Our analysis of these intermediate measures leads to our final set of conclusions,
which relates to the possibly competing objectives relating to coordination and
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exploration. Our study lends insight into the consequences of misspecification for these
two objectives, as we find that the two forms of misspecification affect each differently.
The overall level of exploration achieved by the alliance increases with an over-specified
view; in the case of an under-specified view, however, the overall exploration level
decreases (though with a few exceptions for low complexity patterns). Similarly, we find
that coordination failures increase when both firms share an over-specified view.
Although in the case of the under-specified view coordination failures are limited, they
decline at higher levels of interdependence. This presents an interesting trade-off
between paying attention to firm performance versus other alliance objectives such as
exploration. Firms with an over-specified view of interdependence may achieve higher
exploration, yet trade this off with lower performance. Likewise, with higher levels of
interdependence firms can take on an under-specified view in order to achieve fewer
coordination failures.
From a managerial perspective our results underscore the importance of paying
attention to task interdependencies when structuring alliances. Decision makers should,
in particular, make attempts to identify the true structure of their inter-firm
interdependence. While

estimating

ex ante the

magnitude

and direction

of

misspecification may be difficult, managers may be able to reduce the magnitude of
such errors by investing in efforts to identify the true interdependence structures in
alliances: e.g., pre-alliance discussions and alliance management capabilities can help
reduce the likelihood of any misspecifications. Such investments in understanding the
true structure become particularly important because, as our results suggest, firms’ task
structure representations are significant inputs to the choice of alliance governance
mode.
Before concluding we discuss some of the assumptions embedded in our model,
and their implications for our results. First, our model assumes that both firms are
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symmetric with respect to their views on interdependence. However, it may not be
uncommon to have an alliance where both partners have different views of their
interdependencies. We conducted robustness checks to understand the implications of
this assumption. As noted in our discussion of coordination and exploration, we
evaluated an ‘asymmetric view’ scenario in which only one of the partner firms has an
incorrect view of their interdependence. The overall performance implications were
consistent with our main findings, with the magnitude of value loss decreasing when only
one partner has an incorrect understanding.
As a second assumption embedded in our analysis, note that we pre-specify
firms’ understanding regarding their interdependence structure, and assume that this
remains constant for the entire period (i.e., there is no learning by agents about the true
nature of their interdependence). It is likely, however, that firms update their
understanding based on feedback received over the course of the alliance. While our
purpose in the present paper was solely to examine the implications of relaxing the
assumption of a correct specification of inter-firm task interdependencies (a gap that the
literature has not yet addressed), it would be a natural extension to relax this assumption
and to extend our model in order to study how the process of learning about
interdependencies over time (and possibly modifying the alliance governance structure
accordingly) influences our results.
As a final assumption, note that we use a pre-defined set of patterns of
interdependence to represent task structures and firms’ understanding of these
structures. The current patterns represent discrete points on the continuum of increasing
task complexity. These patterns characterize ideal configuration types that are useful for
exposition; hybrid patterns may arise in reality, however, and future research might thus
examine such patterns. We did run our results using a “random K” scenario to evaluate
the implications of increasing levels of interdependence, where these interdependencies
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were randomly scattered throughout the task matrix. The results on this analysis were
broadly consistent with our findings.
Our paper leads to a number of implications for work in the area of alliance
governance. While the issue of governance structure choice has been examined both
implicitly and explicitly in the alliance literature, with significant progress being made
using empirical indicators, ours is the first effort to attempt to understand the implications
of relaxing the common assumption that managers operate with a “true” representation
of inter-firm interdependencies. Because in practice managers are unlikely to have
perfect ex ante representations of their interdependencies, as we discuss up-front with
the example from Doz (1996), such an assumption is likely to be unrealistic. Using
empirical methods alone, however, is unlikely to allow to us fully address the implications
of interdependence misspecifications, as empirical data is unlikely to be structured so as
to

allow

simultaneous

and

deep

observation

of

managerial

representations,

interdependencies, and governance structures. As a consequence, computational
modeling provides an effective tool with which to examine the implications of managerial
errors in interdependence representations in a structured way. The insights we gain from
our model can complement future empirical work, and more importantly serve to inform
the core theorizing that can guide these future empirical examinations of this topic.
In conclusion, we make an important set of contributions to the literature on
alliance

governance

by

highlighting

how

a

partial

understanding

of

task

interdependencies can be detrimental for alliance performance. We go beyond prior
work to explicitly study the effect of errors on various patterns of interdependence, a task
that would be difficult to accomplish using empirical methods alone. In so doing we
contribute to the literature on governance choice (e.g. Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and
McGahan, 2005), shedding new insights into the link between interdependence,
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governance modes, and firm performance in alliance settings, and offering a promising
set of avenues for future research.
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Figure 4.1: Interaction matrix example
Firm 1

Firm 2
Alliance

A1
A2
N2

Firm 2

Alliance

Firm 1

N1

N1

A1

d1

d2

d3

d4

d1

X

X

X

X

d2

X

X

X

X

d3

X

X

X

X

d4

X

X

X

X

A2

d5

d6

d5

X

X

d6

X

X

N2

d7

d8

d9

d10

d11

d12

d7

X

X

d8
d9

X

X
X

X

X

X

d10

X

X

X

X

d11

X

X

X

X

d12

X

X

X

X

Note: This example corresponds to “Pattern 1” as described in Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Patterns of interdependence
Pattern 2:
Pure alliance
interaction

Pattern 1:
Fully decomposable

N1 A1 A2 N2

Pattern 3:
Firm own-alliance
interaction

N1 A1 A2 N2

N1 A1 A2 N2

N1

N1

N1

A1

A1

A1

A2

A2

A2

N2

N2

N2

Pattern 4:
Firm partner-alliance
interaction

Pattern 5:
Full interdependence

N1 A1 A2 N2

N1 A1 A2 N2

N1

N1

A1

A1

A2

A2

N2

N2

Figure 4.3: Framework for understanding the effect of misspecification

Misspecification

Coordination failures

Firm performance

Governance mode

Pattern of interdependence

Exploration achieved
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Table 4.1: Value loss, over-specified representation
Underlying
pattern
Pattern 1

Pattern 2

Pattern 3

Pattern 4

Governance
mode
Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated
Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated
Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated
Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

Performance with
correct view

Performance with
over-specified view

% value loss

0.991
0.993
0.993
0.989
0.948
0.989
0.989
0.986
0.950
0.932
0.908
0.949
0.884
0.884
0.879
0.922

0.949
0.927
0.912
0.926
0.771
0.842
0.802
0.785
0.783
0.793
0.765
0.763
0.747
0.845
0.803
0.816

-4.1%
-6.8%
-8.0%
-6.4%
-18.6%
-15.0%
-18.8%
-20.0%
-17.0%
-14.9%
-15.2%
-19.5%
-14.8%
-4.6%
-8.3%
-11.3%

Table 4.2: Value loss, under-specified representation
Underlying
pattern
Pattern 2

Pattern 3

Pattern 4

Pattern 5

Governance
mode

Performance with
correct view

Performance with
over-specified view

% value loss

0.944
0.990

0.921
0.928

-2.6%

Self-Governing
Ratification

0.990

0.918

-7.2%

Integrated

0.985

0.919

-6.6%

Modular

0.950

0.773

-19.1%

Self-Governing

0.931

0.773

-17.3%

Ratification

0.902

0.770

-15.6%

Integrated

0.949

0.751

-21.6%

Modular

0.873
0.884

0.745
0.795

-15.6%

Self-Governing
Ratification

0.877

0.755

-14.7%

Integrated

0.927

0.749

-19.0%

Modular

0.747

7.8%

Self-Governing

0.828

0.808
0.829

-1.0%

Ratification

0.780
0.910

0.757

-2.5%

0.823

-9.5%

Modular

Integrated

-6.2%

-10.3%

Note: Values in bold indicate the governance mode providing superior performance for each combination of
pattern and managerial representation (either correct or misspecified). For example, in Table 4.1, with the
combination of [Pattern 1, Correct View], both the self-governing and ratification modes provide the highest
performance.
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Table 4.3: Changes in coordination and exploration, over-specified representation
Symmetric view

Underlying
pattern

Governance
mode

Pattern 1

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

0.9%
3.4%
2.3%
1.6%

Pattern 2

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

Pattern 3

Pattern 4

Exploration

Coordination

Asymmetric view
Exploration

Coordination

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.7%
-0.9%
-0.6%
-

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-

0.6%
5.3%
0.5%
1.8%

-14.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

1.6%
0.3%
0.3%
-

-5.6%
0.0%
0.0%
-

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

7.7%
9.4%
0.2%
3.7%

0.1%
3.5%
6.2%
0.0%

2.6%
0.9%
-0.3%
-

2.4%
1.0%
5.9%
-

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

3.4%
0.5%
0.3%
1.6%

-0.5%
1.6%
3.9%
0.0%

0.7%
0.4%
0.0%
-

2.5%
0.9%
4.1%
-

Table 4.4: Changes in coordination and exploration, under-specified
representation
Underlying
pattern

Governance
mode

Symmetric view
Exploration

Asymmetric view

Coordination

Exploration

Coordination

Pattern 2

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

-1.4%
0.6%
0.1%
-1.2%

-11.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

-0.5%
-1.6%
-1.4%
-

-10.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-

Pattern 3

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

2.3%
-1.8%
1.3%
3.0%

1.1%
3.4%
5.1%
0.0%

0.1%
-0.8%
0.1%
-

1.0%
0.5%
3.6%
-

Pattern 4

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

-2.1%
-0.6%
0.0%
1.1%

-11.0%
2.4%
4.6%
0.0%

-1.8%
-0.5%
-0.1%
-

-8.7%
0.1%
0.9%
-

Pattern 5

Modular
Self-Governing
Ratification
Integrated

-2.6%
-1.3%
-0.6%
0.0%

-24.3%
-1.1%
-13.9%
0.0%

-1.7%
-0.9%
-0.4%
-

-17.6%
-1.8%
-12.1%
-
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Table 4.5: Effect of misspecification on exploration, coordination failure and total
profits
Dependent variable

Exploration

Coord. failures

Performance

Independent variable
(all dummy variables
except for constant)
Misspecification
Self-governing
Ratification
Integrated
Pattern 1
Pattern 3
Pattern 4
Pattern 5
Constant
2
R
Misspecification
Self-governing
Ratification
Integrated
Pattern 1
Pattern 3
Pattern 4
Pattern 5
Constant
2
R
Exploration
Coordination failures
Misspecification
Self-governing
Ratification
Integrated
Constant
2
R
Observations

Model 1
(Over-specification)
0.098
-0.147
-0.234
1.055
0.293
-1.053
-1.629
0.379
0.874
0.003
-0.694
-0.600
-0.768
-0.278
-0.077
0.282
0.532
0.132
0.383
-0.212
-1.116
0.116
-0.005
-0.423
0.636
0.413
320,000

Model 2
(Under-specification)
-0.009
-0.221
-0.250
0.787
-1.328
-1.958
-1.988
1.244
0.818
-0.193
-0.801
-0.561
-0.916
-0.081
0.117
0.478
0.537
0.179
0.459
-0.375
-0.830
0.012
-0.127
-0.445
0.555
0.390
320,000

Note: All independent variables are dummy variables, except for exploration, coordination
failures, and the constant. The misspecification dummy variable refers to the over-specified view
for Model 1 and to the under-specified view for Model 2.
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5. DISCUSSION
This final section concludes by summarizing the core results from three essays
and discussing their contribution to theory and practice. Together, the three essays had
the broad objective of systematically examining the structure of interdependencies that
underlie the success of a firm’s innovative efforts, particularly in the context of platformbased ecosystems. The dissertation starts with the premise that firms are situated in a
complex web of interdependencies that often lies outside their boundaries. It then builds
on this premise to offer novel characterizations of these interdependence structures
based on the interaction between a firm’s products and other elements of the ecosystem
and to explore how these characterizations help explain firms’ performance dynamics.
The first essay takes a granular view of the interdependence structure and starts
with examining the interdependencies that lie at the level of a firm’s innovation. It
conceptualizes a platform-based ecosystem as an interconnected technological system
in which a firm’s innovation interacts with the platform and other complements to create
value. It introduces the notion of ‘connectedness’ to describe an innovation’s
interdependence with other elements in the ecosystem. It explicitly distinguishes
between an innovation’s connectedness with the platform and other complements. In so
doing, it examines how these two types of connectedness help firms leverage
complementarities from the ecosystem, as well as create challenges that may limit an
innovation’s value creation. In the context of the Apple iPhone ecosystem, I find that the
higher connectedness with the platform and complements increases the likelihood of
successful commercialization. However, the benefit of platform connectedness is
negated during the initial periods of the new generation of the platform. The effect of
complement connectedness during the initial periods of the new generation of the
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platform is more nuanced and varies with the extent to which the connected complement
is interdependent on the platform itself.
The second essay zooms out to the interdependencies that lie at the level of an
ecosystem and are primarily driven by the structural properties of the ecosystem.
Specifically, it examines how the ecosystem-level interdependencies, characterized by
the number of components that interact with a firm’s product, shape the extent to which
complementors can sustain their value creation. The empirical context is Apple’s iOS
and Google’s Android ecosystems, which provides a nice opportunity to study
complementors’ dynamics in ecosystems with varying levels of interdependence.
Overall, I find that greater ecosystem complexity helps firms sustain their value creation.
Further, the firms’ ability to sustain superior performance is facilitated by their experience
within the ecosystem, but hampered by transitions initiated by platform firms.
While the first two essays are focused on the structure of interdependencies in
explaining firm performance, the third chapter takes a more behavioral perspective and
addresses the implications of a partial understanding of these interdependence
structures by decision makers. I use a computational model to understand the
implications of over- and underrepresentation of interfirm task interdependencies in the
context of the alliance relationships. The results suggest that both types of
misrepresentation of task structure are, on average, detrimental to alliance performance.
However, the degree of value loss varies by governance mode. The decline in
performance is lower for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. Interestingly, I
also find that the decline in performance decreases with an increase in the degree of
interdependence in the underlying task structure.
Collectively, these essays make several theoretical and empirical contributions to
the strategy and innovation literatures. First, this dissertation contributes to the emerging
strategy literature on platforms and ecosystems by providing a detailed account of
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interdependencies that exist within an ecosystem (e.g., Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner
and Kapoor, 2010, 2014; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Kapoor, 2013). Scholars studying
platforms have focused on the strategies used by platform firms to attract
complementors and to compete against rival platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002;
Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et al.; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).
In this dissertation, I look at the other side of the phenomenon, beyond the platform
firms, and illustrate how the performance of complementor firms is shaped by the
structure of interdependencies faced by them within the ecosystem. I show that
complementor firms can enhance the value of their innovations by leveraging a broad
set of complementary technologies provided by platform and other complementor firms,
but they must consider the platform-level generational transitions that may offset the
benefits. This finding provides practical implications to both the platform firms and the
complementor firms. From the platform firm’s perspective, a platform firm can increase
opportunities for value creation for the complementor firms by integrating additional
components along with the core module of the platform. From the complementor firms’
perspective, they can increase the utility of their innovation for the users by connecting it
with additional platform components and other complements available in the ecosystem.
Further, I also show that the sustainability of a complementor firm’s performance is
driven by the number of components that its product interacts with within the ecosystem.
This finding highlights how platform firms’ strategies with respect to the design of the
platform architecture and governance of the ecosystem can shape complementor firms’
performance.
Further, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on technological
change, which is typically premised on how technological transitions impact the
performance of firms in the focal industry (e.g., Tushman and Anderson, 1986;
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997). In this dissertation, I show how
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technology transitions initiated by platform firms can impact the performance of
complementor

firms

within

an

ecosystem.

It

highlights

that

technological

interdependencies between platform firms and complementors in related industries can
have important consequences for complementors during periods of platform transitions.
Relatedly, the evidence in the study also points to the difficulties of coordinating
technology transitions at the level of the ecosystem. Even if platform firms intend to
create a smooth generational transition for all of their complementors, the system-level
interdependencies and technological uncertainties make such coordination difficult.
This dissertation also makes an important set of contributions to the literature on
alliance

governance

by

highlighting

how

a

partial

understanding

of

task

interdependencies can be detrimental to alliance performance. It goes beyond prior work
to explicitly study the effect of errors on various patterns of interdependence—a task that
would be difficult to accomplish using empirical methods alone. In so doing, it contributes
to the literature on governance choice (e.g., Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan,
2005), shedding new insights into the link between interdependence, governance
modes, and firm performance in alliance settings and offering a promising set of
avenues for future research.
Finally, I also briefly note several avenues for future research given the
theoretical and empirical results of the essays in this dissertation. While this dissertation
is a first attempt to shed light on the microstructures of interdependencies that exist in a
platform-based ecosystem, it has not accounted for the vast heterogeneity that exists
with respect to the interdependent elements. For example, in the case of an iPhone
ecosystem, an app interacts with different actors present in the ecosystem, such as
handset providers and wireless providers. These actors differ from one another in many
aspects, such as their added value in the ecosystem and their bargaining power. In
future work, I hope to further characterize the structure of interdependencies introduced
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in this dissertation by explicitly taking into account these differences. Finally, while I
show the role of the structure of interdependencies in value creation, it would be
important to understand how these interdependencies arise and evolve over time. In
future work, I also hope to explicitly consider firm-level factors to understand how they
drive the benefits and challenges posed by the interdependence structures that firms are
subjected to in an ecosystem.
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